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Preface
Circumstances often create opportunity. This book would not have been
possible without two developments. The first development has been the
remarkable improvement in agricultural production that Russia has expe-
rienced since 2004. The increase in production has provided food security,
allowed import substitution, and increased food self-sufficiency. A second
development is the Russian government’s commitment to extend food
policy beyond food security and self-sufficiency and to become a seafood
and food exporter. In particular, the emergence of Russia as a major grain
exporter is one of the major story lines in the past decade. In 2004, not
many people would have predicted that Russia would be a major player
in the international agri-food system within a decade.
The purpose of this book is to assess contemporary Russia’s role in the
international agri-food system, which includes fish and seafood. During
the Soviet period, the world was accustomed to Russia as a grain importer.
During the 1990s, Russia decreased its grain imports but became the
world’s largest poultry importer. Despite Russia’s turn toward protec-
tionism since 2010, Russia has not withdrawn from the international food
trade system, but rather has enhanced its international role, and become
an active player in the system as both a food importer and exporter.
The origins of this book were rather serendipitous. Frode Nilssen,
Christel Elvestad, and I have been working together since 2015 on various
projects related to Russia’s food policy and food trade. In May 2019, I
took a quick trip to Bodø, Norway to discuss what was next for us, and
v
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during the course of an afternoon brainstorming session we came up with
the outlines of a book project. During the next several weeks and months,
Frode and I developed the ideas further and began to put the project
together, including a proposal to Palgrave Macmillan, which subsequently
was accepted.
Nord University has been especially generous in providing financial
support that helped bring this book to fruition. It funded a workshop
for contributors that was to be held in Brussels in March 2020 that
subsequently had to be canceled due to Covid-19 and international travel
restrictions. Nord University also provided funding for the index, and it
funded Open Access so that more readers are able to benefit from our
collective research. We are very grateful to the university for its generous
support.
We acknowledge and thank two anonymous reviewers for their
comments and suggestions for improvement. We thank the contributors
who put aside their own work to write a chapter for this volume. Finally,
we thank Ruth Jenner for supporting this project and including it in
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Introduction: Is Russia’s Role
in the International Agri-Food System
Sustainable?
Stephen K. Wegren and Frode Nilssen
1 Introduction
This book examines Russia’s role in the contemporary international agri-
food system. For several decades Russia’s role in the global food trade
system was as food importer because the Soviet command economy had
difficulty keeping food shelves full or providing adequate choice for urban
consumers. In the contemporary period, Russia remains a significant
food importer by dollar value, but its role has evolved since 2000 as
Russia’s food production has rebounded. If Russia as a food importer
is the old story, a new development has occurred that makes this book
relevant. Twenty years ago, Russia’s agricultural recovery was only begin-
ning and the country was not a significant food exporter. In recent years,
Russia has returned to its historical role as a major food exporter. During
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1909–1913, for example, Russia was Europe’s largest grain exporter,
and its grain exports accounted for 30 percent of the world’s grain
exports.1 Since 2010, Russia has become a major wheat exporter, ranking
either first or second in wheat exports by volume during 2014–2020.
Grain importing countries and regions around the world have a stake
in Russia role in the international food market. In calender year 2020,
more than 130 countries imported Russian grain, and for the 2020/2021
agricultural year 125 nations are expected to import food from Russia.2
Russia’s agricultural rebound has led to a qualitative and quantita-
tive change in its role in the international agri-food trade system, and
subsequent chapters explore different dimensions of that occurrence. But
is Russia’s rise to a prominent player as both a significant importer
and exporter sustainable? The purpose of this introductory chapter is
to examine this core question, with a timeframe covering the next 10–
15 years. In the sections below we discuss the variables that affect Russia’s
trade sustainability. We adopt a macro-view and make no attempt to
predict actual levels or values of food imports and exports.
2 Prospects for Sustainability
as an Agri-Food Importer
A country becomes a food importer for a variety of economic and polit-
ical reasons. For example, common reasons for importing include: trading
opportunities via a regional free trade agreement; economic advantages
of importing that allow allocation of resources to other purposes; the
building or maintenance of international alliances; the constellation of
political interests within a nation that favour imports; the political philos-
ophy of an administration in power that may favour open trade; and a host
of other economic and political reasons.3 Being a food importer does not
necessarily connote deficiencies in domestic production or an inability to
feed its population, although in some countries those factors are certainly
relevant. Importing companies may discover a new product from abroad
that they think will sell domestically. Or perhaps a company detects an
unfulfilled market niche. An example of a country that imports food but
is not food deficient in the United States, which is the largest importer
of food in the world by dollar value, but it is also one of the world’s
largest food producers by volume. The United States, for example, in
2017 imported more than $137 billion in food and beverages, or almost
five times the dollar value as in Russia in that same year.4 At the same
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time, the United States has a high per capita caloric intake, more than
3,600 calories a day, and the United States is the world’s leading food
exporter by dollar value. Thus, being a food importer does not have to
mean that a country is food deficient.
In the post-Soviet period, four main trends characterise Russia’s agri-
food imports since 1992. The first three trends are well-known. First,
there has been a change in the composition of Russia’s imports from
grain imports in the early 1990s to meat products by mid-decade and
continuing into the 2000s (see Chapter 2). Meat import levels continue
to decline and since about 2010 Russia’s meat imports have declined from
about 2.5 million tonnes per year to 600,000 tonnes in 2020. The emer-
gence of vegetarian ‘meat’ should not have a major impact on the demand
for real meat within Russia.5
Second, there was a rise in the dollar value of Russia’s agri-food
imports from 2000 to 2013, although the increase was not linear due
to variable economic conditions. Russia’s population, the largest among
European nations, suggests that its food market will remain attractive for
domestic and foreign business. Third, Russia’s food embargo in 2014
led to a decrease in the dollar value of its agri-food imports. The dollar
value of Russia’s food imports has increased from its low in 2016 ($25.1
billion USD), but remains far below the peak year 2013 when imports
were valued at $43.2 billion USD. During 2018–2020, for example, the
dollar value of Russia’s food imports was under $30 billion USD.
The fourth trend, which is less well-known, is that the share of Russia’s
agri-food imports as a percentage of total imports has declined signif-
icantly since 2000 even though the dollar value of food imports rose,
thereby reflecting the fact that the import of non-food products was
increasing faster than food imports. In short, food imports have become
less important to the national economy. The decline in the share of
agri-food imports as a percentage of total imports is shown in Table 1.
The table shows that the share of Russia’s food imports to total imports
declined during 2000–2013 even as the dollar value of food imports was
increasing. This trend was due to an impressive increase in domestic food
output. Since 2014, the ratio of food imports to total imports contin-
uously fell due to import substitution policy. The decline in the share
of food imports was also due to a lower-cost structure of food imports
because Russia has changed its trading partners from the European Union
(EU) to China and other non-Western nations where production costs are
lower. The upshot of the table is that Russia over time has become more
4 S. K. WEGREN AND F. NILSSEN
Table 1 Russia’s food imports as percentage of its total imports (billion USD)
Dollar value of total
commodity imports





2000 $33.9 billion $7.3 billion 21.5
2005 $98.7 billion $17.4 billion 17.6
2010 $229.0 billion $36.3 billion 15.8
2012 $317.2 billion $40.6 billion 12.8
2013 $315.2 billion $43.2 billion 13.7
2014 $297.0 billion $39.9 billion 13.4
2015 $182.9 billion $26.2 billion 14.3
2016 $182.2 billion $25.1 billion 13.8
2017 $227.8 billion $28.9 billion 12.7
2018 $238.4 billion $29.7 billion 12.4
2019 $254.5 billion $29.9 billion 11.8
2020 $239.7 billion $29.4 billion 12.2
Note Percentages have been rounded
Sources Rosstat, Rossiiskii statisticheskii ezhegodnik, various years; author’s calculations
food self-sufficient in the production of certain basic commodities (see
Chapter 4).
It is likely that Russia will remain a significant food importer simply
because some of the products it imports cannot be grown in Russia. Being
an importer is a natural condition for large-population nations, and with
more than 146 million people Russia represents the largest single-country
food market in Europe. Large-population countries import food even if
they are generally food secure. Russia ranks in the top ten countries for
food imports based on dollar value, trailing large-population nations such
as the United States, China, Germany, Japan, and France. Thus, Russia
will remain an agri-food importer, but here we note that the structure of
Russia’s agri-food imports has changed and will likely continue to evolve
as shown in Table 2.
The table reflects the impact of food policy in terms of reducing
imports for some commodities. Specifically, the dollar value of imported
meat (exclusive of poultry meat) fell and its ranking based on dollar
value dropped from 1st in 2005 to 3rd in 2018; the dollar value of
imported poultry meat was halved and its ranking dropped from 4th to
9th; and the dollar value of imported raw sugar fell dramatically and its
ranking dropped from 5th to 10th during the same period. Significant
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Table 2 Top 10 commodities in Russia’s agri-food imports by dollar value,
2005–2018 (USD)






$1.5 billion $2.2 billion $1.7 billion $2.6 billion 2/1
Apples, fresh $297 million $669 million $387 million $518 million 8/6
Bananas $451 million $704 million $910 million $1.1 billion 7/5
Butter $245 million $504 million $311 million $432 million 10/8
Citrus fruits $484 million $1.2 billion $1.2 billion $1.2 billion 6/4
Fish and
seafood




$1.9 billion $4.7 billion $2.4 billion $1.4 billion 1/3
Milk and
cream
$247 million $795 million $598 million $503 million 9/7
Poultry meat $865 million $940 million $365 million $364 million 4/9
Raw sugar $744 million $1.1 billion $191 billion $4.9 million 5/10
Notes
a2005 is used as base year for top 10 commodities
bcommodities are listed alphabetically
ccitrus includes fresh and frozen
dfish and seafood include fresh and frozen
emeat includes fresh and frozen
fmilk and cream include condensed and non-condensed
Sources Rosstat, Rossiiskii statisticheskii ezhegodnik, various years
increases in the value of imports and a rise in rankings occurred for fresh
apples, butter, citrus fruit, fish and seafood, and milk and cream. Alcoholic
and non-alcoholic drinks remained a large-value import throughout the
2005–2018 period. Given the priorities of state food policy, we expect
that the value of imported meat and poultry meat to decline in the
future. In the sections below, we discuss several variables that impact the
sustainability of Russia’s agri-food imports going forward, presented in
alphabetical order.
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2.1 Food Production
The Russian government has been explicitly concerned with food produc-
tion levels since 2008 when its first food security doctrine was drafted and
subsequently adopted in 2010. Since then, food security has been a core
principle in Russia’s food policy, although usage of the term food security
by Russian policymakers has a dual meaning, referring to trade protec-
tionism and self-sufficiency as well as the more traditional meaning of
adequate caloric intake.6
For the past decade, in order to fulfil the goals of the 2010 Food Secu-
rity Doctrine, the volume of raw food production has increased thereby
creating more supply for Russian processors and exporters, and reducing
the need for imports of several commodities. Domestic production of
pork and poultry meat currently meets domestic demand, which means
that Russia is basically self-sufficient. Domestic poultry meat production
has increased from 3.4 million tonnes in 2009 (90 percent of which
produced by farm enterprises) to 4.9 million tonnes in 2019 (91 percent
from farm enterprises).7 Russia has become self-sufficient in poultry meat
and started to export. Through the first ten months of 2020, poultry
meat exports were about 280 thousand tonnes which ranked Russia 11th
in the world, and equalled a 33 percent increase over the same period in
2019.8
Russia’s pork production rose from an average of 2.7 million tonnes
during 2011–2015 to 3.7 million tonnes in 2018. In 2019, Russia
became self-sufficient in pork production.9 At its annual meeting in
November 2020, the National Union of Pork Producers noted that the
combination of Russia’s 25 percent import tariff and rising international
pork prices due to African Swine Flu curtailed Russia’s pork imports by
93 percent.10 In 2020, Russian analysts argued that for the first time in
30 years, Russia will be essentially import-free, in comparison to the mid-
2000s when imports comprised 50 percent of consumption.11 By 2025,
Russia’s pork production is forecast to reach 6 million tonnes, 1.5 times
the level of 2019.12 With the expected increase in pork production, the
need for imports will disappear and exports should increase. Pork exports
were around 143 thousand tonnes in 2019 and were projected to reach
200 thousand tonnes in 2020.
Other branches of animal products are trending positively too. There
are indicators that production in the beef sector may be ending after a
25 year slump, as the rate of decline in number of cattle has slowed.13 A
tariff-rate quota on beef imports has been in place since 2003. The quota
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will be retained for 2021, but starting in January 2022 the tariff-rate
quota on imported beef may be replaced by a flat tariff of 27.5 percent.14
That policy change is expected to lead to a retail price increase of up to
one-third, which, if occurs, will put downward pressure on demand and
lower the need for beef imports. Higher retail prices should also attract
investors and perhaps lead to higher domestic production.
After many years of decline, domestic milk production increased in
2017, 2018, and 2019. In 2020, raw milk production exceeded 32
million tonnes, up from its low of 29.8 million tonnes in 2016, and
equal to meet 84 percent of national demand.15 The target in the
January 2020 version of Russia’s Food Security Doctrine is 90 percent
of demand.16 Russian experts expect that when the food embargo ends,
Russia will no longer need to import milk from the European Union
(even assuming that supply chains could be reestablished, which have
already been disrupted for seven years).17 The point is that positive
production trends in Russia’s animal husbandry put downward pressure
on the need for imports.
In addition, domestic vegetable production is supported by a rise in
greenhouse vegetables, which more than doubled in volume from 2013
to 2019. In 2019, greenhouse vegetable production reached about 1.3
million tonnes and was estimated at 1.4 million tonnes in 2020. Produc-
tion is on track to reach 2 million tonnes by 2024.18 The rise in domestic
vegetable production is reducing vegetable imports. In 2019, Russia
imported 558 thousand tonnes of tomatoes and about 100 thousand
tonnes of cucumbers. By 2025 those volumes are expected to decrease
to 347 thousand tonnes and 36 thousand tonnes, respectively.19
2.2 Constraints on Food Production
Going forward, we identify three variables that will affect Russia’s food
production. First, Serova argues that the ‘resource curse’ affects Russia,
by which she argues that ‘the availability of vast land and water resources
and relative biodiversity do not yet pose an urgent need for the country to
preserve’.20 Environmental degradation is widespread, evidenced by soil
leached of its nutrients; wind erosion; streams, rivers, and ponds polluted
with animal waste; rivers fowled with chemical runoff; and a degradation
in soil biodiversity. Although Russia has a large amount of agricultural
land (in 2019, Russia had 193.3 million hectares of agricultural land, of
which 115.7 hectares were arable, and 79.6 million hectares were sown),
it faces a range of problems related to land use: 20 percent of agricultural
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land has saline soils, 18 percent is subject to water erosion, 12 percent
is marshland, and 8 percent is subject to wind erosion.21 Russia’s federal
government adopted a land reclamation project that ran 2014–2020 with
the goal to improve more than 3 million hectares by draining, irrigating,
and repairing irrigation systems. By 2025, the Ministry of Agriculture
hopes to bring back into production 4 million hectares of arable land
that previously was abandoned or unused land, which it claims will add
1 million tonnes of grain production.22 The problem is that formerly
unused land has lower yields per hectare and is more expensive per unit
of output.
Second, the country lacks a national strategy for food losses. Food
loss is defined as a decrease in quantity or quality along the supply chain
and this loss affects the amount of food that is available to consumers.23
Serova notes that in some branches of Russian agriculture food losses
reach 40 percent of output, which means that resources are used to
produce food that is never consumed.24 For context, throughout Europe
in 2016, post-harvest food losses averaged just over 15 percent.25 The
implication for Russia is that food losses need to be remedied, but Serova
argues that Russia’s taxation system is an obstacle.
Third, the financial aspect is important. The rise in Russia’s food
production correlates with an increase in state financial assistance to agri-
culture, including credits, loans, subsidies, and investment. Private sector
investment also increased as the agricultural sector became profitable, but
state assistance has led the way. Russian state assistance has not come
close to the level of state support in the United States or EU. Moreover,
companies involved in production, processing, storage, and transporta-
tion expect state assistance. We cite just two examples from 2020. In
December 2020 the State Duma considered a first reading of bill for
a new state insurance policy for 2021. The government is interested
in increasing the participation in crop and animal insurance due to the
frequency of weather anomalies that can have devastating financial effects
(see Sect. 3.2 below). In the proposed new system, federal subsidies for
insurance premiums will double from the R2.2 billion level of funding
in 2020. In addition, the state will pay 80 percent of the insurance
premiums for small and medium-sized farms. For other farms, the state
will pay 80 percent of the first year’s insurance premium, which in subse-
quent years would decline to 50 percent of the premium.26 The second
example also comes from December 2020 when the Ministry of Agricul-
ture suggested to compensate grain millers for their grain purchases, up
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to 50 percent of the difference between current domestic market prices
and the average price for the previous three years during a comparable
time period, adjusted for inflation.27 Put in perspective, financial trends
in agriculture could be worrisome in that expectations may exceed capa-
bility. Depressed oil prices and the economic effects of the pandemic led
the Russian government to lower its budget allocation to agriculture in
2021 to R256 billion, down from R308 billion in 2020.28
2.3 Knowledge-Based Innovation
Knowledge-based innovation in the agricultural sector affects food
production and food imports. Although there are indicators of a nascent
technology boom in Russia’s agriculture through the introduction of
automation and robotics on farms, pilotless driver equipment, and other
‘smart’ technology, Russia remains far behind agri-firms in the West. A
big reason for Russia’s disadvantage is a severe generation gap in its
agricultural sciences, exacerbated by the fact that during the 1990s the
influx of a new generation of scholars into science declined dramatically.
In addition to a deficit in human and intellectual capital in the agricul-
tural sciences, state funding for agricultural sciences is only a fraction
received by other branches in the economy. Serova notes that the planning
horizon for Russia’s agribusiness companies is four to five years whereas
the research and development cycle of new technology can span 12–
20 years.29 The takeaway is that bridging the technology gap may increase
efficiency, lower production costs, reduce loss and waste, and therefore
may contribute to reduce food imports, but this is not something that
will happen in the near term.
The economic power of agricultural science is seen by the rebound in
food production that has been greatly augmented by increases in yield per
hectare, milk output per cow, and meat yield per cow, results that come
from greater use of high-yield seeds and animals. Russia imports most
of its high-yield animals at present. To help boost domestic production,
Russia’s federal government exempted the import of high-yield pedigree
cattle from the value-added tax starting in 2016, which was to last to the
end of 2020. In November 2020, President Vladimir Putin signed into
law an extension for the tax exclusion through 2022.30
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2.4 Per Capita Income and Value of the Ruble
The value of the ruble against the dollar, which as the international
currency is used for most trade transactions, is an influential factor that
affects import levels. During 2014–2015, for example, the devaluation
of the ruble against the U.S. dollar made imported food more expensive
and, combined with a drop in real per capita income, contributed to a
decline in the value of Russia’s food imports (see Table 1). Russia’s aggre-
gate value of food imports will continue to be affected by the value of the
ruble and trends in per capita income. If the value of the ruble falls against
the dollar, Russian importers face higher import bills and may be cautious
due to uncertainty over the ability to sell more expensive products.
2.5 Politicalisation of Food Trade Policy
Recent years have witnessed the politicalisation of Russia’s food policy.
The Russian government’s definition of food security is very narrow,
referring to production of several basic commodities. But upon closer
examination it becomes obvious that the Russian version of food security,
i.e., lessened dependence on imports, is far from reality. Despite official
proclamations of food security, Russia imports a high percentage of its
seeds; high percentages of farm machinery and equipment are imported;
high percentages of pedigree livestock are imported; and foreign agri-
firms have a substantial presence in food processing and market share in
food retailing. All of these factors are central to a nation’s food security,
suggesting that the government’s narrow fixation on the production of a
few commodities does not offer a complete view of Russia’s actual food
security. In addition, political leaders’ expressed concerns over food inse-
curity have been used as political symbolism rather than an indicator of
inadequate food consumption among Russian consumers.31
In Russia, the term ‘food security’ is politicised to justify trade protec-
tionism. Food import policy has been politicised in the form of counter-
sanctions, originally introduced in August 2014 but extended through
2022 by presidential decree in September 2021.32 This protectionist
policy tool has been used to rally nationalist feelings and anti-Western
sentiment. Moreover, Russia’s food trade in general has been politi-
cised.33 This occurrence is reflected by numerous temporary import
limitations on milk and dairy exports from Belarus, or outright food
import bans against former Soviet republics such as Ukraine since 2016,
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or Uzbekistan in 2020.34 Russia has also waged a hot and cold ‘tomato
war’ with Turkey that witnessed a ban on tomato imports from November
2015 to November 2017 when the ban was completely lifted (although
restrictions were partially lifted starting in fall 2016). From May 2018 the
ban was replaced with an import quota on Turkish tomatoes, originally
set at 50,000 tonnes during the winter months, but the quota was gradu-
ally increased several times.35 In 2020 a disagreement arose over Turkey’s
import tariffs on sunflower seed and oil.36 The point is that ‘objective’
factors such as the level of food production and population trends are not
the sole drivers of Russia’s food imports. Objective factors send signals to
Russia’s food market, but decisions about country origins of food imports
and import levels are also based on political calculations.
2.6 Population and Food Consumption
A final variable that affects food imports is the size of the population and
its demographic characteristics. In Russia’s case, according to government
estimates, the total population is projected to decline slightly from 147.1
million in 2018 to 146.9 million in 2036, but the urban population will
increase from 109.3 million to 114.0 million during that same period.37
The rising number of urban residents is accompanied by higher levels of
per capita food consumption among urban consumers. While the size of
the urban working-age cohort is expected to decrease slightly from 62.1
million in 2017 to 61.3 million in 2030, higher food consumption levels
may offset the decline.38 At the same time, Russia’s population is aging
and life expectancy is not high compared to other developed states. As
the Russian population continues to age and a higher percentage becomes
too old to work, there will be downward pressure on demand for food
imports.
3 Prospects for Sustainability
as an Agri-Food Exporter
While Russia has long been a net food importer, its role as a substan-
tial exporter in the international food trade system is relatively new.
The Ministry of Agriculture claims that Russia exported its grain to 138
nations in the world in 2020.39 Russia’s rise to significance has been rapid
in recent years, leading President Vladimir Putin in 2018 to decree that
the dollar value of food exports should reach $45 billion USD by 2024.40
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A general increase in the dollar value of Russia’s food exports has occurred
since 2000, as shown in Table 3, and this trend is expected to continue.
Data from the Russia’s Ministry of Agriculture show that in 2020 Russia’s
agri-food exports equalled $28.9 billion USD, a 18 percent increase over
the same period in 2019. Grain exports accounted for $9.7 billion USD;
fish and seafood exports were second at $5.2 billion USD; oilseed was
in third place at $4.6 billion USD; and processed foods were in fourth
place at $4.1 billion USD. Currently about 6 percent of Russia poultry
meat and pork production is exported, but Andrei Dal’nov, an analyst
at Rossel’khozbank, believes that meat exports will reach 10 percent of
output. If new markets can be opened, meat exports could reach 1 million
metric tonnes a year.41 In 2020, China was the single largest importer of
Russia’s agri-food products with a value of $3.9 billion USD, with fish
and seafood the single largest category at $1.5 billion USD; followed
by the European Union at $3.2 billion USD, with fish and seafood the
Table 3 Russia’s food exports as percentage of its total exports (billion USD)
Dollar value of total
commodity exports





2000 $103.0 billion $1.6 billion 1.5
2005 $241.4 billion $4.4 billion 1.8
2010 $397.0 billion $9.4 billion 2.4
2012 $524.7 billion $16.8 billion 3.2
2013 $525.9 billion $16.2 billion 3.0
2014 $497.3 billion $19.8 billion 3.9
2015 $343.5 billion $17.0 billion 4.9
2016 $285.6 billion $17.8 billion 6.2
2017 $357.7 billion $21.6 billion 6.0
2018 $449.5 billion $24.9 billion 5.5
2019 $426.0 billion $24.8 billionb 5.8
2020 $336.3 billiond $30.4 billionc 9.0
Notes
aBased on dollar value of exports. Percentages have been rounded
bDollar value of food exports in 2019 is from the federal customs agency. The ministry of
agriculture’s data is a bit higher at $25.6 billion
cDollar value of food exports in 2020 is from the federal customs agency. The ministry of agriculture’s
data for exports is a bit lower at $28.9 2020 is from the federal customs agency
Sources Rosstat, Rossiiskii statisticheskii ezhegodnik, various years; Ministry of agriculture export
data (https://mcx.gov.ru/ministry/departments/departament-informatsionnoy-politiki-i-spetsialnykh-
proektov/industry-information/info-operativnaya-statistika/); author’s calculations
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single largest category at $1 billion USD; and Turkey in third place at
$3.0 billion USD, with grains the single largest commodity at $1.7 billion
USD.42 Together, those three countries account for about 36 percent of
the total dollar value of Russia’s agri-food exports.43
The table shows an upward trend in Russia’s food exports in dollar
value and in percent of total exports, rising from 1.5 percent of total
exports in 2000 to 9 percent in 2020 (based on data from the Federal
Customs Agency). That said, food exports continue to have a small share
in overall export revenue, a theme discussed in more detail in Chapter 3.
Oil and gas and other mineral exports will remain Russia’s primary gener-
ators of revenue from exports for the next decade at least, although
Aleksei Kudrin predicts that during the 2030s other Russian exports will
become more important due to the decline in global demand for oil and
other fossil fuels in the effort to combat climate change.44 To a significant
degree, the increase in the share of agri-food exports is due to a decline
in total commodity exports.
To be sure, Putin’s $45 billion USD food export target was always as
much about political signalling as it was economics. After the May 2018
decree, a political campaign mobilised regional leaders who were expected
to draw up plans to increase food exports and to report on fulfilment
towards the target. But politics cannot change economic realities and in
2020 Russia’s Ministry of Agriculture identified a number of risks and
limitations to different branches of production that would affect agri-food
exports even in the best of conditions.45
Thereafter, the combination of Putin’s political goal imposed from
above, the COVID-19 pandemic and its economic effects on consumers,
and the litany of risks identified by the ministry led to an extension of the
deadline to 2030 to reach the $45 billion USD agri-food export goal.46
The new target is to reach $34 billion USD in agri-food exports by 2024.
Going forward, a variety of economic and political factors affect Russia’s
sustainability as a major food exporter. As with food imports, we discuss
several variables that affect the sustainability of Russia’s food export levels
in alphabetical order.
3.1 Agri-Food Export Policy
Russia’s agri-food export policy has become a story of contradictions, torn
between two impulses since 2018. The first impulse is to protect domestic
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consumers from higher prices and possible shortages, thereby reflecting
the importance of food security that continues to resonate among top
policymakers. The second impulse is to increase food exports, expand to
new markets, and deepen market presence in existing markets.
The first impulse was evidenced in previous years by Russia’s export
ban on wheat exports during August 2010-July 2011 due to drought
and severe harvest losses, which led to an export tariff on grain starting
February 2015 (subsequently lowered to zero in 2019). The anomaly
today is that Russia is more food secure than ever and grain harvests
have been strong for several consecutive years, but the government is
restricting wheat exports in an effort to maintain stable domestic prices
and to prevent shortages as a result of a weak ruble and potential excess
exports.
The impulse to protect the domestic population continues to be
evident. In 2020, an export quota of 7 million metric tonnes was enacted
during the second half of the 2019/2020 agricultural year, from 1 April
to the end of June 2020. For the 2020/2021 agricultural year, the
Ministry of Agriculture returned to an export quota despite a very strong
harvest, originally suggesting a quota of 15 million metric tonnes from 15
February 2021.47 Wheat exporters pushed back and complained about
the monetary losses that they would incur.48 In response, the ministry
increased the quota to 17.5 million metric tonnes effective from 15
February 2021 to 30 June 2021.49 The size of the quota was allo-
cated among exporters in February 2021, based on their share of grain
trade during July-December 2020, a practice that critics allege drives
small traders out of business.50 Without a quota allotment, an export
company is unable to access transportation or ports. As it turned out,
the quota allotment was in fact highly concentrated. Although a total
of 234 companies received an allotment, the top ten wheat exporting
companies received 70 percent of the quota.51 Two grain companies
from Rostov-na-Donu were allocated 27.5 percent of the quota.52 As
a further disincentive to export, or to put it differently, keep grain within
Russia, an export quota was also levied (see Chapter 1). For the entire
2020/2021 season, Russia’s total wheat exports were expected to exceed
40 million metric tonnes, close to the record of 41 million metric tonnes
exported in 2017/2018.53 The concern over too much grain being
exported was reflected in President Vladimir Putin’s comment in his year-
end press conference at which he stated that it had been a mistake for the
government to subsidise food exports.54
INTRODUCTION: IS RUSSIA’S ROLE IN THE INTERNATIONAL … 15
Wheat is not the only commodity that either has been restricted or
there are appeals for restrictive measures. In October 2020, Russia’s
Oilseed Union called for limits on the export of oilseed. In November
2020, animal husbandry unions asked for restrictions on corn exports
in order to slow the rise in price of animal feed. Livestock and flour
producers in Russia support export tariffs on grain to prevent higher cattle
feed prices and higher domestic grain prices for wheat to be milled.55 In
December 2020, the Oilseed Union requested an increase in the export
tariff on sunflower seed from 6.5 percent up to 30 percent in order to
slow the price increase in sunflower oil.56 The Union also asked for and
received an increase in the export tariff on soybean to 30 percent.
The second impulse, to increase food exports, has been followed since
Putin’s May 2018 decree on the national development strategy to 2024,
which emphasises an increase in the value of agri-food exports. Russian
food policy took a turn from food security through protectionism, import
substitution, and self-sufficiency to emphasising agri-food exports and
an expansion into new markets. A Federal Analytical Center within the
Ministry of Agriculture was created to assist exporters to enter markets,
produce analyses to help exporters understand foreign demand, and
offer guidance about negotiating and concluding contracts (see www.aem
cx.ru). A state project on food exports was adopted in late 2018 with its
own budget line to facilitate food exports (R400 billion allocation upon
inception, which of course is subject to change). In 2019, R38 billion
of multidimensional state support was allocated to increase food exports.
State support is budgeted at R47 billion in 2021, approximately the same
level as in 2020.57 State support for food exports is scheduled to rise to
R69.5 billion in 2022 and R80.8 billion in 2023.58
As part of the national project, the number of Russian foreign trade
attaches is increasing. There has also been a rise in the number of
memoranda of understandings and cooperative agreements in agriculture
between Russia and foreign governments (see Chapter 6). In September
2020, as part of the national project on food exports, an information
system called ‘One Window’ was unveiled. The purpose of this infor-
mation system is to simplify the process between exporting companies
on the one hand and ministries and regulatory bodies on the other
for the purpose of reducing operating and administrative costs incurred
by exporters.59 The One Window system essentially allows exporting
companies to order services they need, from logistics to consulting.60 In
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October 2020 the government extended subsidisation for the certifica-
tion of products to be exported. Under the new expanded rules, exporters
who work through an intermediary are eligible for compensation from the
state for the cost of certification for their products.61 Taken together—
the creation of a bureaucratic entity to promote exports, the adoption
of a national project attached to money, the increase in foreign attache
offices, and the creation of a service provider to exporters—suggest that
the Russian government considers food exports to be sustainable.
3.2 Climate Change and Effects on Food Production
The level of food production, particularly crops, is a variable that depends
to a large degree on the weather. For the past decade there has been
year-to-year fluctuation in Russia’s grain output but the overall trend has
been upward. Weather and weather-related anomalies play a key role,
of course, but so far agricultural output has continued to rise despite
frequent drought and flooding in different regions of Russia. A future
trend line in which food production declines over several years, however,
will set off political concerns about food supplies and generate pressures
to increase food imports and decrease exports.
In recent years there are numerous regional examples of weather
‘anomalies’ that are believed to stem from climate change. Because Russia
is so large, the effects of climate change and anomalous weather are felt
differently depending on the location of a specific region. Severe flooding
in recent years in the Far East, wildfires in Siberia, and rising air tempera-
tures in the Far North are attributed to climate change. Table 4 presents a
summary of weather anomalies and their economic cost to the agricultural
sector during 2010–2020.
The impact of climate change on Russia’s agriculture sector affects
prospects for food exports. Climate change could bring lower volumes
of grain production in traditional grain-growing regions and more grain
production in non-black earth regions where yields are lower and produc-
tion costs are higher.62 If Russia’s south produces less grain due to climate
change, the entire agricultural profile of Russia may shift from being
a major grain exporter, thereby putting stress on global grain supplies.
The entire structure of grain production would change, and non-black
earth regions would become relatively more important. This scenario is
problematic for three reasons.
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Table 4 Effects of climate change on Russian agriculture, 2010–2020







2010 Drought 43 13 million + 41 billion
2012 Drought 22 5.5 million 21 billion
2013 Flooding 7 458 thousand 8.7 billion
2013 Drought 10 2 million 11.5 billion
2015 Drought 13 9 million 7 billion
2017 Drought 20 489 thousand 3.6 billion
2018 Drought and
flooding
27 5.8 million 7.3 billion
2019 Drought 25 3.5 million 13 billion
2020 Drought, flood 12 4.2 million 8 billion
Note 2020 data are through October
Sources Compiled from various reports in the Russian press
First, it raises the prospect of food insecurity for low-income groups
as prices rise due to tighter supplies. Non-black earth regions gener-
ally are less suitable for agricultural production due to soil composition,
a prevalence of forested land, and shorter growing seasons. Two of
Russia’s Western regions—the Central and Northwest Federal Districts—
have marginal farm land that lacks the natural fertility of Russia’s south.63
These two non-black earth districts have experienced significant land
abandonment, rural depopulation, and farm closures during the past
30 years, and as a result there are demographic ‘black holes’.64 These
black holes in the non-black zone reflect insufficient human capital in
addition to deficiencies in physical infrastructure and poor land quality
for agriculture.65 It would be a monumental task to reverse demographic
trends, if it could be accomplished at all, which means that non-black
earth regions cannot be depended upon to replace lost food production
in the south.
Second, Russia’s role in the international food trade system would
change. If Russia’s dependence on grain production had to shift to non-
black earth regions, the country would undoubtedly lose its position as
one of the world’s top wheat exporters. Grain production in non-black
earth regions would become much more expensive with lower yields per
hectare and lower volumes of production. Given the fact that federal
policymakers have indicated that productive and profitable farms are to
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receive the most state support, it is not clear how directing more resources
to marginal agricultural areas would play out since farms in the south
would be unwilling to give up their advantaged position even if their
production declined.
A third problem is that if Russia’s south becomes hotter, drier, and
less productive, Russia’s grain exports may decrease which in turn affects
world grain supplies. At a time when the global population is increasing
and the need for more food production is greater, global reserves would
decline and the entire world would be much more vulnerable to spikes in
food prices if drought or other weather conditions affected production in
the United States, Canada, Australia, or Argentina. There are also interna-
tional political implications. During 2010–2012, several grain-producing
countries curtailed their grain exports which in turn caused global grain
shortages and a spike in global commodity prices. In the Middle East,
many countries experienced chronic food insecurity, high rates of poverty,
high unemployment, and inequality for many years. Russia’s grain cutoff
of grain exports in 2010–2011 to the Middle East contributed to polit-
ical instability that led to the Arab Spring and the collapse of regimes in
Tunisia and Egypt, and the outbreak of civil war in Syria.66 Today, among
Middle Eastern nations, Turkey, Egypt, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, and
United Arab Emirates are among the biggest buyers of Russian grain (see
Chapter 9). In addition, Russia provides food assistance to Syria.
3.3 Foreign Competition and Russia’s Competitiveness
Wheat will remain Russia’s most valuable food commodity export for the
foreseeable future. Russia’s wheat exports in turn are affected by foreign
competitors: the United States, Canada, Australia, France, and Argentina.
As a major player in the international grain market, Russia competes
for market share. A particularly good harvest for a competitor increases
competition for Russia’s exporters, just as a poor harvest among one
or more competitors creates opportunity. Together, producer countries
influence the level of world reserves and international grain prices.
Many variables affect world grain production such as weather, rainfall,
and fuel prices, thereby making it difficult to forecast exact produc-
tion. That said, the FAO determined that global reserves for cereals
will increase slightly during the 2020/2021 agricultural year despite
the economic effects of COVID-19.67 Longer-term forecasts are more
problematic due to a high degree of variability. The United States
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Department of Agriculture (USDA) predicts that world grain prices are
likely to decline to 2029 as production and reserves increase, which could
create fewer incentives to export depending on the magnitude of decline.
Against those trends, the USDA forecasts that Russia will continue to
increase production thanks to higher yields, which will lead to higher
grain exports but that the growth rate in exports will not match those in
the 2010s (see Chapter 2).
On the demand side, the United Nations projects that the world’s
population will increase from its current 7.7 billion to 9.7 billion by
2050.68 The fastest population growth rates will be in developing coun-
tries where the structure of the diet is oriented towards grain, starches,
and carbohydrates, which plays into Russia’s strength. To feed the new
population, the FAO estimates that cereal production will need to rise
by about one-third and annual meat production will need to more than
double by 2050.69 In developing countries, yields of major crops have
been dropping, which means that their net imports of cereals will more
than double to 300 million metric tonnes by 2050.70 The expected
food situation in developing countries presents an opportunity for grain
exporting countries such as Russia.
A second aspect of foreign competition is food trade policy used by
other countries. Russia’s exports are obviously susceptible to import tariffs
and non-tariff barriers that may be used by other states. The World Trade
Organisation noted a general rise in trade import restrictions among G20
countries in 2019.71 In 2020, the number of trade restrictions decreased,
but mainly because the spread of COVID-19 reduced the growth rate
in international trade.72 The general rise in protectionism as a result of
populist governments may also enhance the general drift towards more
restrictions on trade. Furthermore, Russia’s grain exports are impacted
not only by objective needs in the purchasing country, but also by the
presence (or absence) of regional trade agreements that the importing
country may have with other states; the status of political relations with
the importing country; the comparative quality of Russia’s grain; and the
actual terms of the deal that is negotiated.
A third factor that affects the competitiveness of Russia’s export of
food commodities is quality and food safety. The Ministry of Agriculture
has made clear that the promotion of Russian food brands requires accu-
rate labelling of food products if Russia is to be successful in expanding
its food exports abroad.73 A favourable reputation is necessary to expand
exports because, in the words of Deputy Minister of Agriculture Oksana
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Lut, Russia is engaged ‘in a competitive battle for consumers throughout
the world’.74 In recent years there have been concerns that Russia’s
dairy and other milk products may contain unsafe additives or labels may
not accurately reflect the content. Falsification of product content is not
unique to the post-Soviet food system, but may have become worse since
2014 in the push for food self-sufficiency. In February 2019, Rospotreb-
nadzor raised the possibility of criminal penalties for product falsification
by domestic food producers.75 In March 2019, senators in the Federa-
tion Council began to consider changes in penalties for misrepresentation
of goods, services, and labour, which had not been revised since 2007.
Misrepresentation by companies involving false advertising or mislabelling
would see fines increase tenfold to R300,000-R400,000. If the falsifica-
tion threatens health or lives of humans, plants, or animals, companies
could face fines of R500,000-R800,000.76
To crack down on counterfeit food, the re-export of food from banned
countries through transit countries such as Belarus and Kazakhstan, and
to increase consumer confidence in food safety, in May 2019 the govern-
ment announced the introduction of a system for product certification
called ‘Merkurii’ for packaged milk, yogurt, kefir, and several types of
cheeses. Starting 1 July 2019 a pilot system for digital labelling was
introduced for sweetened milk and sour cream and different cheeses,
not including pasteurised milk products. Obligatory digital labelling for
all dairy products was supposed to begin in March 2020 for milk and
cream, dry milk and cream, kefir, yogurt, cheeses, butter, tvorog, and
other dairy products, but the start date was delayed. Digital labelling of
food products allows a product to be traced and tracked. Three ministries
(Agriculture, Trade, and Communications), Rossel’khoznadzor, Rospotreb-
nadzor , the Federal Customs Agency, and the Federal Security Service
(FSB) are responsible for implementation and compliance with labelling
regulations.77 Following several postponements, the Ministry of Trade
announced that mandatory digital labelling would be phased in starting
in 2021. According to the latest schedule as this chapter is completed,
labelling for dairy products was on a voluntary basis starting in January
2021. Beginning in June 2021, mandatory labelling was required for ice
cream and cheeses. Starting in September 2021, mandatory labelling was
required for dairy products that have an expiration date of more than
40 days. From December 2021, mandatory labelling was required for
dairy products that have an expiration date of less than 40 days.78 Those
timeframes obviously are subject to modification as they have since 2019.
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By 2024, the government expects digital labelling to expand to other food
products besides dairy.
The introduction of digital labelling raised strong objections in the
private sector against the government’s plan. Dairy producers and proces-
sors have raised many complaints, one of which is that digital labelling
will impose high costs on producers of dairy products, estimated between
R15,000–R35,000 for a small enterprise. But this estimate has been
called into question. The General Director of Russia’s Milk Union, Artem
Belov, implied that cost estimates are too low by pointing out that a
company would have to buy a machine capable of reading the digital
codes, equipment for applying the codes to product packaging, and would
need to integrate digital labelling with the information systems used in the
enterprise.79 For small producers, those added costs could be the differ-
ence between profitability and having to close. Other objections included:
(1) digital labelling would lead to higher prices for consumers as compa-
nies pass on their costs; (2) digital labelling does not stop producers
from misrepresenting products’ contents; and (3) some dairy processors
do not have the equipment to begin digital labelling according to the
government’s timeline, and therefore interruptions in supplies may occur.
For example, the General Director of Russia’s Ice Cream Union, Natalia
Utkina, asked for digital labelling to be postponed to at least 1 December
2021 because the branch is unprepared to begin labelling by 1 June 2021
and the machinery needed to label ice cream is only available in Italy
and Denmark. She indicated that packaging prices would increase by an
estimated 40 percent, and that if labelling began in June 2021 produc-
tion would have to be interrupted during peak demand in order to begin
labelling.80 Finally, (4) digital labelling in Russia may create an opportu-
nity for black marketeers to increase their market share because they can
offer lower prices.
The government rejects these arguments, indicating that retail prices
are likely to rise only modestly. The head of the Ministry for Industry and
Trade, Denis Manturov, argues that he expects a one-time price increase
of 1.8 percent for dairy products that are digitally labelled, a price rise that
he termed ‘hardly even noticeable’. Further, he indicated that producers
are eligible for loans with interest rates below 1 percent to help them
reduce production costs.81 In addition, the Ministry of Agriculture does
not accept the notion that there will be interruptions in supplies.82
The takeaway from this discussion is that the government is inter-
ested in building a ‘produced in Russia’ brand that has a solid reputation
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abroad. The private milk and dairy sector is concerned about its bottom
line. The introduction of obligatory digital labelling presents an inter-
esting case study of the private sector pushing back against a government
initiative. Previously, the relationship between the government and agri-
cultural interests had been mostly cooperative and corporatist during the
Putin administrations. At the end of the day, it is likely that state interests
will ‘win’. The state holds powerful policy levers—licensing, subsidies,
loans and credit, tax audits—over private companies and can use those
levers to force compliance. Moreover, the public and private sectors have
a common interest. Private producers benefit from domestic consumers’
trust in their products. The Russian state benefits from foreign purchases
having faith in the quality of its food exports.
3.4 Regional Foreign Demand Based on Population Trends
Russia is expanding the number of food trade partners by signing regional
and free trade agreements, memoranda of agreements, and bilateral trade
agreements with other nations (see Chapter 6). Russia’s largest export
customers are, in order: Asia, Europe, and the Middle East and North
Africa (MENA). Population trends in those regions are discussed.
In Asia, Russia’s attempts to increase market share in the enormous
Chinese market go hand in hand with the geostrategic pivot to China that
occurred more than a decade ago. Trade relations are steadily improving
and the two countries hope to reach $200 billion USD in total trade
turnover by 2024 (see Chapter 7). Bilateral agri-food trade is growing
although it remains quite modest in a comparative perspective. Russia’s
prospects for increasing food exports to China are affected by three demo-
graphic realities, one positive and two negative. The first reality is the
size of China’s middle class, estimated at up to 500 million consumers,
who represent a potential base for Russia to increase its market share as
consumers’ income and preferences change. The second reality is that
China faces a looming demographic decline. Its fertility rate has been
below the population replacement rate of 2.1 since the early 1990s and
presently stands at 1.6 according to the Chinese government. Other esti-
mates place China’s fertility rate at 1.4 and in major cities it may be below
one child per woman.83 As a result, China will see its population peak in
2027, after which its working-age population will decrease by 100 million
from 2015 to 2040 according to the United States Census Bureau. The
working-age population under the age of 30 may decrease by 30 percent
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during the same time period.84 A third reality is that China’s over-65
population will increase very rapidly, from 135 million in 2015 to at least
325 million in 2040, which means that in 2040 China could have twice
as many people over 65 as children under the age of 15.85 Older people
on average need and consume fewer calories per day than working-age
people. The effect of the two negative demographic trends on Russia’s
ability to increase food exports remains to be seen, but Russia’s poli-
cymakers cannot count on ever-expanding demand for its exports from
the Chinese population. Assuming that the political relationship remains
friendly, we envision a rise in Russia’s food exports to China for the next
10 years or so, then a flattening of the curve, followed by long-term
stagnation or even decline.
In Europe, despite Russia’s ban against food imports from the Euro-
pean Union, the EU continues to buy Russian food exports, and the value
of these exports has actually increased a bit during 2009–2019. That said,
Russian food exports to the EU pale in comparison to the sale of its
energy and manufactured goods to the EU.86 In 2019, Russia exported
4 billion euro worth of agri-food products to the EU, compared to 97
billion euro worth of energy.87 In aggregate, EU members comprise a
large food market with almost 448 million consumers who had an average
per capita income of more than $37,100 USD in 2019. In other words,
on the positive side, the EU is a valuable food market and although many
nations within the EU have contracting total populations and working-
age populations, food demand will remain strong due to high income.
On the negative side, Russia does not have any regional free trade agree-
ments with the EU and thus faces high tariffs on its exports which puts
it at a disadvantage vis-à-vis low cost producers who as members of the
EU enjoy free trade with other member states. As a result, Russia’s food
exports to the EU may be expected to grow slowly in coming years.
The population in the Middle East and North Africa is projected to
double to more than 650 million people by 2050, thereby exceeding the
population of the EU, which means that the size of the food market
will be significant. Russia’s main food export to MENA is grain. Based
on its demographic structure, large numbers of Middle East youth will
enter the workforce in the coming years, which means that they will
have increased income and higher demand for food because employed
individuals require higher caloric intake than unemployed persons. Russia
is actively increasing trade ties and agricultural cooperation with Middle
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East countries (see Chapter 9). Based on these trends, Russia’s agri-food
exports to MENA could grow rapidly in the coming years.
4 Outlook
Since 2010, Russia has experienced repeated weather anomalies (see Table
4), a recession, significant devaluations of the ruble in 2014–2015 and
2019–2020, sluggish economic growth, a decline in the price of oil which
affects revenue, increasing trade protectionism at home and abroad, and
a global pandemic. Through it all, Russia’s domestic food production
has increased, import substitution has improved food self-sufficiency, and
the dollar value of the nation’s agri-food exports has almost tripled. As
a result, Russia’s role in the international agri-food trade system has
changed from importer to importer and exporter. A lot has gone right
to get Russia to this point, and state food policy appears determined to
maintain that positive momentum.
Returning to the original question posed at the beginning of the
chapter whether recent trade trends are sustainable, Russia will remain
a food importer. For all of the hoopla from the Russian government
surrounding progress in food security, import substitution, and rise in
self-sufficiency, actual reductions in food imports have occurred for
mainly meat products (see Table 2). In the early 2000s, Russia imported
2.5–3 million tonnes of meat annually, now, it is around 600 thousand
tonnes thanks to protectionism and increases in domestic production.88
Russia remains a large importer of milk and dairy products, although the
supplier has changed from the EU prior to 2014 to Belarus after 2014.
Belarus now accounts for almost 80 percent of Russia’s milk and dairy
imports. Due to its climate and geographical position, Russia is likely to
continue to be an importer of fruits and vegetables.89 The point is that
the structure of imports may continue to evolve, as will trading partners,
but Russia will remain a food importer.
Regarding the sustainability of food exports going forward, a lot could
go wrong. There could be a long-term economic downturn. Foreign
markets could turn drastically more protectionist. The China market may
not turn out to be as lucrative as expected or may be arbitrarily closed.
Australia serves as an example of the fickleness of the Chinese market. In
response to complaints by the Australian government, in 2020 Chinese
leaders essentially closed their market to Australian goods: coal was unable
to unload; wine sat stranded on the quay in Hong Kong, barley, sugar,
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timer, lobster, and copper were been banned, and as of early December
2020, a ban on wheat was expected to follow.90 While Russian–Chinese
relations are favourable now, there is always the possibility that a disagree-
ment may arise that will lead China to curtail access or even close its
market to Russian food exports.
Other factors that impinge on sustainability of Russia’s food exports
include: climate anomalies could worsen in severity and duration;
domestic food production may not generate the surpluses needed to
expand exports; investment in food processing may fall short of plans;
and Russia may lose out to other foreign competitors in the Middle East.
Moreover, as was documented above, domestic political concerns about
food security within Russia can curtail food exports. In short, Russia’s
food exports do not depend only upon food production and market
conditions. Whereas Russia’s recent food production trends are positive
and support food exports, cautious optimism is warranted about prospects
to sustain food exports because the future is unpredictable. The chap-
ters that follow explore in more detail Russia’s food trade policies and
practices, as well as regional aspects of its food trade.
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PART I
Agri-Food Trade Policy and Practice




Russia’s role in the international food trade system and impact on that
system has gone through different phases over time. In the pre-World
War I period, Russia was Europe’s largest grain exporter, especially wheat.
During the Soviet period from the 1970s onward the USSR impacted the
international food trade system by entering the global market to purchase
grain to compensate for domestic shortfalls. Recently, Russia has returned
to its historical place and currently plays a significant role in the interna-
tional food trade system as a global supplier of wheat. Russia has been
the leading wheat exporter in the world during six of the past seven agri-
cultural years, surpassing the United States. Russia’s contemporary role
as a leading grain exporter is juxtaposed to lingering impressions of the
Soviet Union as a grain importer to feed people and cattle. The change
in Russia’s role in international agricultural trade is attributable to several
factors: the liberalisation of the economy after 1992; the emergence of
private sector entrepreneurs who propel economic development much
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as American inventors and investors were driving forces in the Amer-
ican food industry in the early twentieth century; a significant rebound
in agricultural production; an increase in the state ambitions for inter-
national prestige; and the emergence of mega-farms that are modern,
globally competitive, and use advanced technology to achieve high effi-
ciency. These processes work together to produce a food revolution in
food supply, distribution, and retailing that has led to unprecedented
consumer choice about how and where to obtain food.1
The purpose of this chapter is to survey Russia’s role in international
agricultural trade and how that role has changed over time. The chapter
sheds light on three related questions. (1) To what extent has Russia’s
role as a significant player in the international food trade system changed
over time? (2) To what extent has Russia been integrated to world food
markets and how has the degree of integration changed over time? (3)
What is the significance of those changes? The goal is to provide historical
context for the chapters that follow which focus on the contemporary
period since 2014.
2 Analytical Framework
Countries engage in food trade for a variety of reasons. History shows
that nations engage in food trade because it yields several benefits. In the
economic realm, a food exporting country may have a comparative advan-
tage and is able to sell its food at an attractive price, thereby earning
foreign currency by meeting demand in another country. Or maybe a
country wants to reduce its food surplus and support domestic prices.
In the political realm, countries export food to strengthen or maintain
friendly relations. Exports may be used to bind other nations to the
exporter; in this respect food exports are useful for maintaining alliances
and empires. Food exports are also used to build international status and
prestige. And food may be exported as aid as a means to expand soft
power abroad. In the security realm, food exports may help an ally or
withheld to punish an adversary. These motivations are not exclusive and
several may be true simultaneously.
Although protectionism throughout the world has been on the rise
since 2016, countries may benefit from food imports. For example, a
country may have a comparative disadvantage for a given commodity and
therefore it saves money by importing. A country may experience chronic
or temporary supply shortages and needs to import food to avoid hunger
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or political instability. A country may import food to benefit consumers
by opting for a cheaper alternative to domestic production, or simply
to allow consumers more choice. A country may import a commodity
or commodities that it cannot produce itself. Or a country may import
food as part of an alliance network in which trade serves to maintain that
alliance.
My framework to analyse Russia’s food trade behaviour consists of
four variables, with responses ranging from low to high: (1) frequency
of entrance into the global food market; (2) degree of food trade
protectionism; (3) degree of integration with Western global trading
institutions; and (4) degree of involvement in the global food market.
The variables are defined as follows. The global food market consists of
trading institutions defined and created by the West, such as General
Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) or World Trade Organisation
(WTO). Frequency is defined as how often Russia enters the global food
market in a given timeframe; the range is periodic to consistent entrance.
Degree of protectionism concerns whether food trade protectionism was
high or low, encompassing both tariff and non-tariff barriers. Degree of
integration refers to whether Russia was a full member of global trading
institutions or acted outside of them. Degree of involvement concerns the
volume of Russia’s food imports and exports with Western nations. Time
is overlaid with those variables and the framework is illustrated in Table
1.
The table displays patterns of continuity and change. Since the 1980s,
Russia has had high frequency of entrance into the global food market,
mostly as a food importer. Its degree of involvement in the global food
market has been high as a consistent food importer and recently as a food
exporter. Discontinuity since the 1980s is found in the degree of agricul-
tural protectionism, degree of integration with global trade institutions,
and Russia’s emergence as a significant grain exporter since 2014.
3 Institutions for International
Agri-Food Trade
The Soviet Union participated in the Bretton Woods conference in 1944
that led to trading rules established by the 1947 General Agreement on
Trade and Tariffs (GATT). Ultimately, the Soviet Union chose not to
join GATT or other institutions created out of the conference such as the
World Bank or International Monetary Fund (IMF). The GATT allowed
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Table 1 Framework for analysis of Russia’s food trade behaviour
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countries in the developed world to use non-tariff barriers, quotas, tariffs
on imports, and export subsidies to protect their agricultural sectors.
Soviet participation in GATT was on the table in 1972 when the United
States proposed entry as a complement to détente, but the Soviet lead-
ership declined the invitation.2 The Soviet Union also chose not to
participate in the Tokyo Round of negotiations that began in 1973.
The importance of the Soviet Union being outside of GATT was that
it allowed non-application countries to be denied most-favoured nation
status (MFN). Therefore, the USSR’s non-application status meant that
the U.S. Congress could extend or withhold MFN for the Soviet Union,
which in turn allowed trade to be politicised as was evident with the 1974
Jackson-Vanik Amendment which linked MFN to Jewish emigration from
the USSR. When the Soviets balked at this linkage, MFN was denied.
Henceforth, MFN would only be granted after annual certification of the
Soviet Union’s behaviour. It was not until 1992 that post-Communist
Russia was given permanent MFN.
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The Tokyo Round of negotiations in 1973 revealed three different
approaches to agricultural trade among developed countries. First, effi-
cient producers wanted negotiations to lead to freer agricultural trade,
while inefficient producers preferred stable markets through regulation
and minimum commodity prices. Second, the European Community
preferred to negotiate agricultural products separately from industrial
products, a disagreement that would not be settled until 1977. Third, the
United States favoured a reduction of tariffs on all products, including
agriculture, and also supported a prohibition on direct export subsidies
for all products. This position was rejected by the European Community.3
Meanwhile, the use of trade ‘exceptions’ by the United States, Western
Europe countries, and Japan meant that the general trend in reducing
trade barriers as mandated by GATT did not affect agricultural trade. For
example, the U.S. Congress pressured GATT members to allow tariffs
if imports caused ‘domestic injury’ to agriculture (Sect. 22), or allowed
GATT rules to be suspended if needed in order to preserve health, safety,
or national security.4 Thus, the agricultural sector in developed nations
remained more protected than industry and manufacturing. Over time,
however, the cost of farm subsidies and protectionism grew onerous,
rising to $300 billion annually by the mid-1980s in OECD countries,
with around 40 percent of farm income coming from subsidies.5
The cost of agricultural protectionism to U.S. taxpayers was also
considerable and financial pressures led to support for liberalised agricul-
tural trade. During the 1970s the United States quadrupled the value of
its agricultural exports from $6.7 billion USD in fiscal 1970 to over $27
billion USD in fiscal 1978. As a result, the U.S. share of world agricul-
tural trade increased from 13.5 percent in 1970 to 17 percent in 1978. In
1981, U.S. agricultural exports reached $43.8 billion USD; but by 1986
they had declined to $26.3 billion USD. U.S. stockpiles of wheat, corn,
and rice grew rapidly. By the mid-1980s, the American farm sector was
in crisis due to overproduction and high farm debt, which led to farm
closures. Export markets for American products that had been robust in
the 1970s contracted as oil price shocks led to tighter monetary policy,
higher interest rates, and weakened purchasing power.6 Thus, the United
States was saddled with an expensive farm policy at a time of declining
exports. Faced with a domestic farm problem, the U.S. government felt
that freer agricultural trade would open new markets and help to alle-
viate farm surpluses that were driving down domestic prices. This situation
served as the background to the Uruguay Round of negotiations.
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In September 1986 the eighth round of GATT negotiations began,
called the Uruguay Round. The Soviet Union requested to join the
negotiations but was denied permission. In 1990, the Soviet Union
applied for observer status to GATT but was originally blocked by
the United States. The United States subsequently relented following
opposition to its stance from other countries. In May 1990 the Soviet
Union was granted observer status to GATT, a move that represented
the first step in integrating to the world trade system. Observer status
allowed Soviet representatives to attend meetings but not to participate
in decision-making or dispute resolution.7
After several years of negotiations and several failures, in 1994 the
Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) was signed, which
focused on improving market access, domestic support, and export subsi-
dies. The Uruguay Round Agreement came into effect in 1995 and
improved access to foreign markets for food exporting countries by
lowering tariffs and removing quantitative restrictions on imports. Coun-
tries agreed to convert quantitative restrictions to tariffs, to be followed
by a reduction in tariffs.8 Developed countries would reduce their agri-
cultural tariffs by an average of one-third over six years while developing
countries would reduce their tariffs by an average of 25 percent over ten
years.9 Under the AoA, domestic subsidies to agriculture were also sched-
uled for reduction. Developed countries were to reduce their domestic
subsidies by 20 percent over six years while developing countries would
reduce subsidies by 13 percent over ten years.10 Least developed countries
were exempt from any reductions. Domestic subsidies were categorised
into different boxes, representing the level of distortion that they caused
in trade. Subsidies in the ‘amber box’ were considered highly trade-
distorting and were to be reduced the most. ‘Green box’ subsidies were
considered to have minimal trade-distorting effects and did not require
reduction. ‘Blue box’ subsidies also did not require reductions and were
not limited. Finally, the AoA required reductions in export subsidies, the
purpose of which was to end agricultural dumping (selling below produc-
tion cost). Developed countries would reduce their export subsidies by
an average of one-third over six years while developing countries would
reduce their subsidies by an average of 25 percent over ten years.11
Although the AoA represented progress in liberalising agricultural
trade, Clapp notes that because the United States and European Union
(hereafter EU) moved many of their subsidies into green and blue boxes,
their level of subsidies increased in comparison to the 1980s. Moreover, as
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late as 1998 agricultural protection remained high and tariffs averaged 40
percent. Clapp argues that, ‘loopholes in the agreement allowed United
States and the EU to continue with many of the protectionist practices to
which they had become accustomed. As such, the AoA has been criticized
as reinforcing already unequal agricultural trade rules’.12 Davis adds that,
‘nontariff barriers remained common in the agricultural sector long after
they were eliminated for most industrial goods’.13 Ironically, developed
countries raised their level of agricultural protectionism even as the size
of the agricultural sector was shrinking in comparison to the rest of the
economy.
Until the last two years of its existence, the Soviet Union was virtu-
ally a non-entity in Western international trade arrangements. Its primary
trade, both agricultural and non-agricultural, was with fellow East bloc
nations who comprised the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
(CMEA, sometimes referred to as Comecon, 1949–1991). This bloc of
communist economies was not integrated with capitalist economies and
instead opted for intra-bloc trade to the widest extent possible. Commu-
nist leaders wanted to protect their consumers from global food prices
and their producers from Western competition. As a result, Soviet protec-
tionism vis-à-vis Western nations was in line with Western protectionism
as described above.
In 1993, Russia’s post-Soviet government applied to join GATT, which
in 1995 became the World Trade Organisation (WTO). Negotiations over
Russia’s entry to the WTO would continue for 18 years, cycling through
periods of cooperation when membership seemed near and animosity.14
Negotiations over agriculture were particularly contentious.15 Finally, a
breakthrough occurred in fall 2011 that led to a positive vote to allow
Russia’s membership. In July 2012 the State Duma ratified the agree-
ment and in August 2012 Russia officially joined the WTO, the 156th
country to do so at that time. Accession brought two major changes.
First, Russia’s membership to the WTO represented integration with
the global trading system. Second, Russia’s integration into the global
institutional trading system brought obligations and responsibilities.16
Not long after Russia’s WTO accession, however, the 2014 political
crisis in Ukraine and Crimea led President Vladimir Putin to suspend
some of Russia’s commitments by invoking ‘protection of national secu-
rity’, allowed by Article XXI in GATT.17 Since then, Russia has continued
to communicate with the WTO concerning issues in food safety, photo-
sanitary standards, and veterinary requirements. Broader trade obligations
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such as refraining from the use of import quotas or import bans have
gone by the wayside. Russia also continues to use various forms of state
assistance that may be considered market-distorting, for example, trans-
portation subsidies for grain from point of origin to port. That said, it is
useful to review briefly the set of obligations that Russia agreed to when
it joined the WTO.
First, Russia’s agricultural budget for ‘trade-distorting support’ was
limited to no more than $9 billion (USD) in 2012 and 2013, which
dropped to $4.4 billion by 2018. Not limited are expenditures for
research, disease control, infrastructure, food security, farm restructuring,
and rural development, which are not considered trade distorting.
Second, the average tariff rate for agricultural products after full imple-
mentation was scheduled to decline from 13.2 to 10.8 percent.18 In
comparison, the average tariff rate for manufactured goods dropped from
9.5 percent currently to 7.3 percent, so agriculture remained somewhat
more protected but less so than in the past. For context, during 2000–
2008 Russia’s average tariff rate on imported food almost doubled from
10 to 18 percent, which is not especially high by global standards as
many nations have much higher tariff rates, including the EU, but it did
represent more, not less, protectionism.19 Thus, entry into the WTO was
expected to bring a reduction in Russia’s agricultural tariffs.
A third obligation was that one-third of tariff lines were to be reduced
on the date of accession, with another one-quarter of tariffs to be reduced
within three years. The longest implementation period was to be eight
years for pork. Tariff rates for dairy products and cereals were to be
reduced by about 5 percent; tariffs for oilseeds, fats, and oils were to
decline by about 2 percent.20 Under the terms of accession, tariffs for
agricultural products would decline by more but still be higher than for
many other non-agricultural goods. Russia was allowed to continue to
use tariff-rate quotas (TRQs) for beef, pork, and chicken. Russia’s use of
TRQs, which originated in 2003, was adjusted in 2012 following Russia’s
accession. According to the adjustment, the in-tariff quota for fresh and
chilled beef was increased from 30 thousand tonnes to 33 thousand
tonnes; the in-tariff quota for fresh and chilled pork was reduced from
472 thousand tonnes to 400 thousand tonnes; and the in-tariff quota
for fresh and chilled poultry was raised from 330 thousand tonnes to
341 thousand tonnes. From 2013 through 2019 in-tariff quotas for these
products were kept constant: 570 thousand tonnes for fresh, chilled, and
frozen beef; 400 thousand tonnes for fresh, chilled, and frozen pork; and
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364 thousand tonnes for fresh, chilled, and frozen poultry. In compliance
with its promises made to the WTO, starting in 2020 Russia’s in-tariff
quota for pork was abolished and all pork imports were subject to a 25
percent tariff. Previously, pork imports within the in-tariff quota were
taxed at 0 percent and outside the quota at 65 percent.21 Whether linked
to the ending of the TRQ or the rise in domestic pork production, pork
imports fell in 2020 to a very low level (see Chapter 4). In late 2020,
Russia proposed to the Eurasian Economic Union to replace its TRQ for
beef with a flat tariff rate of 27.5 percent. If approved, the change would
take effect in January 2022.
4 Russia’s Agricultural Trading Behaviour
This section moves from the global trading institutions to Russia’s actual
trading behaviour over several time periods. The USSR was an irregular
player in the international (Western dominated) agri-food trade system
prior to the 1970s. The first significant Soviet foray into the international
grain market followed poor harvests in 1963 and 1965. During 1964–
1966 the Soviet Union was forced to make large grain purchases on the
international food market for the first time since World War II. The 1964–
1966 period was also the first time that Soviet grain imports exceeded
grain exports since the early 1950s.22
The Soviet Union’s entry into international food markets as a grain
importer was driven by several factors: domestic production shortfalls;
grain stock building policy; the need for feed grain for cattle; and livestock
expansion plans. Soviet food imports were also influenced by weather
anomalies during the 1960s–1980s. Arguably, aside from weather, the
most important driver for grain imports was the degree to which domestic
production could meet consumption needs.23 Starting in 1971, Soviet
leaders decided to improve levels of food consumption and to increase
livestock inventories which would lead to higher meat production.24
Henceforth, the so-called ‘social contract’ between regime and popula-
tion was based on a commitment to produce more food and increase
consumption during each successive Five-Year Plan. Specifically, Soviet
leaders wanted to increase output in animal husbandry in order to meet
rising consumer demand for meat, milk, cheese, and other animal-based
protein. During several five-year plans the goal to increase meat consump-
tion was successful, as annual per capita consumption rose from 47.5 kg
in 1970 to 62.4 kg in 1986.25 These official statistics do not, of course,
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factor in the quality of production or the time that consumers expended
to obtain meat which had an economic cost to productivity. The Soviet
social contract based on a more diversified diet was mirrored in Eastern
Europe. Deutsch links political stability in Eastern bloc countries with the
need to improve food consumption via a ‘food revolution’, writing that
‘rising consumer demands now form the most serious challenge that the
socialist system has ever had to meet’.26
5 Russia’s Trading Behaviour in the 1970s
During the pre-1970s period, the USSR did not play a significant role
in the international food system except during 1964–1966 due to excep-
tional circumstances when grain was imported from the West as noted
above. During the 1970s, Russia’s frequency of entrance into the global
food market was periodic, its integration with global institutions was low,
and its degree of involvement with the global food market was low. Soviet
entry into the international food system was based on need until the early
1970s. Conversely, its protectionism was high.
The 1970s began with the USSR basically food self-sufficient. In 1970
the Soviet Union was actually a net grain exporter of more than 7 million
metric tonnes (mmt). As previously noted, most of Soviet Russia’s trade
consisted of intra-bloc trade with CMEA nations. This occurrence was
an outflow of the economic integration imposed by the Soviet Union on
Eastern Europe during the 1950s and 1960s, and by the 1971 Compre-
hensive Program for Socialist Integration that stressed plan coordination,
joint investment projects, and cooperation in long-term programmes.27
During the first half of the 1970s, trade with the West by CMEA nations
accounted for only 30 percent of exports and 37 percent of imports.28
The positive food situation in the USSR changed rapidly as poor
harvests occurred in 1971–1972, followed by another poor harvest in
mid-decade (1975) and at the end of the decade (1979). Actual grain
output during 1971–1975 fell significantly below planned levels, and the
same was true for the 1976-1980 Five-Year Plan as well.29 As a result,
the Soviet Union became a more significant participant in the global
food system, although not on a regular basis. Beginning in 1972, the
Soviet Union turned to the West for grain imports and particularly the
United States (see Chapter 10). The Soviet Union became a ‘burden’ on
the world food system.30 As a further irritant, Robert Paarlberg argues
that the Soviets ‘used its access to western food markets as more than a
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means to compensate for domestic production shortfall’ by re-exporting
imported American grain at a higher price.31
In 1979, the Soviet Union experienced another poor harvest. The
volume of grain available for domestic trade was down about 30 mmt
compared to 1978, including a decline of more than 20 mmt of wheat.32
The USSR again turned to the West, and particularly the United States,
to purchase grain. But that effort was stymied following the Soviet
Union’s December 1979 invasion of Afghanistan after which U.S. Pres-
ident Jimmy Carter imposed an embargo beginning in January 1980 on
17 mmt of wheat sales that had been sold to the Soviet Union. The
embargo lasted into April 1981. The Soviet Union started the decade
as an irregular and mostly insignificant player in the international food
system, but during the 1970s it became a consistent purchaser of Western
grain, which means that its entrance into the global food market became
more frequent and its degree of involvement with the global food market
rose.
6 Russia’s Trading Behaviour in the 1980s
During the 1980s, Russia’s frequency of entrance into the global food
market was high, its protectionism was high, and its degree of involve-
ment with the global food market was high as a consistent grain importer.
Its integration with global institutions remained low.
In the 1980s the USSR became a regular participant in the interna-
tional food system by importing grain due to domestic shortfalls. The
1980s started badly, beginning with three consecutive years of poor
harvests, 1980–1982. By 1982, the Soviet Union had a net agricultural
trade deficit of $18 billion and had net grain imports of 45 mmt, a very
different situation from just a decade earlier. Another very poor harvest
came in 1984. During 1980–1985 grain output in the Soviet Union
averaged about 182 mmt, far short of the 200 mmt that state planners
had anticipated. To be clear, domestic grain production was sufficient
to provide the population with bread and grain products and Western
analysts recognised that hunger was not a problem in the USSR.33 Poor
harvests created feed grain deficiencies that affected livestock herds that
trickled down to affect meat and milk production. The Kremlin’s plan to
expand livestock herds stalled.
The Soviet Union transformed from a periodic participant in the inter-
national food system in the 1970s into a regular buyer of grain during
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the 1980s who impacted the world food system. In the early 1980s,
Western economists warned that Soviet demand for imported grain could
‘create disruption in world grain trade with serious consequences for both
grain-exporting and grain-deficit countries’.34 During 1976–1980, the
Soviet Union imported an average of 19.9 mmt of grain per year. In the
1981–1985 period, however, average annual grain imports rose to over
40 mmt, of which 12.4 mmt were purchased from the United States.35
The value of Soviet grain imports from the West averaged $10 billion
USD per year during 1981–1984 when hard currency reserves were
declining. Moreover, the Soviet Union also became a buyer of meat, fruit,
vegetables, vegetable oil, and sugar on the international market.36 The
Soviet Union’s largest impact on the international food market, however,
remained its grain imports.
The final Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev (1985–1991), frequently
spoke about far-reaching reforms in agriculture. He had made his repu-
tation for modest agrarian reforms as First Secretary in Stavropol’ krai
in the 1970s. After he was brought to Moscow in 1978, he became
Party Secretary for agriculture in November 1978, a position for which
he was eminently qualified, and he remained in the position for several
years (1978–1984). As the secretary in charge of agriculture, he played
a large role in drafting the 1982 Food Programme. As General Secre-
tary of the Communist party, Gorbachev targeted agriculture for reform,
although space limitations prevent a full discussion of those reforms.37
Gorbachev first tried to implement some of the goals of the 1982 Food
Programme—improving the capital stock of farm machinery and repair
facilities, improving storage and transportation, improving rural housing,
and upgrading food processing and packaging.38 After 1987, Gorbachev
moved beyond the Food Programme to embrace farm self-financing, farm
autonomy and incentives, land leasing, and encouraging a private (non-
state) sector. In 1987 foreign trade was partially liberalised although
the USSR did not turn into a free trade country. During Gorbachev’s
early years in power, 1985–1987, the Soviet Union remained highly
food protectionist except when needed. After 1988, the Soviet economy
opened up and foreign companies entered the Soviet food market in food
retailing and restaurants, including the opening of the first McDonald’s
restaurant in Moscow in 1990.39
Despite the fact that there was a short-term rise in food consump-
tion, Gorbachev’s reforms did not bring farm autonomy and food losses
remained high: as much as 30 percent of the harvest and 50 percent
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for potatoes and vegetables.40 The Stalinist procurement system that had
existed since the 1930s crumbled in 1990 and 1991 and the prodnalog
(food tax) proved ineffective for obtaining food to feed the cities and
maintain livestock.41 As a result, grain imports from the West continued
to be high. Despite favourable harvests of 211 mmt in 1989 and 235 mmt
in 1990, the USSR imported nearly 40 mmt of grain in 1989 and 26 mmt
in 1990. In 1991, the last year of the Soviet Union’s existence, the harvest
was less than 173 mmt and it imported 38 mmt of grain.42 Gorbachev’s
agrarian reforms did little to reduce reliance on Western grain, which
meant that entrance into the global food market remained frequent and
its degree of involvement with the global food market remained high. Its
agricultural trade protectionism transitioned from high to low by the end
of the decade.
7 Russia’s Trading Behaviour in the 1990s
In the 1990s, Russia’s frequency of entrance into the global food market
was high and its degree of involvement in the global food market was
high as the value of imports rose significantly. Post-Soviet protectionism
was low during much of the decade although that started to change in
mid-decade. The degree of integration with Western global institutions
remained low as Russia remained outside of GATT/WTO.
As the country transitioned from a command to a market economy
during the 1990s, Russia was a regular participant in the international
food trade system as an importer due to the steep decline in its agri-
cultural production. Large farm enterprises traditionally fed the nation,
whereas food production from household gardens tended to be consumed
by the household, in other words, locally. An index for 1994 estimated
agricultural output by agricultural enterprises (large farms) at 57 percent
of their 1990 level.43 To compensate for falling domestic production by
large farms, Russia turned to food imports. Calculated in U.S. dollars,
the value of Russia’s food imports rose from $5.6 billion USD in 1993
to $13.3 billion USD in 1997 before declining in 1998 and 1999
following the financial collapse and devaluation of the ruble that made
foreign food very expensive. It is worth noting that the value of food
imports exceeded by many times the value of domestic food production.
The 1990s witnessed an increase in food imports from the West, which
replaced former republics as Russia’s primary food trading partner. Up to
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1998, the dollar value of food imports from states not in the Common-
wealth of Independent States (CIS) exceeded the dollar value of food
imports from CIS members by a factor of two or three, depending on the
year.44
The increase in the value of Russia’s food imports accompanied the
liberalisation of the economy and foreign trade after 1992. Although still
not a member of GATT, the early post-Soviet years witnessed a lowering
of Soviet-era barriers and further opening the Russian economy in antic-
ipation of early membership in the WTO. As a result, foreign foodstuffs
both raw and processed flooded Russia’s marketplace. Within the context
of a rising value of food imports, Russia changed from a large importer
of grain early in the decade (more than 15 mmt per year during 1990–
1992),45 to a large meat importer by mid-decade, driven by a significant
drop in domestic livestock herds. The percentage decline in the number
of pigs, beef cattle, and milk cows during the first five years of market
reform in the 1990s exceeded the losses during the first five years of
Stalin’s collectivisation. The decline in livestock herds reflected farm adap-
tation to new economic conditions: a range of state subsidies disappeared,
price increases for domestic feed grain, fuel, and other inputs exceeded
farmgate prices. As a consequence, large cities were importing upwards
of 70–80 percent of their meat by 1995–1996.46
Russia had poor harvests throughout the decade. The first year as a
non-communist state started with a good harvest of nearly 107 mmt in
1992. During 1995–1996, however, its grain harvest averaged 66.3 mmt
and in 1998–1999 it averaged of just 51.2 mmt per year. Nonetheless,
grain imports averaged just 3.74 mmt for 1995–1996 and 3.78 mmt for
1998–1999, far below the levels of the 1980s. The precipitous decrease
in the size of livestock herds was one reason why grain consumption
plummeted and there was less need for foreign feed grain, as explained
by the Lieferts in Chapter 2. In addition, consumers’ food consump-
tion patterns changed. As retail food subsidies from the state disappeared
after 1992, for most Russian consumers the primary problem during the
1990s was the price of food, not availability.47 In the grips of a major
recession, consumers ate less beef, which put downward pressure on farm
incentives to maintain large herds.48 By 1996–1997 Russian consumers
substituted cheap imported poultry for domestic beef, similar to how
American consumers turned to chicken during the early 1930s when up to
one-half of households had no regular income during the Great Depres-
sion. The availability of cheap starches and carbohydrates meant that even
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with high food inflation and mass poverty, there was no mass hunger even
as average caloric intake decreased.49
Russia’s financial crisis in 1998 led to three occurrences that affected
its food imports. First, with the devaluation of the ruble, imported food
became very expensive and thus Russian consumers shifted to domestic
products. As a result, the dollar value of food imports fell from $13.3
billion USD in 1997 to $7.3 billion USD in 2000. Second, Russian food
processors and manufacturers adapted quickly to capitalise on their price
advantage and created attractive packaging that mirrored Western brands.
Third, Russia’s trade policy became more protectionist.
The origins of increased trade protectionism pre-dated Russia’s August
1998 financial crisis. By 1996–1997 conservative voices in society and
the government were raising alarms about threats to national food secu-
rity. In December 1997, President Boris Yeltsin approved a document
titled ‘Conception of the National Security of the Russian Federation’,
which stated that dependence on food imports and Russia’s integration
into the world market was not beneficial. Simultaneously, conservative
and nationalist groups within Russia complained about the loss of food
independence.50 In April 1998, the law ‘On Measures of Protection of
Russian Economic Interests in Foreign Trade’ was signed that identified
poultry, vegetable oil, and meat for protection through an increase in
tariffs.51 In June 1998, a 5 percent increase in tariffs for all food imports
was enacted. At this time, Russian leaders were engaged in a delicate
balancing act, wanting to protect domestic producers while simultane-
ously avoiding a large increase in the cost of food to the average family
budget, which already was quite high; and in 1998 the Yeltsin adminis-
tration still held out hope to join the WTO by the end of the year and
thus did not want to go too far in protectionist measures.
Following Russia’s financial crisis in August 1998, then-Minister of
Agriculture Viktor Semenov (April 1998–May 1999) called for a ‘new
course’ in agrarian policy that rested on increased state regulation of the
agro-industrial complex and defence of Russia’s domestic food market.
In particular, Semenov noted that export subsidies in the European
Union undercut Russian producers, thus ‘easily conquering’ Russia’s
food market.52 Aleksei Gordeev, who became Minister of Agriculture in
August 1999 (to March 2009), was explicit that his ‘new agrarian policy’
would emphasise strengthening the role of the government in regulating
Russia’s food market. He also specified that tariff-custom policy would
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create conditions whereby domestic producers could effectively compete
with food imports.53
8 Russia’s Trading Behaviour
in the 2000-2013 Period
During the 2000-2013 period, Russia’s frequency of entrance into the
global food market was high and its degree of involvement in the global
food market was high as the value of food imports and exports rose
significantly. Russia’s degree of protectionism remained relatively low. The
degree of integration was transitional as Russia finally became a member
of the WTO in 2012.
Russia remained a consistent participant in the international food trade
system as a food importer. The value of Russia’s food imports grew
substantially as a result of economic recovery, a significant increase in real
per capita income, and a strengthening in the ruble that made imports
cheaper. Russia’s agricultural imports increased from $7.3 billion USD in
2000 to over $35 billion USD in 2008. After a brief decline in food
imports in 2009 due to the global financial crisis (Russia’s GDP fell
by almost 9 percent), the value of food imports began to rise again in
2010 and eventually reached its post-Soviet peak of $43.2 billion USD
in 2013. Similar to the 1990s, the largest value of food imports consisted
of meat and animal husbandry, not grain, as explained by the Lieferts in
Chapter 2. Other main imports included highly processed foods, fruits,
and vegetables. During the first decade of the 2000s, Russia became the
second largest agricultural importer among emerging markets, trailing
only China. It is conceivable that the value of Russia’s food imports would
have continued to rise had the 2014 Ukrainian crisis not occurred that led
to a ban on agri-food imports from major Western nations.
Russia’s participation in the international food trade system was also
fuelled by a rise in its food exports. The value of Russia’s agricultural
exports grew from $1.62 billion USD in 2000 to $10 billion USD in
2009 before declining in 2010. Russia’s food exports then rose to $12
billion USD in 2011 and reached their pre-Ukrainian crisis high of $18.9
billion USD in 2014. Most of the export growth came from grain (mainly
wheat and barley). Grain exports rose from 1.3 mmt in the 2000/2001
agricultural year to 21.8 mmt in the 2009/10 agricultural year before
declining in 2010/2011 due to a drought and a subsequent ban on grain
exports from August 2010 to July 2011. One the export ban ended, grain
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exports started to increase again, reaching 22.4 mmt in the 2012/2013
agricultural year. Grain exports generated the most foreign trade revenue
among Russia’s food exports. Expressed in dollar value, however, the
overall impact of Russia’s exports on the world food system was low.
During 2000–2009, the value for global exports of food commodities
averaged $522 billion USD per year.54 The dollar of Russia’s food exports
during the same period averaged just $5.14 billion USD.
Foreign food trade protectionism remained low during this time
period. In 2003 Russia introduced tariff-rate quotas on beef, poultry,
and pork that offered some protection to domestic producers. The Putin
administration walked a fine line: on the one hand it wanted to protect
domestic large farm enterprises from foreign competition until such time
that they could compete effectively, and it wanted to help them recover
financially. On the other hand, it wanted to meet rising consumer demand
for food and therefore the volume of meat imports continued to climb.
If cheaper food imports helped to limit the amount an average household
spent on food, all the better.
Government policy began to emphasise food security in 2008 when
the combination of high food imports and the dramatic rise in global
commodity prices sparked fear of contagion. In 2008, a Food Secu-
rity Doctrine was drafted and circulated for commentary; it was signed
into force in January 2010 by former President Dmitrii Medvedev, the
importance of which was to quantify what percentage of different food-
stuffs Russia should produce for itself in order to be food secure. Until
2014, Russia’s Food Security Doctrine did not translate into higher trade
barriers or an increase in food trade protectionism aside from what already
existed.
Russia’s integration with global food trade institutions transitioned
from low to high as Russia finally became a member of the WTO in
2012 after being an observer to the WTO for many years. The debates
over whether to integrate with the world trading system appeared to be
over.55 At the time Russia entered the WTO, most of its food trade was
with Western nations. In 2000, for example, 72 percent of Russia’s food
imports came with nations that were not former Soviet republics in the
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), as did 56 percent of its
food exports. Over time, trade with non-CIS nations increased. In 2013,
the last full year before the Ukrainian crisis in 2014 and Russia’s subse-
quent food embargo in August 2014, food trade with non-CIS nations
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accounted for 85 percent of Russia’s food imports and 70 percent of its
exports.56
After the Ukrainian crisis and the first rounds of Western sanctions
in 2014, Putin invoked the protection of national security clause in the
WTO to relieve Russia from some of its commitments, for instance,
not to introduce food bans or treating trading partners differently.
Russia continues adhere to other obligations. In 2017 import duties on
sunflower oil, water, and cigars were reduced in accordance with commit-
ments made to the WTO. As noted before, in 2020 Russia ended its
tariff-rate quotas on pork, replaced by a flat tariff of 25 percent. Whether
coincidental to the changed tariff rate or not, Russia’s pork imports fell
in 2020, attributed to rising investment in the sector, increased output,
and the attraction of export possibilities.
9 Russia’s Trading Behaviour since 2014
Since 2014, two contradictory impulses in Russia’s agri-food trade policy
have become discernible. The first impulse is a strong emphasis on food
security, import substitution, and food self-sufficiency (see Chapter 4).
As Clapp reminds us, self-sufficiency means to produce enough to meet
one’s own needs, and thus food self-sufficiency is concerned with the
origin of food.57 Self-sufficiency policy implies not just protectionism but
a withdrawal from international markets in terms of food imports.58 The
second impulse, which contradicts the first, is an emphasis on expanding
food trade, opening new markets, and increasing food exports. Despite a
food self-sufficiency policy, Russia has not withdrawn from international
food markets, and although the dollar value of its food imports is down
from the pre-2014 period, Russia remains a large importer of food. In this
respect, Russia’s policy of self-sufficiency is not exactly what the literature
would assume is true. Further, although Russia’s food security policy has
economic implications, it should be understood as a political variable that
is used in tandem with food trade as an instrument of foreign policy, and
as a prop for nationalism. What this means is that Russian leaders defini-
tion of ‘success’ in food security is very narrow, referring mainly to the
production of several basic commodities. But if the view of food security
is expanded just a bit, it is obvious that the Russian version of food secu-
rity, i.e., protectionism and lessened dependence on imports, is far from
reality. In this respect, one may point to high percentages of seeds that are
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imported; high percentages of farm imported farm machinery and equip-
ment; high percentages of imported pedigree livestock; and a substantial
presence and market share by foreign agri-firms in food processing and
food retailing. One might even include the erosion of human capital in
rural areas, a result of outmigration, as an aspect of food security.59 Thus,
a narrow fixation on certain commodity production, therefore, does not
offer a complete or necessarily accurate view of Russia’s food security.
Turning to the four variables that frame the analysis, since 2014
Russia’s frequency of entrance into the global food market has been high
and its degree of involvement in the global food market is high. Russia
regularly enters the global food market as both a food importer and
exporter, both of which are valued in the tens of billions of dollars annu-
ally. Agri-food trade protectionism became variegated as it transitioned
from low protectionist to selectively high towards Western nations while
remaining more open to non-Western nations. The degree of integration
with Western institutions transitioned from high following entry to the
WTO in 2012 to low starting in 2014 and continuing thereafter.
The year 2014 was a watershed year for Russia’s role in the inter-
national food trade system. The origins of change in Russia’s role in
international food trade were found in the Ukrainian crisis that witnessed
the removal of Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych in February 2014,
followed by Russia’s military involvement in eastern Ukraine and annex-
ation of Crimea in March 2014. Subsequently, Western sanctions were
placed on Russia in March and July 2014, and Russia’s countersanc-
tions—a food embargo against the West—were announced in August
2014. Russia’s countersanctions, often referred to as the food embargo,
banned most agri-food imports from the United States, the European
Union, Canada, Norway, and Australia from 7 August. The ban has
been extended several times since then and currently runs to the end of
2022. In 2015, four other nations were added to the banned list, and in
2016 Ukraine was added. Since 2014, four discontinuities with previous
agri-food trade patterns have occurred.
The first discontinuity from the pre-2014 period is a reversal in the
upward trend in the dollar value of Russia’s food imports. Russia’s food
imports rose from $30 billion USD in 2009 to over $43 billion USD
in 2013. Following the introduction of Russia’s food embargo in August
2014 against Western nations, its food imports fell to $26.5 billion in
2015 and then to a low of $25 billion USD in 2016 before starting to rise
somewhat in subsequent years, but remaining far below the pre-embargo
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level. In 2020, the value of food imports was just over $29 billion USD.
As noted above, the decline in the value of Russia’s food imports was
facilitated by policies of import substitution and food self-sufficiency, both
of which were actively pursued by the Kremlin (see Chapter 4).
A second discontinuity is a significant rise in the volume and value of
food exports, a departure from many years of moderate food exports.
The rise in exports is due to a confluence of factors, including favourable
weather, state financial assistance that promotes higher grain produc-
tion, protectionism from competition, and favourable farming practices
such as re-mechanisation, digitalisation, and increases in yield per hectare.
Russia’s wheat exports since the 2014/2015 agricultural year and contin-
uing through the 2019/2020 agricultural year averaged more than 37
mmt. From 2014/2015 through the 2019/2020 agricultural year, Russia
led the world in volume of wheat exports in four of the six agricultural
years, and ranked second in the other two agricultural seasons. By volume,
in the 2016/2017 agriculture year Russia’s wheat exports accounted for
14 percent of global wheat trade; in the 2017/2018 agricultural year,
Russia’s wheat exports accounted for 18 percent of global wheat trade;
19 percent in the 2018/2019 agricultural year; and 18 percent in the
2019/2020 agricultural year.60
In 2020, grain exports generated approximately one-third of Russia’s
total food export revenue ($9.7 billion of $28.9 billion USD), and wheat
in particular accounted for more than any other agri-food commodity.61
In 2020, other main food exports consist of fish and seafood (18 percent
of total), fats and oils (16 percent of total), and processed and manu-
factured foods (14 percent of total). Although Russia will remain a major
grain exporter, it is necessary to note in passing that political food security
remains an important variable. During the second half of the 2019/2020
agricultural year the government introduced an export quota of 7 mmt
to the end of June when a new agricultural year would begin (on 1 July).
In reality, the quota was reached prior to the 30 June deadline. Although
the quota did not appear to directly reduce grain exports, the existence of
the quota affected the willingness of traders to enter into contracts. The
purpose of the quota was to ensure that too much grain was not exported,
fuelling inflation or causing domestic shortages. For the 2020/2021 agri-
cultural year, the government introduced another export quota of 17.5
mmt 15 February 2021 to 30 June 2021, plus an export tariff. Starting 15
February, the tariff was 25 euro per tonne which doubled to 50 euro per
tonne on 1 March. From 2 June 2021, a flexible tariff was used for wheat,
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corn, and barley sold outside the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU),
equal to 70 percent of the difference between the contract price and the
base price of $200 per tonne for wheat and $185 for corn and barley.62
A third discontinuity is a partial withdrawal from integration with
major Western nations, at least as far was food imports into Russia are
concerned, although Russia continues to export to member states of the
European Union. Russia has not withdrawn from the WTO, although
some voices within Russia have called for doing so. Further, as early as
2015 the United States Trade Representative noted in its annual report
about Russia’s compliance to its WTO commitments that Russian stan-
dards for tetracycline, ractopamine, and other hormones in pork and
beef were more stringent than accepted levels. The June 2015 report
concluded that ‘the United States has become increasingly concerned that
Russia may be moving away from the core WTO principle of trade liberal-
ization’.63 Subsequent reports continued to express concern over Russia’s
standards, notification of risk assessment, and implementation. The 2018
report, for example, noted that, ‘although Russia has put in place the legal
framework to allow it to comply with its WTO commitments, its imple-
mentation of these commitments remains problematic….Russia does not
appear to have implemented fully its commitments to base measurements
on international standards, or, where it applies a more stringent stan-
dards, to provide a science-based, objectsive risk assessment’.64 In other
words, Russia became increasingly willing to use non-tariff barriers such
as sanitation requirements to restrict food imports from the West.
A fourth discontinuity flows from the third and concerns the expansion
of trade relations with non-Western partners. Russia has changed its main
food trading partners, substituting China and Southeast Asia, the Middle
East, and South America for the EU and United States. The discontinuity
is seen by the fact that up to 2014 the EU was Russia’s primary partner
in agricultural trade. Ironically, while most agricultural imports from the
EU are banned, the EU remains an important market for Russia’s food
exports. In 2020, the EU ranked second after China in dollar value of
Russia’s agri-food exports, accounting for about 11 percent.65 Following
the events in Ukraine in 2014, Russia turned elsewhere to substitute for
its lost partner in the EU (see Chapters 5 And 7).
Furthermore, the EAEU, which came into being in January 2015,
represents Moscow’s efforts to create a regional trade bloc with non-
Western nations. Other chapters explore agri-food trade within the EAEU
in more detail, but here suffice it to say that since its inception the EAEU
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has expanded its trading network. In May 2018 China signed a trade
agreement with the EAEU that has been touted as a free trade agree-
ment but in reality seems to be something less than that as explained
in Chapter 8. In May 2018, Iran signed a provisional free trade agree-
ment with the EAEU that covers a limited number of goods, including
agricultural products. The provisional agreement is to last for three years
and paves the way to full free trade. In December 2018 the EAEU and
Iran established free trade zones. In October 2019, the EAEU and Serbia
signed a free trade zone agreement for cheese and alcohol, building on
the previous preferential trade agreement.66 The EAEU had previously
agreed to free trade with Vietnam in December 2016, and trade between
Russia and Vietnam is explored in Chapter 6. The point is that Russia is
using the EAEU to pivot its food trade away from Western nations.
The opening to non-Western trade partners is further witnessed by
Russia’s bilateral memoranda of understanding (MoU) or statements of
cooperation in agriculture with India, Morocco, China, Syria, Mongolia,
Japan, and Saudi Arabia during 2017–2019, to name just a few. Egypt,
Iran, Bangladesh, and Turkey remain main purchasers of Russian wheat.
Food trade with China very likely will increase as Russia’s exporters
attempt to capture market share lost by American farmers due to the
trade war started by President Donald Trump. Russia’s food exporters
are also eyeing markets in Vietnam and other Southeast Asian nations
and the Middle East as discussed in subsequent chapters. In addition to
those regions, agricultural trade has expanded with South America since
2014. In particular, Russia became the largest importer of Brazilian meat.
Chile has increased its exports of poultry, pork, fish, vegetables, and fruits
to Russia. Uruguay also increased meat exports to Russia.
10 Outlook
The future outlook for Russia’s agri-food trade behaviour is summarised
according to the four variables that comprise the analytical framework.
The frequency of Russia’s entrance into the global food market is likely to
remain high as an annual importer and exporter. The Russia’s structure
of demand for food that suggests an impending large decrease in food
imports. Further, Russia’s food export ambitions commit the country to
continue as a significant food exporter on an annual basis. Russia intends
to remain an active participant in global food trade as evidenced by the
adoption of an export programme in 2016, followed by the adoption
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of a national project on food exports in late 2018. The existence of
an analytical centre within the Ministry of Agriculture facilitates Russia’s
food exports by training personnel in contracts and negotiations and
providing consultation and legal services to exporting companies. The
export project received more than R38 billion in 2019 and is sched-
uled to receive more than R400 billion during 2019–2024.67 Under the
auspices of the export project, the Ministry of Agriculture is opening
attaché offices abroad to establish trade ties in new markets. Russia’s role
as a food exporter is likely to expand.
Agricultural protectionism is likely to remain selectively high, which is
to say that there is no end in sight to Russia’s countersanctions against
the West. Russia’s domestic agri-food producers are pleased with the
government’s protectionism and favour its continuation. The govern-
ment likes agricultural protectionism because it helps domestic producers
and processors whose higher profitability leads to more tax revenue
for regional budgets and the federal government. The government also
appreciates the prestige that comes from being a large wheat exporter.
The degree of integration with Western trade institutions is likely
to remain low. As noted above, the trend is for less cooperation with
the WTO. Instead, Russia has pivoted to Asia, the Middle East, and
other non-Western countries. Engagement with other BRICS nations,
the EAEU, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), as well
as bilateral trade ties has replaced most food imports from the EU. So
far, the pivot has worked well and thus Russia shows little motivation to
revert back to ties with the West which would make Russia vulnerable to
the whims of Western policy again.
Russia’s degree of involvement with the global food market is likely
to remain high. Russia will continue to import food valued in the tens of
billions of dollars annually. As an exporter, Russia is likely to account for a
significant portion of global grain trade. A major effort is being made to
increase the export of processed and manufactured food products, not
just raw commodities. Further, Russia’s agricultural sector is generally
considered to be a winner during climate change as growing seasons in
northern latitutes lengthen. Around the world, water tables are depleted,
but Russia has an ample supply of water. In many regions of the world,
land is leached of its nutrients, but Russia has tens of millions of unused
hectares of agricultural land. Russia is already increasing the cultivation
of previously unused or abandoned agricultural land and expects to bring
millions of hectares into production by 2025.
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Finally, a few words about the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on
food exports. The pandemic created uncertainty for lives and livelihoods
around the world, leading to higher unemployment, loss of income, the
closure of businesses including restaurants, and disruptions in supply
chains. The economic effects, which were initially quite severe—trade
turnover in Russia decreased to 35–45 percent in April 2020 and by at
least 60 percent at restaurants and cafes—may be shortlived as people
get vaccinated and businesses rebound.68 Through it all, Russia’s agri-
cultural sector performed well, with the second largest harvest in the
post-Soviet period at 133 mmt of grain after cleaning. Russia’s infrastruc-
ture for policy as a food exporting state remains strong: high ambition to
be a global food power and to benefit from the leverage that accrues from
that position; an active state that promotes food exports; and strong polit-
ical commitment to increase global influence and status. Those factors,
combined with a weak ruble, led Rossel’khozbank to predict that Russia’s
role in the world food system will become more significant despite myriad
obstacles.69
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1 Introduction
Since the mid-2000s, Russia has developed into a major grain exporter.
The growth in grain exports in the last few years was especially high, with
foreign sales rising from the 2011–2015 period to the 2016–2019 period
by an annual average of 64 percent, from 27 to 44 million metric tonnes
(mmt). The country’s main grain export is wheat, and by the late 2010s
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Russia’s annual average foreign sales of 35 mmt gave the country around
a 20 percent share in world wheat trade.
During the late Soviet period, Russia (along with the Soviet Union as
a whole) was a major grain importer rather than exporter. This chapter
examines how Russia has flipped its trade balance in grain and emerged as
a large wheat exporter. The key causal developments were the extreme
downsizing of the country’s livestock sector during the 1990s which
reduced domestic demand for feed grain, and more importantly, the
steady rise in grain production beginning after 2000 that created surpluses
for export. The growth in Russian grain output has been driven by an
increase in yield (output per hectare). We explain why Russian grain yields
have been rising. The chapter also examines the outlook for Russian grain
production and exports.
The chapter is structured as follows. The next section discusses Russia’s
importance in world grain markets, followed by an analysis of the
close connection between the Russian grain and livestock sectors. The
following section examines why Russian grain production has increased
substantially since 2000. The effect on grain production and trade of
state policy and changes in the value of the Russian ruble (especially its
exchange rate vis-à-vis the U.S. dollar) is also assessed. The last section
presents the outlook for the Russian grain economy, in particular the
volumes of production and exports. A model of world agriculture and
trade developed by the Economic Research Service (ERS) within the
United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) is used to project
future Russian grain area, yield, production, and exports to the year 2029.
2 Russia in the World Grain Market
During 2016–2019, Russia supplied 10–14 percent of total world grain
exports, and about 20 percent of wheat exports (see Fig. 1). In recent
years the country has supplanted the United States as the world’s top
wheat exporter. The country is also a major exporter of barley, with 17
percent world export share in 2016–2019, while Russia’s corn export
share during that time was 2.7 percent.1
During 2016–2019, Russia’s total grain exports averaged 44 mmt a
year, and exports of wheat 35 mmt. In volume terms, wheat accounted
for 79 percent of Russia’s total grain exports, while barley and corn both
had shares of 10 percent during the same period. Russia currently imports
almost no grain.
















Fig. 1 Russia’s share in world grain exports (Source USDA Production, Supply,
and Distribution Online, accessed 27 July 2020 Note Exports are gross)
Currently, the main foreign markets for Russian grain are the Middle
East and North Africa (especially Turkey, Egypt, Sudan, Morocco, and
Yemen), certain Asian countries (such as Bangladesh and Vietnam),
Nigeria, and some countries formerly within the USSR (such as Latvia
and Azerbaijan). Most of the wheat exported is of low milling quality
used to produce (human) food products, though it can also be used as
animal feed.
3 Russia’s Grain Economy
and the Livestock Sector
Historically, Russia’s grain economy has been closely linked to its livestock
sector. During the last two decades of the Soviet Union, the main goal of
state agricultural policy was to expand the production and consumption of
meat and other animal products in order to raise the country’s standard
of living. Between 1970 and 1990, a policy built on large subsidies to
both producers and consumers succeeded in increasing meat production
by more than 50 percent.2 To help supply its livestock sector with animal
feed, the Soviet Union became a larger importer of grain, soybeans, and
soybean meal, to the benefit of large producers of these bulk crops such
as the United States, Canada, and Australia.
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The transition from a planned to a market economy in the 1990s
led to contraction in the livestock sector. Because of severe financial
constraints, the large budget subsidies to agriculture—and especially
the previously favoured livestock sector—were mostly terminated. Price
reform also ended the indirect subsidies that agriculture had enjoyed
during the Soviet period, whereby output prices were set high relative
to input prices.3 Consequently, during the 1990s the terms of trade for
Russian agricultural producers (the ratio of output to input prices) fell by
about 75 percent. Substantially higher prices for inputs resulted in a large
decline in their use, which contributed to the extreme drop in agricultural
production, both in ruble value and in volume.
During the 1990s, product output in Russia fell by about a half.4 As
livestock herds declined in size, the demand for animal feed dropped
sharply. Russia’s large imports of feed grain (as well as soybeans and
soybean meal) largely ended, and grain production declined by about a
third, from an annual average of 95 mmt during 1987–1991 to 63 mmt
during 1996–2000 (see Table 1). Rather than importing a lot of animal
feed to maintain a large and costly livestock sector, Russia increased its
imports of meat, from an annual average of 1.9 mmt during 1989–1991
to 3.1 mmt during 2006–2010.5
The extreme downsizing of agriculture during the 1990s caused severe
hardship for producers and was regarded by the Russian government as a
disaster. However, the major restructuring of agricultural production and
trade during the decade appears to have been an economically rational
and necessary correction to the overexpansion of the sector during the
last decades of the Soviet period, especially of livestock.
4 Growth in Grain Production
After 2000, Russian grain production began to slowly rise, and then
increased more rapidly after 2008. From 1996–2000 to 2016–2019,
annual average Russian grain output increased from 63 to 115 mmt
(see Table 1). The growth from 2011–2015 to 2016–2019 was espe-
cially high, with annual average production over the two periods rising
by almost a third. In addition, from 1996–2000 to 2016–2019, the
annual production of wheat more than doubled, from 34 to 76 mmt
(all output figures are annual averages). Corn output also rose at a fast
rate to 13.5 mmt by 2016–2019 (though from a low base). However,
the annual production of other coarse grains, including barley, rye, and
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wheat 41.8 38.0 34.3 44.9 52.3 53.2 75.7
barley 23.4 24.2 14.2 17.8 16.6 16.7 18.6
corn 3.3 1.8 1.4 2.2 4.2 10.3 13.5
other
grain
26.2 19.7 12.8 11.2 8.8 8.1 7.3
total
grain




wheat 23.8 22.5 21.5 22.9 24.2 23.7 27.0
barley 15.0 14.3 9.1 9.3 8.0 8.0 8.0
corn 1.1 0.6 0.6 0.7 1.2 2.2 2.6
other
grain
18.3 13.6 9.2 6.9 5.3 4.9 4.0
total
grain
58.2 51.1 40.4 39.8 38.8 38.9 41.6
Yield Tons per hectare
wheat 1.76 1.69 1.59 1.96 2.16 2.24 2.80
barley 1.56 1.69 1.57 1.91 2.08 2.07 2.34
corn 3.00 2.82 2.34 3.30 3.42 4.61 5.24
other
grain
1.43 1.45 1.39 1.62 1.66 1.64 1.83
total
grain




wheat 0.9 0.6 0.9 7.7 12.8 20.0 34.9
barley 0.1 0.8 0.5 2.2 1.8 3.6 4.4
corn 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 3.2 4.5
other
grain
0.3 0.3 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2
total
grain




− 21.1 − 7.7 − 2.6 8.3 14.3 25.9 43.4
Note Grain excludes rice, buckwheat, and pulses. Figures are annual average over the period identified.
Net trade is for total grain; positive values are net exports, negative values net imports
Source USDA Production, Supply, and Distribution Online, and for yield, computed from data from
that source
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oats, fell collectively from 1987–1991 to 1996–2000 by over half, and to
2016–2019 by a further 43 percent (see Table 1).
Contraction of the livestock sector during the 1990s contributed to
the growth in grain exports after 2000 by reducing demand for domestic
feed, thereby freeing up output for sale abroad. The downsizing of the
livestock sector, replacing of domestically produced livestock products
with imports, and rising grain exports after 2000 are consistent with the
country’s fundamental cost competitiveness (or comparative advantage)
in world markets.6
Russia’s move from being a large grain importer during the late Soviet
period to a major exporter has resulted in about 70 mmt of more grain
being available on the world market (see Fig. 2). Similar to Russia, both
Ukraine and Kazakhstan have experienced a similar restructuring of their
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Fig. 2 Russian grain production and net trade (Source Russian Federal Service
of State Statistics, Russian Statistical Yearbook, various issues, accessed 31 July
2020; USDA Production, Supply, and Distribution Online, accessed 27 July
2020. Note The bars give average annual grain production over the periods
1987–1991, 1992–1995, 1996–2000, 2001–2005, 2006–2010, 2011–2015, and
2016–2019. Negative net grain exports are net imports)
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market economies. If one includes those two countries with Russia, an
additional 120 mmt of grain is available on the world market.
4.1 Grain Area
Given that grain output can be expressed as grain area times yield, one
way of examining why Russian grain production began to rise around
2000 is to focus on these two elements. Russian grain output has been
increasing mainly because of growth in yields rather than area. Total
Russian grain area (harvested) dropped from 1987–1991 to 1996–2000
by 30 percent, and since that time has remained fairly flat, with an annual
average of 42 million hectares during 2016–2019. The main reason
Russian grain area has not rebounded from its drop during the 1990s
appears to be that much of the abandoned land was in remote regions
with high production costs, mainly in the northern and eastern parts
of the country, though also in some arid regions in southern European
Russia.7
However, some switch in area has occurred between the various grain
crops, with the changes in area mirroring those in production. From
1987–1991 to 2016–19, the area devoted to wheat increased from 24
to 27 million hectares, while over the same period the area cultivated
with corn more than doubled (though from a small base) to 2.6 million
hectares. On other hand, area for the other coarse grains (such as barley,
rye, and oats) decreased over this period by almost 80 percent (see Table
1).
4.2 Grain Yield
In contrast to area, Russian grain yields since 2000 have increased
substantially. From 1996–2000 to 2016–2019, total grain yield rose from
1.55 tonnes per hectare (annual average) to 2.77 tonnes per hectare (see
Table 1). One reason for the growth was a rebound in fertiliser use, which
during the 1990s had declined by around 80 percent (as measured by
kilograms of fertiliser used per hectare of sown grain area), as part of the
overall decline in agricultural input use discussed earlier. From 2000 to
2018, fertiliser use per hectare of Russian grain tripled, from 20 to 60 kg
per sown hectare.8
Yields can grow from increasing the amount of inputs (such as
fertiliser) used in production, or by raising the productivity of those inputs
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(measured by units of output per units of input used in production). One
way to raise productivity is through technological change. Russian agri-
culture, including the grain sector, has benefited from such improvement,
partly from the use of new and superior inputs (called embodied techno-
logical progress). For the grain sector, this has taken the form of new
high-quality seed varieties (such as high-yielding hybrid corn seed) and
modern machinery, much of it imported. Modern techniques such as soil
testing for fertiliser rates have also been adopted. Productivity-enhancing
investment and technological change are occurring in Russian agricul-
ture.9 For example, between 2010 and 2015, investment in machinery
and equipment grew by 120 percent in real terms.
Another reason why the Russian agricultural sector in general, and
grain yields in particular, improved was that the new market-oriented
economy freed farms from the dictates of central planning. Producers,
rather than distant planners, could now determine for themselves the mix
of goods to produce and the inputs to use in production. Economists call
the specific type of gain that can ensue from such changes improvement
in allocative efficiency , which can have two components.
The first is a gain in the allocative efficiency in production, whereby
producers/farms determine the optimal mix of inputs to use in making
a given volume of output.10 The second is a gain in the allocative effi-
ciency in consumption, whereby in determining the mix and volume of
goods to make, producers respond to market demand rather than plan-
ners’ orders. The market-generated changes in the composition of output
raise consumer welfare, and thereby the welfare of the overall economy.11
Improvement in allocative efficiency can be difficult to measure.
However, the major changes in the mix of specific grain products in
total grain area and production since 2000 (more wheat and corn and
less other coarse grains) are indicators of likely improvement in allocative
efficiency.
An example of an allocative efficiency gain in production within the
grain economy that is amenable to some measurement is that since 2000,
area has been moving from spring wheat to higher-yielding winter wheat.
Between 2000–2002 and 2017–2019, Russian spring wheat area fell from
an annual average of 14.2 to 11.6 million hectares, while Russian winter
wheat area rose from 8.7 to 15.3 million hectares.12 Winter wheat is a
higher-yielding crop than spring wheat, and after 2000 investment in its
production pushed its trend yield up, while spring wheat yields grew only
slightly. Figure 3 shows that since 2000, Russian winter wheat yields have
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Fig. 3 Russian Winter Versus Spring Wheat Yield (Source Calculated from
USDA Production, Supply, and Distribution Online, accessed 27 July 2020)
risen at more than twice the rate of spring wheat yields, increasing the
yield gap between the two crops. The switch from spring to winter wheat
is raising the allocative efficiency of grain production, and thereby overall
grain yields and output, by moving resources (in particular land) from
producing a less productive type of wheat to a more productive one.
An appeal of allocative efficiency gains that can increase input produc-
tivity and output, as well as consumer welfare, is that the benefits
achieved do not require technological change. Russia’s allocative effi-
ciency gains have been generated by systemic change, whereby market-
oriented producers replaced planners in determining the mix of goods
produced and the inputs used in their production.13
That said, technological change and improvement in allocative effi-
ciency can both increase the productivity of inputs used in production,
thereby raising the volume of output produced by a given amount of
inputs. Empirical studies find that since 2000 productivity in Russian agri-
culture has been increasing. From 1999 to 2008, total factor productivity
(TFP) in Russian agriculture grew by about a quarter.14 Other analysts
concluded that during 2000–2007, TFP rose even more substantially, by
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54 percent.15 Still others found that from 1998 to 2013, agricultural TFP
increased by 72 percent.16 Productivity growth was highest in southern
European Russia, which specialises in grain and oilseeds.
5 Producers
The systemic change of moving from a planned to a market
economy allowed agricultural producers to improve allocative effi-
ciency by switching to a more productive mix of inputs and a
more consumer-satisfying mix of outputs. Around 2000, another major
systemic/institutional change occurred in Russian agriculture whereby a
new type of agricultural operator emerged which took advantage of the
opportunities offered by the market economy to increase productivity and
profit. Before discussing these new operators, we will review the main
types of producers in Russian agriculture.
During the 2000s, several types of agricultural producers developed,
but in 2000 there were three major types in Russia: (1) the former state
and collective farms inherited from the Soviet period; (2) household plots;
and (3) new private family farms.17 The dominant producer has been
the former Soviet state and collective farms, which in the 1990s were
forced officially to reorganise. Most became corporate, and in particular
‘joint stock’ enterprises that issued ownership vouchers to their managers
and workers, giving them a share in the farm’s land and other assets.
Individuals could use these vouchers to obtain land and leave the farm
to work as private farmers, or they could sell their vouchers to the farm
management and remain on the farm as hired labour. Most workers chose
the latter option. These farms retained their large size from the Soviet
period, typically holding thousands of hectares.
A second type of producer is household plots, also inherited from the
Soviet period, where households on the large farms were given small plots
to tend (typically only half a hectare). Households tended to produce
animal husbandry products, fruit, vegetables (including potatoes), and
honey; they contributed less than 1 percent of grain supply. Production
from household plots could be consumed by the households themselves
or sold in farmers’ private markets.18
The third type of producer is private family (also called ‘peasant’)
farms. These were created mainly by workers on the new corporate farms
using their ownership vouchers to obtain land and break away as inde-
pendent producers. These farms specialise in producing bulk crops such
CHAPTER 2: RUSSIA’S DEVELOPMENT AS A TOP PLAYER … 79
as grain and oilseeds, and by 2018 they held about held 34 percent of
Russian grain area. In that year, they accounted for 29 percent of Russian
grain output, a sizeable increase from their share in 2000 of 8 percent.19
In the early years of the 2000s, a new type of agricultural producer
emerged call ‘new operators’, agroholdings, which are vertically inte-
grated enterprises that typically combine primary agriculture, processing,
distribution, and retail sale.20Agroholdings usually acquire a number of
existing corporate farms and try to improve them, by cutting waste and
reducing production costs, and generally becoming more profit-oriented.
Agroholding management typically comes from outside of agriculture,
and brings investment, management skills, and technological innovation
into the sector (including foreign technology and know-how).
The Russian Federal Service of State Statistics (Rosstat) does not
collect separate data about agroholdings. Some authors argue that agro-
holdings hinder grain production and exports due to management and
financial problems, but those conclusions have been shown to be erro-
neous.21 However, an emerging literature has revealed other trends that
are important to Russia’s status as a major grain producer and exporter.
The largest agroholdings are several hundred thousand hectares in size,
which means that they are many times the size of Soviet-era state and
collective farms.22 Uzun calculated that in 2016 agroholdings held 11
percent of Russia’s total arable land and produced 23 percent of the
country’s grain.23 Agroholdings are particularly prominent in the Russian
grain belt of south-central and southern European Russia, which covers
the country’s rich black soil region.24
Some specialists argue that the new operators, and especially agrohold-
ings, outperform other agricultural producers in terms of productivity,
and therefore are a major source of the growth in Russian agricultural
production (including grain) since 2000.25 Uzun and Shagaida show
that agroholdings accounted for about 54 percent of all production, 56
percent of gross earnings, and more than 41 percent of total employment
among Russia’s agricultural enterprises in 2016.26 Some analysts argue
that the agroholdings benefit not from economies of scale but economies
of scope, given the continued institutional dysfunctionalities of Russian
agriculture.27 Other analysts find that agroholdings are neither more
productive nor profitable than other large Russian agricultural enter-
prises.28 Perhaps the agroholdings have become so large and unwieldy
that they suffer from diseconomies of scale. The data from Uzun and
Shagaida, however, cast doubt on these latter lines of argumentation.
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To summarise, the causality chain in growing Russian grain exports
since 2000 is as follows: systemic change combined with improved
farm management motivated both technological progress and gains in
allocative efficiency. The resulting increase in input productivity raised
grain yields, thereby generating surplus production above domestic needs
available for export.
6 State Agricultural and Grain Policy
Russian agricultural policy played mixed role in the post-2000 success of
the grain economy. In some ways, agrarian policy facilitated grain produc-
tion, for example by providing debt relief to large farms that freed up
money for investment and increasing production; by establishing a price
floor and a state contract system so that in years of good harvests farms
would have an outlet for sales at a guaranteed price; by providing access
to subsidised seed, fertiliser, fuel, and rail transport. Further, in 2005
the federal government identified agriculture as a national priority area
(along with health, education, and housing) that would receive increased
funding. From 2005 to 2010, total state support to agriculture rose by
135 percent in real (inflation-adjusted) terms. In other ways, the govern-
ment impeded rather than promoted grain exports. In the 2000s, the
Russian government took strong action to reverse the extreme decline
of the livestock sector during the 1990s. As during the Soviet period,
state budget subsidies favoured the livestock sector. In 2003, the govern-
ment also introduced tariff-rate quotas on pork, poultry, and beef, which
remained in effect into 2020 except for pork imports. The government
also imposed health and sanitary restrictions on imports of meat, a policy
that continued after Russia joined the World Trade Organization in 2012.
Russian agricultural and trade policy has promoted the interests of
the livestock sector over that of grain. From 1996–2000 to 2016–2019,
Russian meat production increased on annual average by 150 percent,
from 3.6 to 9.0 mmt.29 However, by increasing domestic demand for
feed, the growth of the livestock sector has the isolated effect of reducing
grain exports. Furthermore, when domestic grain supplies have been
low, say because of drought or other bad weather, or when grain prices
have been high, the Russian government has used an array of policies
to restrict grain exports. The controls are intended to help domestic
food consumers and the feed-using livestock sector by keeping more
grain within the country and lowering grain (and thereby food-related
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and animal feed) prices. These restrictions have included export taxes, a
complete export ban that lasted from August 2010 to July 2011, and
taxing and obstructing the transport of grain to exporting ports.30 In
early 2020, Russia imposed a quota on grain exports, this time in response
to concerns that the COVID-19 outbreak could disrupt the internal
grain market and cause food price inflation. Combined with Russia’s
climate and volatile weather that can generate poor grain harvests (mainly
because of drought but sometimes also because of excessive rainfall during
planting or harvesting), such policies lower the country’s reliability as a
grain exporter.31
6.1 Ruble Exchange Rate and Grain Exports
A development that helped Russian grain production and exports in
the years immediately following the country’s macroeconomic crisis of
1997–1998 was the extreme crisis-generated depreciation of the ruble
vis-à-vis the U.S. dollar and other major currencies.32 During 1997–
1999, the ruble depreciated against the dollar in real (inflation-adjusted)
terms by 47 percent, which greatly increased the price competitiveness of
Russian grain exports on the world market.33 Currency depreciation also
raised the prices received by domestic producers of traded goods, thereby
motivating more production.
However, once the Russian economy stabilised after the 1997–1998
crisis and GDP growth resumed, the ruble began steadily to appreciate in
real terms against the U.S. dollar and other major currencies. From 2000
to 2009, the ruble appreciated in real terms against the dollar by about
150 percent. This real appreciation occurred because renewed growth
coincided with domestic price inflation, while the nominal exchange rate
remained fairly stable. Inflation in excess of nominal currency deprecia-
tion appreciates a country’s currency in real terms, thereby making its
exports less price competitive on the world market. More intuitively, infla-
tion hurts a country’s export price competitiveness and world market
share of exported products by raising the prices of its exports to foreign
purchasers, and the stable nominal exchange rate does not correct that
loss in price competitiveness.
Since the economic crisis of 1997–1998, Russia has experienced a cycle
of economic crises that substantially depreciate the currency in real terms,
followed by a period of macro stability and growth that appreciate the
ruble in real terms against the U.S. dollar). The world financial/economic
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crisis of 2008–2009 hit the Russian economy and the ruble depreciated
against the dollar in 2009 by 12 percent. During 2010–2013, the ruble
appreciated in real terms by 19 percent. The economic crisis of 2014–
2015, caused in part by geopolitical tensions with the West and Western
economic sanctions (stemming from Russia’s occupation of the Crimea
and eastern parts of Ukraine), generated depreciation of the ruble in
2014–2016 of about 40 percent. That was followed again by ruble appre-
ciation over 2017–2019 of 15 percent. In 2020, the COVID-19 outbreak
plunged the Russian economy once again into crisis, with the ruble depre-
ciating against the dollar from mid-January to the beginning of August
2020 by about 18 percent.34 These macroeconomic-generated jolts to
the ruble exchange rate have in turn jolted the country’s foreign trade,
including grain exports.
7 Outlook
Continued growth in Russian grain exports will require further increases
in grain production. Our crystal ball-gazing involves examining the
prospects for grain area and yields. For grain area, the question concerns
the likelihood of returning to production the grain area removed from
grain sowing since the Soviet period. The Ministry of Agriculture has
stated its intent to bring back into production as much as 12 million
hectares of unused and abandoned farm land by 2024, requiring federal
expenditures of hundreds of billions of rubles.35 According to one study,
only 5.3 million hectares of the remaining idled land for all agriculture
(not just grain) qualifies for being returned to the plow, if soil and climatic
conditions, accessibility, and environmental trade-offs are all considered.36
Much of Russia’s abandoned area is in remote regions in the northern
and eastern parts of the country, though also in some arid regions in
southern European Russia.37 Returning the land to the plow requires
that world grain prices rise substantially and remain high, to cover both
the fixed costs of making the land suitable again for cultivation, and the
high variable costs of production.
Studies of the effect of climate change on Russian agriculture argue
that rising global temperature could make currently unused land in
northern parts of Russia amenable to agricultural use.38 However,
whether or not grain production on the new land would be commer-
cially viable is unclear, given the relative isolation and marginal conditions
of production. Another consideration is that some of the grain area lost
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during the past decades was not abandoned, but rather switched in use
from producing grain to sunflower seed, Russia’s main oilseed crop. This
occurred largely in Russia’s major grain and oilseed producing districts in
southern and central European Russia.39
Russia has made tremendous progress in increasing grain yields since
2000, both in an absolute sense, and in closing the yield gap with major
Western producers that also have large endowments of agricultural land,
such as the United States and Canada. During 1996–2000, Russian wheat
yields (annual average) were 58 percent and 67 percent of the levels in the
United States and Canada, respectively. However, by 2016–2019, Russia
had closed the yield gap to 84 percent and 83 percent (2.80 tonnes per
hectare in Russia, 3.34 in the United States, and 3.39 in Canada.40 The
fact that Russia is narrowing the yield gap with major Western producers,
while reaching its limit of switching from spring to higher-yielding winter
wheat, suggests that Russian grain yields will continue to grow, though
not at the high rate of the 2010s.
Given that Russian agriculture continues to suffer from major prob-
lems, the potential exists to raise grain yields further and improve the
overall performance of the agricultural economy by correcting (or miti-
gating) these weaknesses. We mentioned earlier in discussing agrohold-
ings that Russian agriculture continues to endure deficient commercial
services and institutional infrastructure to support the sector. A major
study on Russian agriculture conducted two decades ago identified those
weaknesses as the major problem within the Russian agro-food system.41
Although progress has certainly been made in the last couple of decades
in strengthening the Russian agricultural economy, deficiencies remain (as
they do in the agricultural sector of most developed states, so Russia is
hardly unique).
Another continued weakness in Russian agricultural operations is the
shortage of skilled farm labor, in such jobs as machine operators, technical
and production specialists, management, marketing personnel, and finan-
cial.42 The educational and research establishment also remains subpar,
suffering from conservatism and institutional rigidity.43
Climate change could also affect future Russian grain yields. In the
main grain-producing regions of southern and central European Russia,
higher temperatures and other climatic changes are predicted to create
greater aridity, threaten water supplies, and increase droughts. Climate
change is likely to cause grain yields initially to fall.44 However, if
producers adapt to the new conditions, such as by improving irrigation
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and changing the sowing schedule, grain yields could then rise. On the
other hand, although climate change could improve the productivity of
grain production in Russia’s north and Siberia, it will hurt grain produc-
tivity in the main producing regions in the south, with an aggregate net
effect for the grain economy.45
A model for world agriculture and trade created by the United States
Department of Agriculture’s Economic Research Service annually makes
projections of the volumes of world production and trade for major agri-
cultural commodities out to ten years. The United States Department of
Agriculture (USDA) projects that over the next decade world grain prices
will fall rather than rise.46
We next examine the projections generated by this model for Russian
grain production and trade, plus area and yield, to 2029.47 The model
employed is the Country-Commodity Linked (CCL) System, that covers
44 countries and regions, and generates annual volumes of produc-
tion, consumption/use, and trade, as well as prices, for 24 agricultural
commodities. The model is dynamic and partial equilibrium in nature, and
consists of supply and demand equations for products that use synthetic
(rather than estimated) own and cross-price elasticities. In the following
discussion, projected growth to 2029 volumes and levels is relative to the
annual average for 2016–2019.
The model projects that by 2029, the average area devoted to grain
will grow by only half a percent from 41.6 to 41.8 million hectares (see
Table 2). Russia’s wheat area is projected to grow by 17 percent to about
28 million hectares.
The projections in Table 2 indicate that although Russian grain
production and exports will likely continue to rise in the 2020s, the
growth will occur at a slower rate than during the 2010s, again with
almost all the increase driven by rising yields. Although production and
exports will continue to increase, the rate of high growth in providing
grain to the world could be winding down.
According to the USDA model, Russian grain yields are projected to
increase to 2029 to almost 3 tonnes per hectare. Wheat yield growth of
7.7 percent will be just slightly below that for total grain of 8 percent.
These results are also consistent with our previous discussion that Russian
grain yields should continue to grow, but at a lower rate than during
2016–2019.
The projections show that the growth in Russian grain production will
be driven almost wholly by rising yields, such that total grain output is
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Table 2 USDA Projections for Russia’s Grain Economy
2016–19 2029 projection Growth (%)
Production Million tons
wheat 75.7 83.5 10.3
barley 18.6 21.4 15.1
corn 13.5 14.0 3.7
total grain 115.2 125.1 8.6
Area (harvested) Million hectares
wheat 23.7 27.7 16.9
barley 8.0 8.1 1.3
corn 2.6 2.6 0.0
total grain 41.6 41.8 0.5
Yield Tons per hectare
wheat 2.80 3.01 7.7
barley 2.34 2.64 12.9
corn 5.24 5.38 2.8
total grain 2.77 2.99 8.0
Exports (gross) Million tons
wheat 34.9 38.8 11.2
barley 4.4 7.3 65.9
corn 4.5 4.9 8.9
total grain 44.0 51.3 16.6
Meat production Million tons
beef 1.35 1.23 − 8.9
pork 3.06 3.53 15.4
poultry 4.59 5.26 14.6
total meat 9.00 10.02 11.3
Grain used as feed Million tons
wheat 18.0 23.1 28.3
barley 9.6 10.1 5.2
corn 8.1 8.2 1.2
total grain 39.3 44.9 14.2
Note Total grain excludes rice, buckwheat, and pulses, and total meat includes beef, pork, and
poultry. Data for 2016–2019 are annual average over the period
Source Same as Table 1
projected to expand to 2029 by 8.6 percent. Production is projected to
increase from an annual average of 115 mmt during 2016–2019 to 125
mmt in 2029. Wheat output is projected to rise across the two periods
from 76 to 83 mmt.
Growth in the livestock sector cuts into surplus grain production
for export by increasing domestic demand for animal feed. The model
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projects that meat production (beef, pork, and chicken) will grow to 2029
by 11 percent to 10 mmt. Correspondingly, the total amount of grain
used as domestic animal feed will rise to 2029 by 14 percent to 45 mmt,
and wheat feed use will rise by 28 percent to 23 mmt. The increase in the
amount of total grain and wheat used as feed will be 5.6 and 5.1 mmt,
respectively.
The model projects that total grain exports will rise between 2016–
2019 (annual average) and 2029 from 44 to 51 mmt, and wheat exports
from 35 to 39 mmt. Barley exports will increase by two-thirds, although
from a much smaller base.
After the surges in world agricultural prices over 2006–2012, some
observers argued that the three main grain-producing countries of the
former Soviet Union—Russia, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan—had the poten-
tial to raise their grain production substantially, by increasing both area
and yields (depending on the specific country). The additional grain
output would raise world supplies considerably, thereby working to
lower grain prices and bolster world food security. Returning abandoned
agricultural land in Russia to grain production would help make this
three-country region a breadbasket to the world.48
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The impressive increase in Russia’s agri-food exports makes this chapter
possible and gives it significance. Twenty years ago, Russia was not an
important food exporter; today it is. Because Russia’s food exports have
become more significant, the chapter explores the role of food exports in
Russia’s national economy from different perspectives. In the 1980s, the
USSR was a large grain importer and exported small amounts of agricul-
tural and food products to its allies in Eastern Europe. In the post-Soviet
1990s, Russia’s agricultural production plummeted during the transition
to a market economy, and it reduced grain imports but became a large
meat importer (see Chapters 1 and 2). Further, Russia’s position in the
1990s was unfavourable because it produced low-quality wheat which
did not have high global demand. Moreover, in general the country did
not have capacity for large-scale food export. The claims of some experts
that this situation could change relatively soon were not well-grounded.
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The inability to become a large food exporter was rooted not only in
the dramatic fall of agricultural production in Russia after the crash of
the USSR, but also in the structure of the Soviet economy in its last
decades. After many political efforts to become a top agrarian power in
the world (the campaign on developing virgin lands in Southwest Siberia
and North Kazakhstan is a well-known example), the last years of the
Soviet era witnessed the country having to trade oil and gas in exchange
for buying food abroad.
During the past 20 years Russia’s agricultural sector has rebounded
and as noted by several authors in this book, the country has emerged
as a major grain exporter. The existing literature related to Russia’s food
exports is not large but is growing and contributes to our understanding
of the development of Russia’s agricultural export capacity. Petrenko and
his colleagues provide a brief historical review of food regulation in the
Eurasian Economic Community.1 Russia inherited important principles
that earlier had been implemented by the World Trade Organisation
(WTO), the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD), and the European Union (EU), and adjusted those processes
to the institutional and technical heritage of the Soviet agricultural sector.
Taking this pathway made it possible to establish stable and sufficiently
working institutions. These, on one hand, made it worthy for producers
to learn how to trade abroad; on another hand, secured food sufficiency
and safety in domestic markets. Rau explores the quantitative character-
istic of how the integration process changed agriculture and trade in the
Eurasian Economic Union during the first decade of its operation.2 Fore-
casts by Visser et al. and Liefert et al. that Russia could only be a moderate
grain exporter has not played out in reality as Russia has achieved a
significant share in global markets for grain and sunflower oil.3 More
recently, other analysts have explored the impact of Russia’s food security
policy on food exports and prospects for a significant expansion of food
exports to 2024 as posited by President Vladimir Putin.4 Currently, the
Russian government is pursuing larger market shares for fish and seafood,
vegetable oils, animal products, and processed food.5
Other macro-level debates raise other questions about Russia’s food
exports. For one, the resources and capacities of Russia, either alone or
as part of the Eurasian Economic Union, have led many Russian-speaking
researchers to optimistic views on the future of Russia’s expansion of food
exports and the food sector. However, Russia’s food sector still suffers
from institutional shortcomings, obsolete habits, excess risk aversion,
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paternalism, poor management of human resources, and deficits in
working capital. A different question asks whether agricultural exports can
contribute to the welfare of people living in Russia. Ksenofontov warns
that an increase in world grain prices creates incentives for increasing
exports, possibly with damage to consumers if domestic prices increase
as well.6 Others, however, conclude that risks to national food secu-
rity arising from international food trade are minor.7 In either case, it
is clear that certain political risks exist that could affect Russia’s agri-food
exports.8
Why does Russia export grain? Russia’s grain exports are necessary
when the yields are high. Liefert analysed border and domestic prices
and concluded that the price transmission into domestic Russian markets
is incomplete, and second, is due to the underdeveloped market infras-
tructure.9 Uzun and his colleagues show that the grain export volumes
are weakly sensitive to price gaps between border and domestic prices,
but very sensitive to current grain production with a delay of up to two
months.10 Thus, exports are caused by the limited grain storage capacity
within the country during large harvests, and this shortcoming limits the
country’s ability to benefit from favourable prices in the international
grain market. Krylatykh and Belova, as well as Uzun and Lerman, argue
that Russia can benefit from increased consumption of grain even while
reducing its export, and instead entering the global market for animal
products.11
The purpose of this chapter is to examine from an economic perspec-
tive the significance of Russia’s agri-food exports. It addresses two main
questions: (1) what contribution do food exports make to the national
economy and specifically the agricultural sector?; and (2) what contri-
bution do food exports make to the national budget? The chapter is
organised as follows. Section 2 uses national statistics and estimates from
the available literature to explore the contribution of food exports to
the national economy and the agricultural sector. Section 3 studies the
expected consequences of various policy interventions primarily to figure
out whether (and how) the role of agricultural export in Russia’s economy
can be increased by policy measures. Section 4 concludes with an outlook
for Russia’s food exports.
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2 The Contribution of Russia’s Agri-Food
Exports to the National Economy
Despite the impressive gains in the value of food exports during the last
two decades, agri-food exports are far from a dominating share in Russia’s
overall exports. Popkova and Sukhodolov indicate the share of food prod-
ucts and agricultural raw materials in Russia’s total exports measured in
USD: 1.8 percent in 1995, 1.6 percent in 2000, 1.9 percent in 2005,
2.2 percent in 2010, and 3.8 percent in 2014.12 In 2016, the share
of agri-food exports amounted to 5 percent of total exports according
to Rosstat.13 Agriculture exports alone accounted for only 1.81 percent
of Russia’s national exports in 2016. To compare, the export of oil and
gas contributed nearly 19 percent of total national exports and about 5
percent of Russia’s GDP. These data suggest that food exports play a
secondary, if not tertiary, role in the Russian economy, although their
role is steadily growing. That said, it is necessary to point out the record
harvest in 2017 and the second highest harvest in post-Soviet Russia’s
history in 2020, including the higher levels of wheat output, help to
account for a higher percentage of total exports than in 2016.
The agri-food sector largely relies on exports for its development,
especially in recent years, thus suggesting the emergence of an export-
led development strategy. Russia’s agri-food exports grew annually by an
average of more than 18 percent from 2001 to 2018. The fastest rate,
56.4 percent, was achieved in 2011 due to recovery after the drought
of 2010 (see Table 1). The growth of food and agricultural export
outstrips Russia’s growth in total exports. After Russia’s accession to the
World Trade Organization in August 2012, the rate of export growth
became lower, with an average rate of only 0.5 percent for the period
from 2012 to 2016. This slowdown was caused by the high base from
2012. Nonetheless, the role of agricultural exports as a source of foreign
currency inflows to Russia’s economy is significant, although still far from
the topmost.
Although Russia’s agri-food sector is small in comparison to the whole
national economy (as measured in the monetary value of output), it still
influences the lives of more than 37 million rural dwellers as an employer,
supplier, buyer, and taxpayer. The sector’s capacity to contribute to family
or municipal income is directly related to its export capacity. While the
Russian economy has numerous sources of foreign currency, there exist
millions of workers whose budgets and welfare are very sensitive to the
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Table 1 Russian agri-food exports in comparison to other national indicators

























2001 1.460 … 1.46 4.64 0.3 … 0.95
2002 2.177 1.49 2.04 7.05 1.0 3.3 3.24
2003 2.690 1.24 2.01 7.67 1.1 1.1 3.13
2004 2.479 0.92 1.37 5.70 0.7 0.6 1.61
2005 3.881 1.57 1.61 7.96 1.4 2.0 2.87
2006 4.849 1.25 1.61 8.38 1.6 1.1 2.76
2007 8.257 1.70 2.35 11.34 4.1 2.6 5.63
2008 8.389 1.02 1.79 8.86 3.3 0.8 3.49
2009 9.281 1.11 3.08 12.34 3.5 1.1 4.65
2010 7.250 0.78 1.83 8.94 2.4 0.7 2.96
2011 11.337 1.56 2.19 10.75 4.6 1.9 4.36
2012 16.738 1.48 3.19 16.46 6.6 6.252 1.4 6.49
2013 16.227 0.97 3.09 14.97 4.9 4.752 0.7 4.52
2014 18.981 1.17 3.82 18.18 7.3 7.060 1.5 6.99
2015 16.181 0.85 4.71 20.69 6.0 5.651 0.8 7.67
2016 17.045 1.05 5.97 22.28 6.0 5.610 1.0 7.84
2017 20.706 1.21 5.79 23.63 7.9 7.490 1.3 9.01
2018 24.885 1.20 5.54 29.28 10.8 10.464 1.4 12.71
aValues printed in small font relate to grain export
Source Author’s calculations based on Rosstat data
success and failure of agri-food exports. In 2001, the agri-food sector sent
less than 5 percent of its production abroad, so revenues almost exclu-
sively depended on the domestic market. By 2010, as Table 1 shows, the
share of production exported abroad was about 10 percent, but by 2018
the share increased to about 30 percent. In other words, exports account
for a substantial portion of growth within the agricultural sector. Thus,
Russia’s contemporary agri-food sector largely depends on exports, first,
from the viewpoint of ability to reach foreign markets, and second, from
the viewpoint of monetary inflows.
Among food exports, the export of grain (including a small share of
legumes) is the most important (see Chapter 2). Since 2005, grain exports
account for at least 30 percent of gross agri-food export. The average
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annual growth rate for the exports of grain and legumes during 2001–
2018 is almost 23.5 percent, a high number that is due mostly to a very
low base in 2001. Because gross grain yields and weather conditions in a
specific year have a significant impact on grain exports, it would be more
correct to compare the averages of two nine-year periods, 2001–2009
and 2010–2018. In the 2001–2009 period, mean exports of grain and
legume amounted to $1.9 billion USD. In the 2010–2018 period, mean
exports of grain and legume increased to $6.3 billion USD. The nine-year
growth has an average annual rate of 14.3 percent. The average annual
growth rate for agricultural and food exports amounts to 14.7 percent,
so the share of grain remains relatively stable in the long run. In compar-
ison to gross agricultural production, the value of grain export reached
12.7 percent of total agricultural production by 2018. The value of grain
exports in 2019 fell to $7.928 billion USD, with grain and legumes
exports valued at $8.3 billion USD, which equals about 9 percent of gross
agricultural production.
2.1 The Contribution of Agri-Food Exports to Agricultural
Production14
Russian agriculture is meeting internal needs and import substitu-
tion, witnessed by the fact that domestic consumption per capita has
approached the standards recommended by the Ministry of Health. At
the same time, Russia’s agrarian sector has significant potential and oppor-
tunities to increase its efficiency. Russia accounts for about 4.5 percent of
the world’s agricultural land and has only 2 percent of the global popula-
tion. Under these conditions, exports play an increasingly important role
in the growth of agricultural and food production.
Gross agricultural output from 2000 to 2018 increased by almost one
and a half times. Crop and livestock production grew at approximately
equal rates. The highest growth rates in production were observed in
poultry meat farming (by 5.9 times), sugar beets and oilseeds (by 2.9
times), and in pig farming (by 2.2 times). During the same time period,
the production of potatoes and forage crops decreased by 24 and 30
percent, respectively, as did beef and milk production by 16 and 5 percent
respectively. The most significant contribution to the growth of gross agri-
cultural production was made by grain farming and poultry meat farming:
together their share accounted for more than 50 percent of gross growth
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(26 percent for grain and almost 29 percent for poultry meat). Contribu-
tions to the growth of gross output were also high due to the growth in
the production of oilseeds and pig breeding (more than 19 percent), as
well as vegetables (8 percent) and sugar beet (4 percent).15
In parallel with the growth of agricultural production, the value of
agri-food exports increased (see Table 1). During the period 2000–2018,
the share of agri-food exports from crop production increased from
3 to 27 percent, while the share of export from livestock production
remained low. The largest increase in exports was from the gross produc-
tion of oilseeds and grain. In 2018, more than three-quarters of oilseed
production was exported, including the export of sunflower oil. During
2012–2018, 31.5 percent of all grain production (including legumes) was
exported. During the same period, the share of exported fruits (including
berries and nuts) and poultry meat was 5.2 and 2.2 percent of produc-
tion. For comparison, during 2000–2005 these shares were 10.4 percent
for grain and legumes, 3.8 percent for fruits, berries, and nuts, and only
0.1 percent for poultry meat.16
According to calculations by this author, the growth in exports influ-
ences an increase in production. Exports in effect spurred sectoral growth
during 2000–2018. Calculations show that for the period 2000–2018,
the estimated contribution of exports to the incremental production of
grain and legumes is 79 percent. A similar estimate for oilseeds shows
that exports accounted for 61 percent; 56 percent for sunflower; and
78.5 percent for rapeseed. Conversely, the contribution of exports to
livestock production appears very small, reaching only 0.9 percent for
livestock (including poultry) and 2.4 percent for eggs during the same
period. The contribution of exports to the production of cattle, milk, and
wool approximates zero. In total, the growth of agri-food exports during
2000–2018 caused about 34 percent of the growth in gross agricultural
output.
In conclusion, since 2000 exports have stimulated growth for a signif-
icant part of gross agricultural production. The contribution of exports
to growth in the agri-food sector is positive and statistically significant
for products that by 2018 accounted for 43 percent of gross agricul-
tural production. Although the rate of growth in agri-food exports from
the past two decades may not be duplicated in coming years, it can be
projected that exports will remain a main source of growth in the agricul-
tural sector. This projection is based on the satisfaction of consumption
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demand by domestic production and a stabilisation in the volume of
agri-food imports.
2.2 Budgetary Inflows from Agri-Food Exports Compared to Overall
Budget Inflow
Due to the diversity of budgetary transfers and institutions reporting
them, it normally is very difficult to assess the contribution of the agri-
cultural sector as a taxpayer into the national budget from exports.
Unfortunately, input–output tables are published seldom and differ from
each other in how they aggregate economic activities. For 2016, however,
a set of sufficiently detailed input–output tables for the Russian economy
is available from Rosstat, which makes it possible to understand the role
of agri-food exports in the national budget. The discussion below is based
on this author’s calculations from available input–output data. To start, I
refer the reader to Table 2, which shows net taxes paid by different sectors
of the economy.17
A main conclusion from Table 2 is that the boom in Russia’s agri-
food exports brings almost nothing to the consolidated budget. This
conclusion is based on two considerations. First, the oil and gas industries
provide more than one-third of overall net tax inflows and, if we limit the
analysis to the tax inflows from exports only, more than 97 percent of the
total. Thus, any other tax revenue from exporting businesses is minus-
cule for the national budget in comparison. Second, agri-food exports
are taxed 5.2 times lower than household consumption, accumulation,
and other internal uses. The rate of net taxation for exported agricul-
tural output is 0.65 percent and for the remaining part it is 3.4 percent.
Both rates are quite low, inasmuch as part of taxes are returned to agricul-
tural producers via various subsidies. It becomes evident that the exported
part of total agricultural output is taxed lower, and this helps Russia’s
agricultural exporters to increase their shares in international markets.
Lower taxes also positively influence the welfare of the rural population,
but lower taxes barely make a contribution to the consolidated national
budget. While it is true that the large harvests in 2017 and 2020 generate
somewhat more tax revenue, it remains true that in terms of net input–
output much of even higher tax revenue is returned to agriculture in the
form of myriad subsidies.
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32,187.7 97.23 41,427.0 37.48 77.70
Sources Rosstat; author’s calculations
The main takeaway of this subsection is that Russia’s agri-food export
is not a significant source for Russia’s national budget. The posi-
tive contribution from agri-food exports to the national economy falls
into the hands of private actors. Subsequently, revenue is redistributed
between various economic agents through a network of contract relations,
including employment contracts.
3 How Sensitive Are Agri-Food
Exports to Trade Policies?
State financial support to agriculture in various forms has increased
substantially since 2006, helping to boost food production. That part
of the story has been well told.18 This section explores the impact
of national policy on Russia’s agri-food exports. The section examines
104 N. M. SVETLOV
through modelling the extent to which agri-food exports are sensitive to
trade policy.
3.1 Methodology
At a policy level, scholars and analysts have known for many years that
trade policy affects the level of exports through such instruments as export
subsidies, export quotas, or outright export bans. Russia does not use
direct export subsidies but did ban wheat exports in 2010–2011 and
introduced the option to enact export quotas for the second half of agri-
cultural years starting in January 2020. While it is generally true that
national trade policy impacts agri-food exports, this section is unique
in that it attempts to measure the sensitivity of agri-food exports to
different policies. To measure sensitivity, the section employs a mathemat-
ical model called the ‘production frontier plus partial equilibrium’.19 The
mathematical principle of combining the production frontier with partial
equilibrium equations is developed in Central Economics and Mathe-
matics Institute (Moscow). This principle was used in an analysis of the
impact of climate change on Russia’s agricultural markets, taking into
account spatial differences.20 The purpose of the model is to quantify
the effects of policy change based on four scenarios.21
The ‘base scenario’ simulates the policies that were in force during
the model’s base period 2013–2017. The differences between the base
scenario and reality are twofold. The first difference is that the base
scenario assumes that each region consumes each of five products that
is sufficient to comply the with food consumption norms recommended
by Russia’s Ministry of Health. The second difference is that the scenario
presumes equilibriums in all the markets which, in general, is not the case
in reality. Four alternative scenarios are compared to this base scenario.
All the four inherit the conditions of the base scenario with some specific
change.
The first alternative scenario imposes some effective regulation that
increases the export of five products in total by at least 10 percent
compared to the base scenario. In this scenario, ‘the government’ permits
the producers to meet food consumption norms at least 95 percent of
the recommended levels instead of 100 percent in the base scenario. This
scenario describes partial redistribution of sales from domestic to foreign
markets. The second scenario relates to when the country rejects the regu-
lations of the World Trade Organisation. The scenario imposes 10 percent
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export subsidies on the five products. Other conditions do not differ from
the base scenario. The third scenario relates to forcing national agribusi-
nesses to use a larger share of their grain production as fodder internally
instead of exporting it.22 The scenario imposes a 10 percent export tax
on wheat and grain while leaving other conditions of the base scenario
unchanged. The fourth scenario is ‘populistic’. It imposes a 10 percent
export tax on the export of the five products, a step that would partly
lock in the supply for the domestic market, resulting in lower domestic
prices for producers if during good harvest years.
3.2 Results
The major economic indicators for the entire agricultural sector under
the four scenarios are summarised in Table 3. In the case of the first
scenario, the growth of the gross margin is fully due to the opportu-
nity to reduce food supply to regions with low demand, while in the
second scenario it is due to the considerable export subsidy inflows. The
second and third scenarios promote exports, increase production, reduce
domestic sales and import, slightly raise domestic prices, and increase the
sectoral gross margin.
Table 3 Models of agricultural production under different trade policies (billion
USD)
Indicator Scenario












Production 80.09 81.12 81.12 79.93 79.92
Domestic
sales
89.27 88.13 88.26 89.25 89.24
Import 21.60 19.90 19.90 21.58 21.56





× 1.014 1.014 0.997 0.997
Gross margin 8.51 10.14 10.27 7.70 7.45
Source Author’s calculations
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In the third and fourth scenarios, exports account for less agricultural
production in comparison to the base scenario and also in domestic sales,
although this effect is small. The reason is a lower margin on sales, which
makes it unprofitable to supply food above the set food consumption
rates in some regions. The decline in the gross margin is caused by lower
domestic prices, lower exports, and larger imports.
In general, we conclude that the policy has a weak impact on the
outcomes of policy. The overall outcome of the export promoting policy
is clearly to the favour of agricultural producers, yet at the expense of
domestic consumers, who experience a bit lower consumption and a
bit higher prices, and taxpayers (in the case of the export subsidising
scenario).
Thus, it can be concluded that purely economic considerations do not
support any systematic change in the agricultural and trade policy from
the base period. In the view of this, large policy changes are not very
likely, unless they would be driven by non-economic considerations, and
even if that occurs, they will not make important changes in the domestic
production and markets.
4 Outlook
It is essential to distinguish the role of agri-food exports in Russia’s
national economy and in its national food economy. In the national
economy, the role is still minor, while in latter the role is very impor-
tant. This chapter has shown that the percentage of agri-food production
is now exported, but the agri-food sector does not contribute much to
the national economy or to the national budget, although exports do spur
development in the agricultural sector and do provide some welfare to the
rural population. For these reasons, the short-run outlook for an expan-
sion in Russia’s agri-food exports will likely be driven from commercial
interests. Over the longer term, one can ask whether agricultural export
can one day become a factor of importance for the welfare of the whole
nation.
As for now, Russia has a wide choice on what to export in the future,
depending on its successes or failures in frontier research, global demand
for oil and gas, the consequences of climate change,23 and its polit-
ical willingness to join international food production chains. Even with
comparative advantages due to climate change, Russia’s agricultural sector
is unlikely to become one of the topmost sectors of the national economy
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unless severe crises occur in other sectors that currently fund the national
economy and budget. In addition, scenario modelling makes it evident
that in the short run there is a very small likelihood for raising the role of
agricultural exports in the national economy through trade policy instru-
ments. Sanctions and countersanctions between the European Union
and Russia constrain exports.24 Sanctions in general slow down further
Russia’s achievements in international agricultural trade.
That said, Russia’s agri-food exports face both obstacles and opportu-
nities in the years ahead.25 My feeling is that agri-food exports are more
likely than not to keep growing in the coming years, although the rate
of growth may decrease. Two factors favour an increase in production
that may fuel higher exports: progress in technology as well as over-
coming existing inefficiencies; and, to a smaller extent, an abundance
of unused land suitable for cultivation.26 In the long run, Russia’s large
water resources became an important additional factor contributing to the
competitiveness of crop production in the country compared to increasing
aridity around the world.27 Thus, the role of agricultural export in overall
Russia’s economy is likely to gradually increase, but within the constraints
and limitations that have been examined in this chapter.
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Chapter 4: Russia’s Food Security and Impact
on Agri-Food Trade
Linde Götz, Maximilian Heigermoser,
and Tinoush Jamali Jaghdani
1 Introduction
The emergence of food security as a core component of Russia’s food
policy and as a political priority is important because it affects domestic
food production and the way in which Russia interacts with the interna-
tional agri-food market. Whereas the Soviet period witnessed Russia as a
large grain importer, in the 1990s Russia changed to a meat importer. In
both periods, Russia’s role as an importer meant that Russia was a signifi-
cant player in the international food market (see Chapter 1). Since 2000,
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Russia’s food and agrarian policy has prioritised less dependence on food
imports.
Essentially, Russia’s contemporary food policy entails a trifecta of sub-
policies, all of which are located at the protectionist end of the trade
policy continuum: (1) food security policy, which has a variety of dimen-
sions including reducing dependence on food imports; food security in
the traditional sense, referring to consumption norms and nutrition; food
safety; product tracing; and truth in labelling; (2) food self-sufficiency,
which refers to the effort to increase agricultural production to meet
domestic needs for certain basic commodities; and (3) import substitu-
tion policy, which refers to the attempt to substitute domestic production
for imports where possible. As imports are substituted with domestically
produced foods, consumers often face higher food prices.1
To achieve these goals of food policy and its subcomponents, Russian
policymakers have different instruments to choose from: import taxes,
non-tariff barriers, export quotas, and import bans against companies
and countries. The subcomponents of food policy and the instruments
used are united in trying to reduce the presence of agri-food imports in
Russia’s domestic food market. This protectionism provides incentives for
domestic producers to increase their production. Protectionism has been
combined with higher investments in the domestic agricultural sector
through comprehensive financial subsidies.2
Russia’s food policy frames the way in which Russia interacts with
other states in agri-food trade with carry over effects to other dimensions
as well. Through food security, self-sufficiency, and import substitution,
the Russian government aims not only to decrease Russia’s food import
dependency and to increase its food self-sufficiency, but also to consol-
idate Russia as a large agri-food exporting country, a feature explicitly
discussed in the Food Security Doctrine adopted in 2020. Previously, in
May 2018, President Vladimir Putin signed a decree instructing that the
dollar value of Russia’s agricultural exports reach $45 billion by 2024.3
In late 2020, Russia’s Ministry of Agriculture extended the date by which
that target value of exports would be reached to 2030.
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the impact of food policy
on Russia’s domestic production and its role in the international food
trade system. The chapter will explore the domestic ramifications of
food security as well as the international implications through imports
and exports. Section 2 below presents a brief review of Russia’s food
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security policy, noting that policy has evolved from an import substi-
tution policy towards a policy that also generates agricultural and food
exports. Section 3 presents an overview of the domestic ramifications of
import substitution policy, focusing on pork, poultry, beef, raw milk, and
fruit and vegetables. Section 4 looks at the international implications of
Russia’s protectionism, using pork and wheat as case studies. Section 5
provides an outlook to how Russia’s food security policy, self-sufficiency,
and import substitution will affect its role in the international agri-food
system in the medium-term future.
2 Food Security, Self-Sufficiency,
and Import Substitution
This section provides an overview of Russia’s food security policy, which
has changed from import protectionism and food self-sufficiency exclu-
sively to also generating agri-food exports for international markets. It is
important to emphasise that Russia’s food security policy does not signify
a withdrawal from international food markets, and this theme will be
further elaborated. Food security does signify a change in Russia’s role
in the international food trade system from mainly a food importer to an
importer and exporter, and it does signify a change in trading partners in
terms of countries and regions.
2.1 Russia’s Food Security Doctrines
In reaction to the spike in world food prices in 2007–2008, food secu-
rity emerged as a significant economic and political variable in Russia that
affects food trade policy, international relations, and domestic agrarian
policy.4 The emergence of food security as a core component of food
policy and as a political priority is important because it affects the way in
which Russia interacts with the international agri-food market. Whereas
during the Soviet period Russia was a large grain importer, in the 1990s
Russia changed to a meat importer. In both periods, Russia’s role as
an importer was significant. Since 2000, food and agrarian policy has
prioritised less dependence on food imports.
In Russia, the concept of food security extends beyond the generally
accepted definition of ‘food access, availability, food use and stability’
as stated by the 1996 World Food Summit.5 Specifically, food secu-
rity does not refer to the origin of food as opposed to self-sufficiency
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which is sensitive to where food originates.6 Rather, Russian policymakers
place particular emphasis on reducing food import dependency and there-
fore use the terms food security and food self-sufficiency synonymously.7
Whereas many countries are protectionist on agricultural imports, and
several nations have explicit food security policies, Russia is unique in that
food security and food self-sufficiency are conflated, whereas in the liter-
ature the two terms are distinct.8 Also unique is that since at least 2009
Russia’s food security has explicit connections to national security, more
so than in Western countries.9
An indicator of the seriousness with which Russian policymakers
approach food security was evidenced by the signing of Russia’s first Food
Security Doctrine in January 2010. The doctrine established specific self-
sufficiency targets for several basic agricultural and food products, defined
as the percentage of domestic production in the total supply of commodi-
ties. The original Food Security Doctrine was more than mere rhetoric,
as policymakers repeatedly referred to the doctrine and its standards for
self-sufficiency to guide food and agrarian policy. That said, the Food
Security Doctrine was not hard protectionism, as the dollar value of food
imports into Russia continued to increase during 2010–2013. The orig-
inal doctrine acquired extra importance when, on 7 August 2014, Russia
implemented a food import ban on a wide range of agri-food products
from the European Union (EU), the United States of America (USA),
Norway, Canada, and Australia. The original ban was renewed several
times and in late 2021 was extended through 2022. The food import
‘countersanctions’ were implemented by Russia in retaliation to Western
sanctions over the Ukrainian crisis. It is important to note that counter-
sanctions did not signal the end of Russia as a food importer. Instead,
Russia changed food trade partners and began to trade more with China
(see Chapter 7), within the Eurasian Economic Union (see Chapters 6
and 8), and the Middle East (see Chapter 9). Countersanctions did,
however, bring decreased food trade between Russia and the European
Union, and between Russia and the United States (see Chapter 10).
Thus, neither the Food Security Doctrine nor the food embargo signalled
Russia’s withdrawal from the global food market, but rather a change with
whom it traded.
The impact of the original Food Security Doctrine and countersanc-
tions are beyond the scope of this chapter but have been discussed
elsewhere.10 The success of the original doctrine, plus the impressive
growth in domestic food production, led to the signing of a new Food
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Security Doctrine by President Putin in January 2020.11 The new 2020
Doctrine explicitly mentions the expansion of agri-food exports, which
marks a significant change in Russia’s role in the international food system
compared to the period leading up to 2018.12 In addition to agricul-
tural products, Russia is also among the major global producers of fish
from wild fisheries and aquaculture. The development of the fishery and
aquaculture sectors is supported by the ‘Strategy for Development of
Agriculture and Fisheries Through 2030’, which was approved by Prime
Minister Mikhail Mishustin and published in April 2020.13
The Food Security Doctrine and various strategies for different
commodities and products should be understood as having economic
importance in that they impact domestic food production, and political
importance in that they frame food trade interactions with other states. In
terms of the theme of this book, these political acts define the nature of
economic interactions and the underlying strategy of those interactions.
Food security, self-sufficiency, and import substitution did not just occur
accidentally or organically. They were deliberate policy choices by policy-
makers. Their decision reflected a calculation to enhance national security
and as an appeal to rising nationalism in Russia. Those decisions impact
Russia’s international interactions and role in the global food system.
3 Domestic Ramifications
of Food Security Policy
Food policy and its subcomponents have domestic and international
dimensions. This section focuses on the domestic ramifications and
provides an overview of the main agricultural import sectors which are
targeted by Russia’s food security policy. In particular, poultry, pork,
beef, and raw milk are protected by Russia’s food import ban against
competition from producers in Western countries, while investments in
those products are subsidised by the government. We also cover fruit and
vegetables since they receive greater attention within the 2020 Food Secu-
rity Doctrine. The basic takeaway is that for countersanctions and trade
protectionism to work, domestic food production needs to increase, and
the country needs to maintain or increase self-sufficiency for basic food
groups.
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3.1 Domestic Structure of Production
We start with a brief discussion of the structure of food production. The
change in the structure of production relates to food security because
Russia has become increasingly dependent on output from agricultural
organisations and agroholdings. This dependence in turn means that
organisations and agroholdings receive most of the investment credit and
subsidies from the state. Policymakers have an interest in a strong, vibrant
large farm sector, both for domestic food production and export poten-
tial. The emergence of agroholdings has also led to a concentration of
production in just a few companies for several commodities. In 2019,
for example, the top 25 companies accounted for one-half of total meat
production in the country, and 63 percent of meat production coming
from agricultural organisations.14 The rate of growth in meat production
among the top 25 companies is nearly four times as fast as the rate of
growth in meat production in general.
While not a direct outcome of food security policy, one of the notable
characteristics in Russia’s agrarian system is a change in the structure
of production during the 2000s compared to the 1990s. Russia has
three categories of food producers: agricultural enterprises (also called
organisations), which have subcategories; households, again with different
subcategories; and private farms. Whereas agricultural organisations were
in decline during the 1990s, since 2000 there has been a clear and
unmistakable trend towards dominance by agricultural organisations. In
particular, among agricultural organisations, a specific subset of farms
organisations called agroholdings is the largest, representing mega-farms
often with several hundred thousand hectares each.15 Agroholdings use
industrial methods of production and are characterised by high vertical
integration, reflecting that they own several stages of the supply chain.
In some cases, agroholdings have full control over the whole food supply
chain. During the 1990s, households accounted for more than 50 percent
of the ruble value of agricultural production. Household production
declined in volume and relative contribution after 2000, however, and
by 2019 agricultural organisations accounted for 58 percent of Russia’s
agricultural production, while the contribution from household produc-
tion decreased to 28 percent (based on ruble value). Overall, during the
2000–2019 period, the ruble value of agricultural production increased
more than fivefold, with the value of production from agricultural organ-
isations leading the way. Thus, a distinct positive is increased volume and
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value of production from agricultural organisations; on the other hand,
food security and food self-sufficiency have increased vulnerability to the
financial and production health of agricultural organisations.
Turning to specific commodities, poultry production has always been
dominated by large agricultural organisations who have on average about
320,000 chickens per organisation.16 Organisations’ share in produc-
tion increased since 1996 from 60 percent up to 92 percent in 2019,
thereby decreasing the importance of households, which have, on average,
33 chickens. Concurrently, national poultry production increased from
about 1 million tonnes to 6.7 million tonnes. Of particular note is the
extreme concentration of production by a handful of agroholding compa-
nies. In 2018, for example, the top 20 poultry companies accounted for
two-thirds of the production of Russia’s broilers.17
Pork production is also dominated by agricultural organisations. By
2019, 87 percent of organisations had more than 10,000 pigs, while
households have an average of 4.5 pigs (and a significant number of
households have no pigs at all). Similar to poultry, the increasing impor-
tance of agricultural organisations in the pork sector led to strong growth
in production, rising from 2 million tonnes in 1999 to 5 million tonnes in
2019. Similar to poultry, there is significant concentration. In 2018, the
top 20 pig raising companies accounted for 56 percent of the nation’s
pork production.18 There has also been a geographical structural shift.
The expansion of domestic pork production was accompanied by a
regional shift from the Southern Federal District to the Central Federal
District. Since 2006, pork production has been increasingly concentrated
in Belgorod, an oblast about 600 km south of Moscow that accounts
for almost 20 percent of Russia’s total pork production today. On the
other hand, pork production in Krasnodar Krai and Rostov Oblast in
the Southern Federal District has decreased significantly, two regions that
previously were leading pork producers.
The production structure is different in the beef and milk sectors.
Households average five cattle, of which three are typically milk cows;
while medium-sized private farmers and individual entrepreneurs average
62 cattle, of which 32 are typically milk cows. Overall, households
accounted for 54 percent of beef and 37 percent of raw milk produc-
tion in 2019, although these percentages have been steadily decreasing in
recent years.19 Agricultural organisations average 785 cattle per farm, of
which 330 are milk cows, accounting for 54 percent of raw milk and 36
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percent of beef production in 2019. Total raw milk production has stag-
nated at around 30–31 million tonnes for many years, the share of raw
milk produced by commercial farms has been increasing especially since
2014, accounting for 63 percent of production in 2019.20
Since the Russian government now includes vegetables and fruit in the
2020 Food Security Doctrine, we take a closer look at the structure of
production for these two sectors. Unlike the meat sector, the production
of fruit and vegetables did not experience a comparably strong decline
during the early post-Soviet years. This occurrence might be explained
by the high share of production from households, who did not experi-
ence the declines that large farms did, although more recently households’
share is decreasing similar to meat production. Households accounted for
about 60 percent of open ground/field vegetable production in 2019,
while the share from agricultural organisations was 20 percent. Vegetable
production from private farmers and individual entrepreneurs has also
increased, reaching 20 percent of total production in 2019. The primary
vegetable producing areas are located in the Southern Federal District and
Central Federal District. These two districts account for about 50 percent
of Russia’s total area devoted to vegetable production. In contrast to
open field vegetable production that is dominated by household produc-
tion, large agricultural organisations dominate vegetable production in
greenhouses. With the strong production growth observed since 2014,
the share from agricultural organisations amounted to 70 percent of
greenhouse vegetable production in 2019. Overall, greenhouse vegetable
production has slightly increased in the recent years, accounting for about
14 percent of total vegetable production in 2019. The situation for fruit
production is similar to open ground vegetable production. In 2019
households accounted for 65 percent of production, while agricultural
organisations produced 28 percent.
3.2 Food Self-Sufficiency
The domestic dimension of Russia’s food security includes a quest to
improve food self-sufficiency. Figure 1 presents data on production, trade,
and self-sufficiency for several commodities (see Fig. 1). First, for poultry
and pork, self-sufficiency (calculated as the share of domestic produc-
tion in consumption) has increased since 2010 due to higher production,
while imports have decreased. According to Russian government data,
the country attained self-sufficiency of 97 percent for poultry and 100
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Fig. 1 Development of production, trade, and self-sufficiency for selected
commodities (Note Production of poultry, pork, and beef refers to the produc-
tion of slaughtered meat as only slaughtered meat is traded. Sources Authors’
calculations from Rosstat data, various years; data from EMISS Gosudarstven-
naia statistika, https://www.fedstat.ru/, accessed 20 August 2020; United
States Department of Agriculture, Foreign Agricultural Service, ‘PS&D: Produc-
tion, Supply, and Distribution’, https://apps.fas.usda.gov/psdonline/app/index.
html#/app/advQuery, accessed 20 August 2020)
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percent for pork despite a simultaneous increase in domestic consump-
tion. Russia is on the cusp of turning into a net exporter for poultry and
pork. Even though beef production has been in long-term decline, self-
sufficiency for beef increased to 78 percent in 2019, the result of lower
consumption and substitution by consumers. There is some evidence that
beef production has started to slightly increase recently. Russia remains
a net importer of beef, although imports are declining thanks to higher
yields from pedigree animals.
Similar to beef, self-sufficiency for butter increased to 77 percent
in 2019. Production remained constant, but domestic consumption
decreased. In addition, the Russian market for dairy products (except
cheese) was increasingly supplied by Belarus, which, as a member of the
Eurasian Economic Union, has tax-free access to the Russian market.
Despite Russia’s recurrent temporary bans on the import of milk and
dairy products originating from Belarus, (e.g. on milk in bulk from April
2018 until May 2019), evidence points to a continuing lively black trade
of dairy products between Belarus and Russia.21
Unlike the butter market, Russia’s cheese market was heavily affected
by the import ban implemented in 2014, which led to the strong decrease
in cheese imports. In contrast, the Russian cheese market could not be
supplied by Belarus, and consequently domestic consumption of cheese
in Russia decreased. Although the domestic production of cheese strongly
increased in the aftermath of the food ban against Western countries,
it soon started to decrease again, which was accompanied by strong
decreases in domestic cheese consumption as well. Thus, self-sufficiency
of cheese varies substantially, amounting to between 70 and 80 percent.
Those developments could be linked to the well-known problems with
cheese quality, resulting specifically from the use of vegetable fats as a
substitute for milk fat, which is not sufficiently available in Russia. This
prompted the Russian government to take measures to reduce the mixing
of vegetable oils with dairy products. In particular, the reduced tax for
palm oil was abolished and the value-added tax was increased to 20
percent in July 2019. In addition, new labelling rules were implemented,
requiring information on the use of vegetable fats, especially palm oil, to
be provided on the packaging.
Self-sufficiency in fresh apples, the most popular fruit in Russia, rose to
about 80 percent in 2019. Apple imports heavily declined following the
2014 Russian food import ban, as large amounts of apples originating
from Poland could no longer be supplied to the Russian market. We
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also observe a strong increase in the self-sufficiency of tomatoes, rising
to about 80 percent in 2019. Tomatoes are among the most commonly
consumed vegetables in Russia, boosted by output from greenhouses. As
domestic tomato production has risen, tomato imports from Turkey have
decreased, and since 2016 Russia has placed a quota on the volume of
tomato imports from Turkey.
The point of this discussion is that for several basic commodities,
domestic production increased and the level of self-sufficiency rose. In
that respect, the food self-sufficiency policy has been successful, although
we note that those basic commodities do not represent the full spec-
trum of consumer demand. It is, therefore, a rather narrow definition of
success. Further, and more important as far as this book is concerned, an
increase in self-sufficiency does not mean that Russia has withdrawn from
the global food market. We turn next to the international dimension of
food security in the section below.
4 International Ramifications
of Food Security Policy
The fact that food security (in the Russian variant), food self-sufficiency,
and import substitution lie at the protectionist end of the trade spectrum
does not mean that Russia has withdrawn from being a significant player
in the global food trade system. Russia continues to play an important
role as a food importer, and despite food security policy the dollar value
of its agri-food imports exceeded the dollar value of its agri-food exports
until 2020. Chapter 1 in this book explains how Russia remains active in
the global food market, and Chapters 6, 7, 8, and 9 show that Russia’s
agri-food trade is increasing vis-à-vis several different regions of the world
as well as individual (non-western) countries. Further, as noted above,
Putin’s May 2018 decree and the 2020 Food Security Doctrine aspire to
increase Russia’s role as an agri-food exporter. Russia already has led the
world in wheat exports in six of the seven agricultural years since 2014.
That said, there is no doubt that food security policy has affected Russia’s
foreign food trade, indicated at the macro-level by a decrease in the dollar
value of food imports since 2014 and the introduction of the food ban.
Some of the reduction is due to the 2014–2015 recession, and since then
lower import values are due to changes in consumers’ buying habits and
preferences, the importation of food from lower-cost nations, as well as
import substitution. The purpose of this section is to explore in more
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detail the impact of food security policy on foreign food trade. We use
pork as a case study for imports, and grain as a case study for exports.
4.1 Imports: Pork Trade
Russia’s pork sector illustrates the way in which food security and its
protectionism along with import substitution affect trade relations and
more broadly Russia’s role in the international food trade system.22 For
pork, increased domestic production, concerns over sanitary and health
conditions and additives, and political considerations have led to a signifi-
cant decrease in pork imports. Not only has the volume of pork decreased,
but the composition of the countries of Russian pork imports has changed


































































































Fig. 2 Structure of Russia’s pork imports and trade policies (Sources Linde
Götz and Tinoush Jaghdani, ‘Russia’s agricultural import substitution policy:
Price volatility effects on the pork supply chain’, 57th Annual Conference of
the German Association of Agricultural Economists, München, Germany, 13–15
September 2017; ITC, ‘Trade Map’, n.d. https://www.trademap.org/, accessed
20 August 2020)
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Protectionism for the pork sector began in 2003 with the introduction
of a tariff-rate quota (TRQ), with an in-quota tariff of 40 percent and a
prohibitive out-of-quota tariff of 68 percent. Poultry and beef were also
subject to TRQs. For pork, the TRQ began at 500,000 tonnes although
it was marginally reduced over time, falling to 472,000 tonnes in 2011.
This policy was in effect until August 2012, when the in-quota tariff was
reduced to 0 percent and the out-of-quota tariff to 65 percent, while the
quota was reduced to 400,000 tonnes (exclusive of trimmings, which add
another 30,000 tonnes) as a condition of Russia’s accession to the World
Trade Organization (WTO).23 During this time, Russia’s pork imports
primarily originated from Germany, Denmark, Canada, the United States,
and Brazil.
The reduction in Russia’s in-tariff quota and the rise in domestic
production led to a decrease in pork imports following entry into the
WTO. In addition, non-tariff barriers, such as sanitary and phytosani-
tary measures and technical barriers to trade, were increasingly applied to
reduce pork imports. As an example, since December 2012, selected pork
exporting companies in Germany were banned by the Russian govern-
ment and were no longer allowed to export pork to Russia. This ban was
extended to all companies located in Bavaria, North Rhine-Westphalia,
and Lower Saxony in February 2013. Rossel’khoznador , Russia’s Federal
Service for Veterinary and Phytosanitary Surveillance, justified these inter-
ventions by pointing to non-compliance with Russia’s phytosanitary and
hygiene standards.
In January 2014, pork exports from the European Union to Russia
were completely banned due to the outbreak of the African swine fever
in the Baltic countries.24 In addition, pork imports from Germany and
Denmark completely stopped. Then, in August 2014, pork exports from
all Western countries to Russia were banned as a result of the agricultural
import ban imposed as countersanctions because of the Ukrainian crisis.
Consequently, pork imports from Canada and the United States were
blocked as well and Russia replaced those suppliers by importing almost
exclusively from Brazil and small quantities from Chile. In December
2017, Russia imposed a ban on pork imports originating from Brazil.
Rossel’khoznadzor justified those restrictions by citing food safety concerns
resulting from the reported presence of the feed additive ractopamine.25
Although the import ban against Brazil was lifted in November 2018,
selected pork production plants in Brazil remained banned.26 Subse-
quently, pork imports from Brazil did not recover to the pre-ban level.
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Since 2014, Russia’s agricultural import ban against Western countries
has been extended several times and is currently valid until the end of
2022. As a result, Russia’s pork imports from Western nations decreased
to zero.
In 2020, the tariff rate quota for pork was abandoned altogether and
replaced by a flat 25 percent tariff on all pork imports. The combi-
nation of higher domestic production and the import tariff led to an
overall decline in pork imports. During 2018–2019, Russia imported
about 100,000 tonnes of pork annually, but during the first half of 2020
the volume of imported pork declined to just over 1,000 tonnes.27 Thus,
Russia’s global role as a pork importer has changed. A similar situation
occurred with poultry, although we do not discuss that commodity here,
but the same dynamics were at work: food security and protectionism,
import substitution, and a healthy dose of politicised trade, all of which
contributed to self-sufficiency and a significant decline in poultry imports.
4.2 Exports: Grain Trade
Perhaps the best example of Russia’s new role in the international agri-
food trade system is its emergence as a major grain exporter. Through
the 2019/2020 agricultural year, Russia led the world in the volume of
wheat exports in five of the past six years and was on track to lead again
in the 2020/2021 agricultural year on the strength of the second largest
harvest in post-Soviet history. An overview of grain production, imports
and exports, and export share is shown in Fig. 3.
In contrast to pork and other meat products, Russia’s grain sector
is not protected by food security or trade policies. Grain imports have
decreased to almost nothing (see Chapters 2 and 10 in this book).
But concerns over food security continue to influence grain trade policy
nonetheless through wheat export restrictions, which is to say that Russia
is not a completely free trader. Its trade restrictions on grain trade at
various times point to the fact that Russia’s international role in global
grain trade is subject to domestic food security concerns.
Russia has a history of restricting wheat exports as a crisis policy
measure that aims to stabilise domestic prices, counteract food price
inflation, and dampen feed prices. In response to the spike in global
commodity prices in 2007–2008, the Russian government restricted grain
exports through an export tax of up to 40 percent over concerns that
exports would try to maximise their profits at the cost to domestic food
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Fig. 3 Production, imports, exports, and export share for wheat in Russia (Note
Until 1991 wheat production of the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic.
The values for 2019/2020 represent predictions (Source United States Depart-
ment of Agriculture, Foreign Agricultural Service, ‘PS&D: Production, Supply,
and Distribution’, https://apps.fas.usda.gov/psdonline/app/index.html#/app/
advQuery, accessed 20 August 2020)
security. When Russia’s wheat production was hit by serious drought and
heat in 2010, leading to a loss of 30 percent of the harvest on average,
a complete ban on grain exports was implemented from August 2010
to July 2011. In 2015, the devaluation of the ruble during 2014–2015
prompted the Russian government to establish a grain export tax of 15
percent with an additional payment of 7.5 Euro per tonne in order to
prevent a surge in wheat exports. The intent was to prevent domestic
shortages and high food inflation.
Finally, in January 2020 the government announced that going
forward it may implement a grain export quota during the second half
of an agricultural year (January–June), depending on conditions. Russia
is not the only country to use export quotas, and ordinarily govern-
ments would not be concerned about food shortages in the midst of
the second largest harvest in post-Soviet history.28 Therefore, the export
quota suggests that concerns over food insecurity may be more political
than physiological.29 For 2020, Russia’s grain export quota was set at
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7 million tonnes starting in April, limiting the export of grain to non-
member states of the Eurasian Economic Union to June 2020.30 The
export quota was not well received by grain exporters who complained
about the loss of revenue. In addition, the Russian government placed
export bans on sunflower seed, rice, barley, and corn starting in April
2020 to the end of June countries outside the EAEU, even though no
domestic shortages were reported. In 2021, the export quota on wheat
began in January and extended to the end of June.
5 Outlook
Food security policy, self-sufficiency, and import substitution have guided
domestic food policy for more than a decade. They are unlikely to go away
anytime soon, as witnessed by the adoption of the 2020 Food Security
Doctrine. Further, food security considerations affect agri-food imports
and exports as the discussion in the previous section illuminated. Thus,
food security frames international interactions, influences trade partners
and relations with them, and defines the role that Russia plays in the
international food system.
Going forward, we may expect continued emphasis on self-sufficiency.
Russia is essentially self-sufficient in pork and poultry, while continuing
as a net importer of beef and butter, as well as fruit and vegetables.
The future development of those sectors strongly depends on whether
their markets will continuously be shielded from international competi-
tion by Russia’s food import ban. If the food import ban against Western
countries would be removed, it can be expected that imports of beef and
dairy products, as well as fruit and vegetables, would increase. If the food
import ban remains and continues to protect domestic producers vis-à-
vis international competition, production growth in those sectors can be
expected to be more dynamic. However, Russia’s food security policy is an
element of foreign policy, and geopolitics will decide whether the Russian
food import ban is sustained or abolished.31
In terms of food exports, short of catastrophic events such as
megadrought or years of anomalous heat, we expect Russia to remain
a strong wheat exporter.32 That said, Russia’s wheat market remains chal-
lenged by large distances between the grain-producing regions and access
points to the world market at the Black Sea and also the Pacific Ocean.33
Although Russia has significant potential to increase grain production, the
question is to what extent additional grain production can be mobilised
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and transformed into grain export supply on the world market. Since
grains, and in particular wheat, is the primary agricultural export product,
the political will to catalyse the mobilisation of grain exports by financing
investments in transport and port infrastructure and subsidising the recul-
tivation of land is high. However, growing livestock production will
increase domestic demand for grains and thus reduce the grain export
potential. Nonetheless, given the large additional grain production poten-
tial, a rather weak ruble, and strong political support for upscaling grain
transport infrastructure for domestic and international trade, it can be
expected that wheat exports will further increase, and Russia will continue
to be among the dominant wheat exporters in the world. However,
continuing restrictions of wheat exports by the Russian government, and
increasing domestic livestock production may moderate wheat export
growth.
The bottom line is that food security has not prevented Russia from
playing a major role in the international food trade system, and that is
likely to remain true. We expect Russia to continue its role as an importer
of certain raw products for which it may not attain self-sufficiency (as well
as the importation of packaged and processed foods ready for immediate
consumption). And we expect Russia to maintain and expand its role as
an agri-food exporter to more than 100 countries in the world. Russia as
a player in the global food system is here to stay, even with protectionist
food security policies.
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This chapter examines Russia’s role in the global seafood trade system
over time and concludes with perspectives on its future role.1 The chapter
examines three periods of Russia’s seafood production and trade: (1) the
development of Soviet fishing industry; (2) the early post-Soviet period
(1991–2001); and (3) the Putin period of consolidation. The last section
of the chapter presents an outlook for the future role of Russia in global
seafood trade. My analysis fits into the larger literature on the Russian
government’s dual concern for food security in the domestic market on
the one hand and a desire for Western currency from export earnings on
the other.2 A key question is how Russia balances the tension between
food security concerns and business interests related to foreign trade.
During the past 20 years Russia’s seafood trade policy has emphasised
both exports and a concern that domestic supplies are sufficient. During
the presidency of Dmitrii Medvedev (2008–2012), some noticeable
changes in seafood import policy were made following the introduction
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of the Food Security Doctrine in 2010. For example, during his presi-
dency, the government increased control over the import of foodstuffs to
Russia. Russia’s seafood imports had grown substantially during 2000–
2008. Under Medvedev, Rossel’khoznadzor developed a tight system of
control over registered foreign food export companies and increased
inspections of them. At the same time, new regulations and incentives
related to control of seafood exports were introduced. Since Vladimir
Putin reassumed the presidency of Russia in 2012, Russia’s export of fish
and seafood has been steadily growing. Both commercial interests and
the Russian government have recently advocated for even higher levels of
seafood exports.3 In particular, Russia’s seafood exports play an impor-
tant role in the trade with the neighbouring regions such as the European
Union (EU) and Asia. For example, through 27 December 2020, Russia
exported $3.2 billion USD in food to the EU, of which fish and seafood
accounted for $1.1 billion. To the same date, Russia exported $3.9 billion
USD of food to China, of which $1.6 billion USD was fish and seafood.4
2 The Development
of the Soviet-Russian Seafood Industry
Seafood has always represented an important dimension of the Russian
food system. Looking at Russia as a whole, there are two main geograph-
ical areas for catches and one region for seafood trading. For seafood
catches, the two areas are: (1) The Northwest Russian fishing industry,
which focuses on cod fisheries in the Barents Sea and Northeast Atlantic.
This industry exports seafood to Norway and other European countries
such as Portugal, UK, Spain, and Germany. (2) In the Russian Far East,
the main exportable seafood is Alaskan pollack to China, Japan, South
Korea, and Vietnam. In the Far East, Russia has exclusive fishing rights
to huge fish stocks, in particular Alaskan pollock. Pollock is one of the
world’s largest fisheries, with annual harvests ranging from 4 to 7 million
metric tonnes annually in the North Pacific over the past decade. Manage-
ment of this wild fish resource in the Pacific is a joint responsibility
between the surrounding coastal states, the United States and Russia,
although China, the Republic of Korea, Japan, and Poland also take part
in the annual commission meetings as stakeholders.5 Seafood imports
to the Russian Far East region are modest, explained by the huge fish
resources that Russia manages and controls in the area. Domestic demand
for seafood in the Russian Far East is also limited by its relatively sparse
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population, just over 8.1 million people in 2019 in an area that spans
more than 6.9 million square kilometres.6
(3) For seafood trading, traders in the European part of Russia import
seafood, exploiting the supply void that was left by the former Soviet
fishing industry. The main import business is centred around Moscow
and St. Petersburg where large processing industries have evolved and
thrived. Again, geographical proximity is an important factor for the
choice of suppliers. A large amount of the seafood, primarily herring,
mackerel, and farmed Atlantic salmon, was supplied by Norway while
other northern European countries filled in with other seafood species
and smaller amounts of salmon and herring.
During the first few decades of the Soviet period, the total seafood
catch was relatively modest but there was a steady growth over the years,
reaching 6.7 million tonnes of seafood in 1968, an increase of more than
600 percent compared to the 1 million tonne catch in 1913. The big
increase came with the industrialisation of the fishing industry, charac-
terised by massive building and use of large factory trawlers with large
extractive and storage capacity.7 Another important factor that enabled
the huge growth in the fishing industry was extensive fishing in the open
sea. As a result, the Soviet Union experienced an increase in its fish catch
to more than 11 million metric tonnes at the apex of the Soviet fishing
industry in the 1980s. The entire system was designed to support the
Soviet home market, so seafood exports were very limited. The institu-
tional setup was based on the Soviet planned economic principles. The
whole industrial complex was one holistic entity structured into five huge
seafood general directorates which complied with Gosplan’s requirements
for output.8 There was, however, some minor trade of seafood, mainly
shellfish (cold water prawns), and caviar that was sold by Soviet state
trade organisations, often through foreign subsidiaries in selected coun-
tries. This institutional arrangement was coherent, albeit it involved a
few faults, the most conspicuous of which was an emphasis on quantity
over quality. Fishing vessels were awarded for fulfilling their plan obli-
gation. Any additional delivery that exceeded the plan generated extra
benefits for the fishermen and particularly the manager. The Soviet bonus
system stimulated an emphasis on volumes rather than quality of the fish,
a practice that today would make it difficult to engage in international
trade. The primary goals of Soviet seafood policy were to reach per capita
consumption of 25 kg of seafood and to support the needs of the Soviet
military.
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2.1 The Early Post-Soviet Period (1991–2001)
After the Soviet Union fell apart, the fishing industry in post-Soviet Russia
changed substantially. In terms of structure there was almost total frag-
mentation, with fishing companies the most heavily affected. Russia’s
annual seafood harvest fell dramatically to between 3 and 5 million metric
tonnes, although the total seafood catch increased gradually since the
mid-1990s and continuing to 2019.9 In the early post-Soviet period, the
main geographical areas for the Russian fishing industry were: (1) the
Russian Far East with the Sea of Okhotsk and Pacific ocean; (2) north-
west Russia with the Bering Sea and Northeast Atlantic; and (3) the open
high seas. Over the past ten years, the average volumes of the Russian
seafood catch come from the Russian Far East (66 percent); Northwest
Russia (12.5 percent); and high seas fisheries (14.4 percent).10
Being a coastal state represents an important prerequisite for the ability
to balance the trade of fish on the global market. The United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea paved the way for the establishment of
200-mile Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) for coastal states. According
to this legal institution, most coastal states were given sovereign rights
to exploit the most productive parts of the sea. The rights are defined
by their geographical coastline. For Russia, this meant access to two of
the most productive sea areas on the globe. In the Northwest, Russia
shares sovereign rights to exploit the Atlantic cod fish stock with Norway.
The management and quota distribution are made through the Joint
Norwegian-Russian Fisheries Commission. The commission has a 50-year
record of successful collaboration.
Most of the reduction in Russia’s seafood catch during the early post-
Soviet period can be explained by changes in the use of open seas fishing
areas. The reason why distant fisheries were used less is due to the 200-
mile EEZ, which excluded foreign countries from accessing these fishing
grounds. As a consequence, many of the distant fishing grounds that
Russia used to exploit earlier became significantly less accessible.11 There
are a few exceptions though, where some coastal states contract out parts
of their quotas and receive a part of the catch in exchange. Russia has,
notwithstanding, seen a large decrease in its fishing industry. In addition
to the introduction of the EEZs by coastal states, many of the fish stocks
in the open seas have decreased in size as a consequence of over-fishing.
In addition to reduced access to previous fisheries in open waters,
during the early post-Soviet period the fishing industry struggled with low
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effectiveness and problems in the value chain in the Russian market. The
institutions, or external working conditions of the fishing industry (the
laws, regulations, economic institutions/banks etc.), changed dramatically
compared to the Soviet planned system. Since institutions regulate and
influence the behaviour of companies, institutional change also influences
production and the flow of goods.12 For example, price reform made
operations incredibly expensive for newly privatised companies. Fuel costs
increased more than ten times compared to the costs in the late Soviet
period. Few incentives were established for fishermen to deliver their catch
to the Russian market, and no barriers to export were established.
At the same time, Russian fish companies had incentives to deliver
their seafood to nearby harbours. The incentives to export were found
in the fact that Russia’s land-based industry had problems finding money
to pay for deliveries of seafood. Foreign fish buyers paid for fish upfront in
Western currency, which was yet another attraction for the Russian fishing
companies to export. This led to a situation where large amounts of high-
value seafood were delivered directly to foreign ports in adjacent areas to
the fishing grounds.
The alteration of behaviour among the fishing companies in the North-
west Russian fishing complex illustrates the cumulative effect caused by
changes in the use of distant fisheries. Over a ten-year period, from 1990
to 2000, Russian companies shifted their strategy almost 100 percent.
While around 85 percent of their total catch was taken from the high
seas in 1990, only 6 percent was caught in these areas in 2000. Russia’s
fish catch to harvesting in fishing grounds close to EEZ waters close to
harbours. Russia’s fish catch from the Northeast Atlantic increased from
about 15 percent of the catch in 1990 to 94 percent in 2000. Table
1 shows the distribution of Russia’s fish catch by fishing area and the
volume of catches during 1990–2000.
There are two aspects of particular interest to the decrease of the
distant fisheries. The first was an increase in Russia’s seafood exports, and
the second was a direct result of the sudden transition from state-owned
to privately-held fishing companies. The newly established, privately-held
companies needed quick earnings and lower expenditures on fuel and
other significant operating costs. These needs combined with few restric-
tions on trade.13 The same situation was present in the Russian Far East,
where the new private companies exported large volumes of white fish to
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Other obstacles also affected Russia’s fishing industry. Fuel was expen-
sive and in short supply. Russia’s fishing fleet was old and very inefficient.
According to Deputy Minister Ilya Shestakov, the head of Rosrybalovstvo,
Russia’s federal fishing agency, more than 80 percent of the fishing fleet
is older than 20 years. The fuel consumption of old Soviet trawlers was
around three times higher compared to a typical Western trawler. There-
fore, it became important for newly privatised Russian fishing companies
to reduce idle transportation as much as possible. In sum, the privatisa-
tion of the fishing industry in Russia drove some of the fishermen towards
deliveries to Western markets, in particular in Russia’s Northwest and the
Russian Far East.15
While Russia’s privately-held fishing companies searched for alterna-
tive solutions to renew and modernise their fleets, investors from Western
countries were ready to offer a solution. A special leasing arrangement,
called the bareboat charter (BBC), was introduced. BBC arrangements
are generally a leasing contract with an option to buy the vessel at the
end of the contract period. A key aspect of the BBC contracts is that
they are managed by the Western management company who controls all
transactions related to the leased vessel. As it applied to Russia, in order
to maintain the control of cash flow the leased fishing vessel was required
to deliver all its catches to designated processors in the West (including
Norway). The Western management company was then responsible for
paying the lease in line with the contract requirements, as well as paying
for operating expenses in accordance with the bilateral agreement. At
the end of the lease, the Russian company could purchase the vessel.
Western sellers saw the BBC contracts as the best way of selling fishing
vessels to Russian fishing companies. In practice, the BBC contract was
organised as an instalment-based purchase arrangement. As the number
of BBC contracts increased gradually from 1994 onwards, and as more
of seafood catches were delivered to Western processors the volumes of
seafood deliveries to Russia’s domestic market sank gradually for the next
10 years or so to around 3.2 million tonnes.
The problem for Russia’s political and administrative bodies at the
regional and the federal level was that deliveries of fish from the BBC
vessels were locked into Western buyers by contract. The consequence
was that a large percentage of attractive fish catches from Northwest
Russian and the Russian Far East fishing fleets were delivered directly to
nearby foreign markets. This was basically the export of valuable white-
fish—Atlantic cod in the Northwest and Alaska Pollack in the Far East.
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The operation provided no benefit for the Russian government in terms
of taxes or foreign currency. At the same time, the domestic supply of
seafood decreased sharply, and prices increased, thus reducing demand
even more.
While domestic deliveries decreased, Russia’s seafood exports remained
stable at around 1.2 million tonnes. The deficiency in domestic supplies
of seafood opened an opportunity for foreign exporters who could sell
to Russia. As a consequence, Russia’s annual import of seafood more
than doubled from 424 thousand tonnes in 1990 to 979 thousand tonnes
in 2005, when it stabilised at around 1 million tonnes through 2013.16
The majority of the imported fish was whole frozen, but the import of
fresh fish (mainly farmed Atlantic salmon from Norway) also increased.
A corresponding new Russian processing industry thrived on seafood
imports. Seafood imports did not, however, manage to compensate fully
for the shortage in deliveries to the domestic market. Total supplies to
the domestic market dropped from about 3.3 million tonnes in the mid-
1990s to a record low level of 2.5 million tonnes in 2005. As a rough
estimate, this volume translates to an average per capita seafood consump-
tion of around 17.5 kg. The estimate is based on round weight data of the
fish, which means that the actual average consumption was much lower,
maybe around 14–15 kg per capita.17
Russia’s role in the international seafood trade system during the early
post-Soviet period was affected by the absence of trade protectionism.
The main characteristics of Russia’s engagement in the global seafood
system may rather be seen as two detached arms: one dealing with the
export of valuable whitefish to geographically close markets. The other
arm was dealing with the import of seafood, taking advantage of the
market demand for high-quality seafood. The Russian food market in the
European part of Russia revealed a large demand for seafood that was
traditional in the Russian diet, primarily herring and mackerel and later
substantial amounts of farmed Atlantic salmon.
2.2 The Putin Period of Consolidation
When Vladimir Putin assumed the presidency of Russia in March 2000,
emphasis was placed on consolidation and strengthening the central
government and Russia itself. One of the priorities was addressing the
food situation.18 During the 1990s, the volume and value of national
food production had decreased substantially. At the same time, both
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the value and volume of food imports—mostly meat and meat prod-
ucts—increased significantly during the decade. Food imports declined
in 1998–2000 due to severe devaluation of the ruble before starting to
increase again in 2001 (see Chapter 1).19 Likewise, imports of seafood
rose as well. For Russia’s fishing industry, the value of seafood imports
rose from $209.8 million USD in 2001 to $956.9 million USD in
2005. Interestingly, the majority of Russia’s imported seafood came from
Norway, a small neighbouring country that has only 5 million inhabitants
and an annual seafood production of 2.75 million tonnes. Norway has
exclusive rights to a long and sheltered coastline and adjacent 200-mile
EEZ. The EEZ is one of the most productive sea areas, which explains
Norway’s production capacity and why the country is one of the world’s
largest seafood exporters. During 1991–2005, Norway supplied about
45–50 percent of Russia’s seafood imports.
One of the species that increased the value of Norway’s seafood exports
to Russia was farmed Atlantic salmon. The volume of Norwegian salmon
exported to the European part of Russia increased significantly from 9
tonnes in 1998 to 50 tonnes in 2005, and reached a record high of 182
tonnes in 2012.20 Overall, the value of Russia’s seafood imports from
Norway grew from $96.8 million USD in 2001, to $450.3 million USD
in 2005, and to $1.1 billion USD in 2013.21 Imports of high-value fish
like salmon have a larger impact on import statistics in value than volume,
naturally. Frozen herring, a low-priced and highly nutritional fish that
is popular in all social strata in Russia, constitute the largest share of
frozen imported fish in terms of volume. This situation is neither intended
nor seen as desirable from the Russian government’s point of view. The
political intention remains to reduce seafood imports and lower Russia’s
dependency on Western countries.
For reasons already explored, seafood exports are difficult to control
but from January 2009 a prohibition was enacted on bareboat charter
arrangements (BBC) in the Russian EEZ.22 In January 2010, the Food
Security Doctrine defined and gave direction to food independence and
food security for the Russian Federation.23 In the doctrine, food inde-
pendence and food security refer to Russian sufficiency and economic
availability of safe foodstuffs for every citizen. Both independence from
international supplies and availability of fish for the average Russian are
both important dimensions for Russian food policy and as a basis for
the development plans for the fisheries and agricultural complexes.24 The
doctrine defines how much of supply should be supplied to the Russian
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market from domestic production. According to the 2010 doctrine,
Russia’s fish catch should account for no less than 80 percent of total
consumption of seafood.25
Two other important measures were introduced to develop the Russian
fishing industry and secure a high level of self-sufficiency. The first was a
‘Concept for the Development of the Fishing Industry of the Russian
Federation to 2020’. The Concept was approved by governmental order
No. 1518 on 8 September 2003. The Concept laid out the principles for
how the Russian fishing industry should develop in order to regain an
important role as a pillar in the food system.
The second measure was a Federal State Program entitled the ‘Devel-
opment of the Fisheries Complex’, approved by the government on 15
April 2014 by Resolution No. 314.26 The 2014 programme was subse-
quently amended and revised in March 2018 (Resolution No. 380) and
March 2019 (Resolution No. 324). In March 2020, the most recent
version of the state programme for the development of fisheries was
adopted (Resolution No. 394).27
Similar to agriculture and other branches of the economy, a ‘Con-
cept’ carries more long-term and macro goals, leaving specifics to the
state programme. Thus, the state programme was more operational and
contained monetary allocations for various policy goals. According to the
2020 version, the programme will run through 2024 and it envisions
expenditures of more than R70 billion from 2020 through 2024. During
the entire duration of the state programme, 2013–2024, more than R154
billion will be spent. In addition, domestic production should meet 85
percent of demand, and annual per capita seafood consumption should
reach 23.1 kg by 2024.
The programme postulated other goals as well. One goal was directed
towards the renewal of the fishing fleet and land-based processing
industry by introducing an investment fishery quota. The fishery quota
is an arrangement whereby a relative share of the total fishing quota
for more valuable species is allocated to actors on the condition that
they actually carry out renewal projects in the fishing industry. Basically,
Russia’s government is allocating 20 percent of the total allowable catch
(TAC) for companies willing to invest in new vessels, which must be built
in domestic shipyards.28 The total allowable catch (TAC) is a restricting
factor because it sets an upper limit for a country’s maximum catch of
wild fish species. The establishment of a TAC (which is an annual process)
is based on recommendations from ICES (International Council for the
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Exploration of the Sea), and a joint decision between the stakeholders
(different states).
The initiative from Rosrybolovstvo for the investment quota has encour-
aged fishing companies to spend their money in Russia, that is, to use
Russian fishing wharfs for construction of new fishing vessels, and to
increase the effectiveness and capacity of the Russian fishing industry
and fleet. This is considered as an important dimension of the social and
economic contribution to Russia from the fisheries sector. A large part of
the fishing fleet is still old and obsolete, and a renewal is necessary. From
the perspective of Russia’s policymakers, it is desirable that fishing compa-
nies invest in Russia, and also that they deliver their catch to Russian
processing companies. Together, these key federal support systems, along
with a substantial number of other governmental measures, were intro-
duced to improve the productivity of the Russian fishing industry and
to secure a much-needed renewal for both the land-based processing
industry and the fishing fleet.
In a broad sense, from the perspective of the Russian government,
the state programme since 2013 has been successful. The overarching
goal—to secure stable and sufficient supplies of seafood to the domestic
market without becoming too dependent on any one foreign supplier
country or organisation—was achieved. A reduction in seafood imports
was further amplified by the food embargo in 2014. At the same time,
Russia’s seafood exports have continued to grow substantially as illus-
trated in Fig. 1. The explanation for the increase in exports is twofold: (1)
Russia’s seafood catch has grown gradually and has generated a surplus
that allows for an increase in exports; and (2) Russia’s fishing compa-
nies have focused on key target markets in the Far East such as China,
the Republic of Korea, and Japan. Figure 1 indicates trends in Russia’s
total catch, seafood imports and exports, domestic supply balance during
2000–2019.
3 The Food Embargo and Its Impact
on Russia’s Global Seafood Trade
Following the introduction of the Food Security Doctrine in 2010, Russia
started to govern seafood imports and exports more systematically. The
key goals proceeded along two lines: (1) to reduce dependence on large
volumes of seafood from a few, dominating countries; and (2) to achieve
the goal of self-sufficiency for seafood, defined by the Russian government
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Fig. 1 Russia’s total catch, trade, and domestic supply balance, 2000–2019
(1,000 Tonnes) (Sources Author’s compilation based on data from Rosrybolovstvo
and Rosstat)
as no less than 80 percent of domestic consumption should be supplied
by Russian fishermen and the domestic seafood industry. The 2020 Food
Security Doctrine and the State Programme for the Development of
Fishing increased the threshold to 85 percent. The first point has concrete
implications for the supply structure, that is, who may supply seafood
to Russia’s domestic market. The 2010 Food Security Doctrine gave
power to Rossel’khoznadzor, the Russian food safety authority, along with
three important power bases: legitimacy, expertise, and coercive power.29
Rossel’khoznadzor has formal independence as an executive expert and has
control over the veterinary field, including over aquatic resources.30
Rossel’khoznadzor was established in 2004 and immediately started the
process of looking into critical issues related to suppliers’ (countries)
structure and capacity. As the main foreign supplier of seafood to Russia,
Norwegian authorities received a letter from Rossel’khoznadzor already in
2005, requesting a wide range of information about production systems,
capacity, and technical food safety regimes in Norway. By the end of
2007, the number of approved Norwegian exporters was reduced signif-
icantly, even as the volume of seafood exports continued to rise. The
2010 Food Security Doctrine provided a formal instrument for Russian
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authorities to curtail the dominant position that several food exporting
countries had in the Russian market, but more time to achieve actual
results was evidently required. In 2012, for example, Norway alone had
a 45 percent market share in seafood exports to Russia. According to the
head of Rossel’khoznadzor, Sergei Dankvert, reliance on one supplier is an
unacceptable situation for Russia.31
Subsequent to the 2010 food doctrine, Russia became a member of
the World Trade Organization (WTO) on 22 August 2012. By taking
this step, there was an expectation that Russia would join the liberal
global trading order and that barriers to entry to the Russian food market
would be lowered. In the run-up to formal acceptance into the WTO,
Russia had modified its laws and customs policies, made promises about
reducing tariffs and non-tariff barriers, agreed to limit its subsidies to agri-
culture, and indicated a willingness to open certain sectors of its economy
to competition (banking, insurance, automobiles).
The expected trade liberalisation from Russia’s accession to the WTO,
however, had little chance to become reality. Almost exactly two years
later, on 6 August 2014, Russia introduced an import ban on agri-food
products from selected Western countries as a response to their sanctions
which had targeted certain sectors of Russia’s economy. Russia’s food
embargo (countersanctions) towards the EU did not include seafood but
focused on agri-food. Prior to the food embargo, Russia had been the
second most important destination for EU agricultural products, trailing
only the United States. The main agricultural products from the EU
that were affected by Russia’s countersanctions were pork exports (58.9
percent of Russia’s total imports); milk and milk products (37.4 percent of
Russia’s total imports); and vegetables and fruits (31.9 and 23.5 percent
of Russia’s total imports), respectively.32
Norway, however, was targeted by countersanctions even though it is
not part of the EU, and as a consequence its seafood exports to Russia
were affected. As shown in Table 2, Russia’s import of seafood from
Norway terminated almost instantly after countersanctions were intro-
duced. Norway’s drop from being the dominating supplier with around
45–50 percent market share in Russia’s seafood imports to almost zero
overnight was dramatic. To replace Norwegian seafood, Russia needed to
find other suppliers. The decline in Russia’s seafood imports in 2015 and
2016 reflects initial challenges securing alternative suppliers (as well as the
devaluation of the ruble and an economic recession). Eventually, three
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other farm-raised fish from Europe entered the Russian market: Green-
land, Faroe Islands, and Turkey. In addition, Chile significantly increased
its market share compared to the period before the sanctions. Greenland,
Faroe Islands (EU), and Chile are suppliers of farmed Atlantic salmon,
while Turkey is a new supplier of farmed whitefish such as sea bass and
seabream. In addition, some Norwegian farmed salmon found its way to
the Russian market through Belarus, although the volumes were marginal
compared to previous direct exports to Russia. Norway was not the only
country from which seafood transited through Belarus, which became a
kind of trading hub for seafood from sanctioned countries. Table 2 indi-
cates the country of origin for Russia’s seafood imports from 2001 to
2019.
The table demonstrates three notable dimensions related to the change
in seafood trade in the aftermath of the 2014 embargo. First, there was
a change from one dominating supplier to Russia to a higher number of
suppliers, each of which exported lower volumes of seafood to Russia than
the one dominating supplier had in the pre-embargo period. In particular,
Norway went from being the dominant supplier in 2013 to virtual irrele-
vance, with seafood exports to Russia falling to 1 percent of market share
in 2019. Second, after countersanctions were introduced, the combina-
tion of main suppliers captured a much higher share of Russia’s total
seafood imports. Taken together, the group of main suppliers increased
their market share from 72 percent in 2013 to 85 percent in 2019.
Third, main seafood suppliers to Russia were distributed across a wider
spectrum of geographical regions, including Asia, South America, and
Europe. Chile in particular increased its market share from 10 percent
in 2013 to almost 22 percent in 2019; China’s share rose too, from 9
percent in 2013 to nearly 15 percent in 2019. That said, countersanc-
tions contributed to a decline in the value of Russia’s imported seafood,
which dropped from $2.8 billion USD in 2013 to around $1.6 billion
USD in 2018 (the value includes fresh and frozen fish and seafood).33
The reduction in seafood imports is explained by the combination of
reduced import volumes and the purchase of less expensive seafood, i.e.
the volume of farmed salmon declined.
In the aftermath of Russia’s 2014 countersanctions, Russian seafood
exports did not experience the same change as occurred with imports. On
the contrary, the primary purchasers of Russia’s seafood have remained
stable, with the Asian countries by far representing the largest Russian
export market. In particular, China, the Republic of Korea, and Japan
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have been quite stable markets, buying 70–80 percent of the total Russian
seafood exports. The volume of seafood exports to Asia coincides with
the Russia’s seafood resource base, which is by far the largest in the
Russian Far East. These three Asian countries buy large quantities of
Alaska pollack, salmon, and pelagic species (mackerel and herring). In
Europe, the classical customers (Norway, Germany, Denmark, and the
UK) are purchasers of Northeast Atlantic cod. Compared to the seafood
trade in the Russian Far East, the value is quite small, but is stable and
did not change much as a result of countersanctions. Since 2013, the
Netherlands has become a relatively large consumer for Russia’s seafood,
increasing its share from about 10 percent in 2013 to over 17 percent in
2019. In total, European markets received about 20 percent of Russia’s
seafood exports during 2017–2019. The distribution of Russia’s seafood
exports by main buyers is indicated in Table 3.
The Putin period of consolidation also brought attempts to establish
an institutional setup for the governance of Russia’s role in the global
seafood trade. The federal government has tried to establish a system
of incentives to provide control over seafood exports as a valuable asset.
Russia’s export of fish has been an important binder in relations with large
trade partners in the Far East. Russia seems to have succeeded with the
strategy of assuming some control of the export. It is evident that Russia’s
government intends to remain involved in seafood trade as part of its
overall food security strategy. In January 2020, President Putin signed
a new Food Security Doctrine to replace the 2010 version. Of note is
the fact that the target for self-sufficiency in seafood was raised from 80
to 85 percent (in live weight). In the 2020 version, under the chapter
of ‘Strategic Goal and Key Objectives of Ensuring Food Security’, the
doctrine stated:
The strategic goal of ensuring food security is to provide the country’s
population with safe, quality and affordable farm products, raw materials
and food in the quantities that satisfy balanced food consumption. Based
on food independence requirements, the major sources of foodstuffs are
products of agricultural, forestry, fishery and hunting sectors, as well as
food industry products. The agricultural, fishery and food industries play
central role in the food security assurance.34





























































































































































































































































































































































































Not only does the new Food Security Doctrine provide more detail than
the previous 2010 version, it also contains several strategic measures and
directions for the desired future development in the food sector.
In addition, a governmental order (razporiazhenie) in April 2020 (No.
993-r) laid out a new ‘Strategy for Development of the Agribusiness
and Fishery Sectors of the Russian Federation to 2030’.35 The strategy
considers economic models for development and is closely tied to the
new Food Security Doctrine and other official programmes related to
the strategic development of the food sector in general. Some of the
goals are to increase the share of value-added products and make them
available to Russian consumers, and to increase the exports of food prod-
ucts to at least $45 billion USD annually, a goal that subsequently was
modified to $34 billion USD by 2024 instead. To increase exports, the
order advocates the elimination of trade barriers, stimulation of export-
oriented businesses, and to promote Russia’s agriculture and fish products
in export markets.36
4 Outlook
Russia’s role in global seafood trade has changed over time. The first
change is as a seafood importer. Russia has stabilised as a less promi-
nent actor as an importer in the global seafood market. The overarching
element in the Russia’s seafood trade after 2000 has been self-sufficiency,
that is, to produce enough to meet Russia’s own needs. The early post-
Soviet era was characterised by heavy importation of low-value seafood
and export of high-value seafood. After 2010, Russia now has net produc-
tion that exceeds domestic demand and consumption. Over the past
decade and, in particular after the 2014 embargo, Russia decreased the
value of food imports in general, with the dollar value of food imports
falling from a post-Soviet high of $43 billion USD in 2013 to less than
$25 billion USD in 2016.37 The dollar value of Russia’s food imports has
increased since 2016 but has not come close to the pre-2014 level. The
dollar value of seafood imports also fell due to countersanctions, although
since 2017 have stabilised (see Fig. 1). The 2020 food security doctrine
prescribes more self-sufficiency in seafood.
Seafood imports from Europe fell dramatically as a consequence of
the food embargo and has reinforced Russia’s reduced role as a seafood
importer. The major seafood trade inflows most affected by the ban are
imports of Atlantic salmon, herring, and trout from Norway and cold
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water shrimp from Canada. Even if the import ban against the EU has
been compensated somewhat with imports from other countries, the
big picture is still a reduction in seafood imports.38 A parallel trend
in Russia’s seafood import is the gradual shift from European to Asian
countries where China has maintained its position as the second largest
foreign supplier of seafood to Russia, with the volume increasing by 23
percent during 2010–2016 (see Table 2). Other states that have appeared
as newcomers among the top ten exporters of seafood to Russia are
Vietnam, Peru, Morocco, Thailand, and India, thereby strengthening the
trend for Russia to distance itself from trade with Western countries.39
Russian food security issue is clearly a political ambition strongly
related to the independence of seafood imports in order to self-supply the
domestic market. As indicated above, the Russian model of food security
places emphasis on national vulnerability from foreign sources.40 On the
other hand, the Russian economy benefits from a trade surplus in one
sector in order to bolster sectors that have a negative trade surplus (such
as the agriculture sector). Based on statements by government leaders,
official documents and plans, institutional arrangements, and business
interests within Russia, I expect that Russia’s role as a seafood importer
to remain stable and its global ranking as an importer not to change
significantly.
The second change is as a seafood exporter. Russia’s export of seafood
has increased steadily. During the past 15 years, Russia’s role as a domi-
nant global seafood exporter has grown. In 2003, Russia ranked 35th
globally in dollar value of seafood exports. In 2019, Russia advanced to
7th place as a seafood exporting country, exceeded only by traditionally
large seafood exporting countries such as China, Norway, USA, Chile,
and India. Russia’s ranking as seafood importer and exporter during
2003–2019 is shown in Table 4.
There is an aspiration to further develop seafood exports. In October
2018, then-Russian Prime Minister Dmitrii Medvedev announced a goal
of achieving $8 billion USD in revenue from annual seafood exports by
2024. In 2018, Russia exported seafood valued at $4 billion USD.41 The
head of Rosrybolovstvo, Ilya Shestakov, indicated that Russia’s fish catch
is projected to rise by only 500,000 metric tonnes by 2030, so a rise
in export value has to come from an increase in high-value fish.42 He
suggested moving from supplying primarily whole fish to selling value-
added products such as fillets that come from processing. The move to
exports of value-added products was reflected as well in governmental
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Table 4 Ranking of Russia’s place in global seafood trade
2003 2007 2010 2015 2019
Ranking of eight largest seafood exporting countries
1 China Norway China China China
2 Norway China Norway Norway Norway
3 USA USA Vietnam USA Vietnam
4 Vietnam Vietnam USA Vietnam India
5 India Canada Canada India Chile
6 Canada Chile Thailand Canada USA
7 Chile Spain Spain Chile Russia
(7)





Russia (12) Russia (10)
Ranking of eight largest seafood importing countries
1 Japan Japan Japan USA USA
2 USA USA USA Japan China
3 Spain Spain Spain China Spain
4 France China France Spain Spain
5 Italy France China France France
6 China Italy Italy France France











Russia (11) Russia (19) Russia
(18)
Note Ranking is based on U.S. dollar value
Sources International Trade Statistics; Federal Customs Service, Russia; Rosstat; and UN Comtrade
order from November 2019 (No. 2798-r), also entitled ‘Strategy for
Development of the Fisheries Sector to 2030’. In this document, a clear
ambition was expressed to strengthen the export of white fish and stim-
ulate increased exports of processed fish.43 This order is specific to the
fishing industry although it shares the same name with the April 2020
order that was mentioned above. According to order No. 2798-r from
November 2019, to reach export goals Russia should focus on the export
of large-volume, valuable white fish species.
Going forward, the room for manoeuvre for Russia as a global
actor in seafood trade is affected by resource accessibility, organisational
behaviour, and state political aims, goals, and institutional capabilities.
Russia’s government has made clear its intentions to play a direct role
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in seafood exports. Since 2000 a whole range of different economic and
institutional measures have been implemented. Legal institutions, regula-
tions, and various incentive measures have been introduced together with
the transfer of power to various federal control organs such as the Federal
Customs Service, Rossel’khoznadzor, and other more sector-specific organs
that give the state the ability to move seafood exports in desired direc-
tions. With regard to seafood exports, there is little to suggest a pull back
in Russia’s export orientation. Stable and high levels of the fishing quotas
will continue Russia’s role as a prominent actor in global seafood trade.
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PART II
Russia’s Regional Agri-Food Trade
Chapter 6: Russia’s Regional Free Trade
Agreements and Agri-Food Trade After 2014
Christel Elvestad and Tatiana Isachenko
1 Introduction
Recent years have witnessed the rise of populism and economic nation-
alism. International trade in general is attacked from the political left and
political right. In the United States, the Trump administration has led the
way in attacking free trade. The political left points to rising inequality,
loss of jobs, and stagnant incomes for the working class. The political
right points to high trade deficits. On the political left, critics argue that
trade agreements favour the interests of corporations over workers. On
the political right, critics maintain that agreements put international inter-
ests above national interests.1 Both sides blame trade. A contrary trend,
however, has been an increase in the popularity of regional trade agree-
ments, (RTAs).2 Some RTAs are narrow in range, focusing mainly on
reducing tariffs for specific types of goods. However, modern RTAs often
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include a wider range of areas such as trade in goods, services, invest-
ments, public procurement, competition, and intellectual property rights.
There are over 300 RTAs in force and there is an expanding worldwide
RTA network.
Russia started to negotiate regional free agreements later than other
countries, but since 2015 it has been an active player. This chapter is
important because although Russia has pursued a specific variant of food
security since the 2008–2010 period, a variant that emphasises trade
protectionism, the story is more nuanced than commonly portrayed.
While it is true that food self-sufficiency and import substitution have
dominated Russia’s food policies since 2014, trade patterns show not a
withdrawal from international food markets but rather an adjustment and
recalibration of partners. Thus, this chapter sheds light on how Russia’s
regional trade policies and agri-food trade patterns have changed after the
introduction of countersanctions in 2014.
The purpose of this chapter is to: (1) examine Russia’s regional trade
strategies as the driving force of Eurasian regional trade integration,
focusing on agri-food policies as a key component; (2) review Russia’s
free trade agreements through the Eurasian Economic Union; and (3)
access the role of agri-food trade in signed and upcoming agreements, as
well as how food trade relations have changed in the period after sanc-
tions were introduced in 2014. The final section provides a look into the
future of Russia’s free trade agreements and agri-food trade.
2 International Context
Regional and preferential economic cooperation has attracted increasing
attention as free trade agreements have expanded in number and scope
and become an important part of the global trading system.3 The prolif-
eration of RTAs is important for most countries regardless of their level
of economic development. Because RTAs allow for more favourable terms
of trade, the share of global trade between members of RTAs has been
steadily growing in recent decades.
In addition to an increase in the number of RTAs, from about 50
agreements in the 1990s to over 300 agreements in 2020, RTAs are
becoming more complex.4 Modern RTAs often go beyond tariff reduc-
tion in certain sectors and products, instead covering a wide range of
policy areas. There have been a stronger emphasis on reducing and
removing non-tariff barriers to trade such as unnecessary or overly
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bureaucratic technical regulations and procedures that can hinder or even
stop trade completely.5 There is also a growing trend for RTAs to not
just liberalise trade in goods, but also to liberalise services, investment,
and areas such as intellectual property rights, government procurement,
competition policy, and issues like environmental and labour standards.6
Furthermore, RTAs can be concluded between countries located
within or across regions (inter- or intra-regional agreements). Bilat-
eral agreements are still common, but RTAs can also include a
multiple countries, for instance the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP
11) or the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP).7
In some cases, the agreements are signed between regional trade
blocks, for example between the European Union (EU) and the
Southern Common Market encompassing Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay,
and Paraguay (MERCOSUR).8 Furthermore, regional trade blocs often
coordinate at the multilateral level to try to increase their influence in
relevant international organisations. For instance, the EU has suggested
a comprehensive approach to push forward modernisation of the Word
Trade Organization (WTO).9
Why do countries sign RTAs? The classic answer from the economic
literature is the benefit of net welfare gain that such trade agree-
ments provide. By removing or reducing trade barriers, transaction costs
are lowered and economic growth through internationalisation can be
realised. The international political economy literature provides an analyt-
ical framework with four categories of motives behind RTAs, following a
political–economical dimension and a domestic–international dimension.
The first category ‘International Economic Motives’ refers to the use of
RTAs as a strategy to accommodate and shape the international environ-
ment, making it fit the country’s economic ambitions in the international
arena. Since RTAs provide for better terms of trade, it gives a competitive
edge and potential ‘first mover’ advantages. Another important motive
can be the need to cover a new issue that is missing in WTO/multilateral
negotiations.10 A negative view is that it is a mistake to put all efforts
on new free trade agreements instead of focusing on multilateralism and
thus supporting the World Trade Organization.11 However, to negotiate
RTAs can alternatively be viewed as a constructive response to the lack
of progress at the multilateral level. RTAs may not pose a threat but may
function as building blocks of trade liberalisation to be multilateralised
at a later stage.12 The typical example of this is the desire to include
investment in RTAs, since an agreement is still lacking in this area at
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the multilateral level. Another variant of international economic motives
behind RTAs is the desire to extend domestic reforms to the international
level using RTAs as reform anchors to test and benchmark reforms on a
wider scale of economic integration.13
A second category, ‘International Political Motives’, refers to ambitions
to create new coalitions or to strengthen existing ties between countries.
Sometimes economic reasons are not decisive and regional agreements
arise as a result of politically motivated efforts emphasising the geograph-
ical or historical characteristics of the relationship. For instance, the initial
motivation of the United States under former President Obama was to
make the Trans-Pacific-Partnership (TPP) the centrepiece of its strategic
axis to the Asia–Pacific region.14 In other words, there can be a strong
geopolitical motivation behind RTAs, emphasising and strengthening
relationships between countries in and across regions. Furthermore, actors
at the national level will try to influence RTA negotiations to fit their
interests, and negotiators will try to absorb and take into consideration
what outcomes can be accepted by domestic interest groups.15
A third category ‘Domestic Economic Motives’ refers to the quest for
better market access for goods and services in order to satisfy the interests
of national competitive industries. A classic motivation is to use RTAs as
an instrument to promote its export-oriented sectors by opening relevant
export markets. In other words, RTAs are used to liberalise trade in order
to meet national trade interests.
The fourth category, ‘Domestic Political Motives’, on the other hand,
refers to the use of RTAs in a way that is designed to maintain barriers
or even put up new barriers to trade in order to defend national trade
interests. A way to protect sectors that are not competitive is to treat the
entire sector or specific goods as off-limits to liberalisation in RTAs. Typi-
cally, this type of protectionist strategy restricts agricultural concessions in
RTAs. Agri-food is a so-called sensitive sector for many countries and as
a result, trade liberalisation in the agricultural sector is more limited.16
Agriculture has only undergone one round of negotiations through the
Uruguay Round the WTO. The Doha Round, started in 1997, was
supposed to deal with agriculture but negotiations ended in 2008 and
never restarted, thereby leaving agricultural tariffs generally high.17 The
lack of agreement on agricultural goods is important because generally
RTAs can help lower trade tariffs and barriers. We see that the share of
global agri-food trade between countries with RTAs rose from about 20
percent in 1998 to nearly 40 percent in 2009.18
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Thus, RTAs reflect both domestic and international interests, and for
each of the countries involved economic and political interests can come
into play. Furthermore, the interests between the negotiation parties
may coincide or be contrary to each other, making negotiation of RTAs
a complex balancing act. Regarding Russia, one may discern elements
of each of the four categories of motives, although during 2014–2018
the primary impulses have been domestic economic and domestic polit-
ical. Starting in 2019, however, international economic and political
motives have gained in importance. The earliest international motivations,
however, may be traced to the creation of the Eurasian Economic Union
(EAEU) to which we turn below.
3 Russia and the EAEU
This section examines Russia’s role as the dominant partner and driving
force of Eurasian regional integration. Agri-food policies have been a
key component of Russia’s trade strategies. One of the most notable
features of Russia’s modern trade policy is the search for the best possible
model of regional partnerships.19 During the last decade, Russia has tried
to revive integration projects with the Commonwealth of Independent
States (CIS), as well as to sign trade agreements by drawing from best
practices in international trade relations.
In 1994, CIS countries took measures to transition to a common free
trade regime to ensure stability in the region. However, the parties failed
to agree on a general list of exemptions. Therefore, the 1999 ‘Protocol on
Amendments and Additions to the Agreement on the Establishment of a
Free Trade Area’ allowed for temporary exemptions from the free trade
regime on a bilateral basis. Starting from the early 2000s, Russia initiated
negotiations on a new CIS free trade agreement which was finally ratified
in 2012 by Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan,
Moldova, and Ukraine.20 This phase of post-Soviet integration has been
labelled a case of ‘holding-together regionalism’ of countries originally
forming a single political entity struggling to find an effective form of
cooperation.21
The establishment of the Eurasian Economic Union in January 2015
brought together Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Armenia, and Kyrgyzstan
(see Chapter 8 for more institutional detail). Prior to the establishment
of the EAEU, Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan formed a Customs Union
that existed during 2010–2011.22 A Single Economic Space replaced the
172 C. ELVESTAD AND T. ISACHENKO
Customs Union during 2012–2014. The Eurasian Economic Treaty was
signed in May 2014 which became effective in January 2015, thereby
bringing the EAEU into existence. By design, the EAEU is a type of
regional integration, featuring free trade between the member states,
a common external tariff and suppression of internal customs controls
(Customs Union), and further integration into a single market for all the
‘four freedoms’, for goods, services, labour, and capital. In fact, however,
the EAEU has some features of an FTA and some of a Custom’s Union.23
That said, there are several shortcomings in the EAEU.24 One problem
is that the Eurasian Economic Commission as the executive body and
the Supreme Eurasian Council as a legislative body adopt and approve
decisions, but both bodies have little power to regulate controversial situ-
ations or settle disagreements between members. This situation points
to the fact that Russia wanted to form the Union in order to integrate
post-Soviet states, but having done so, does not appear committed to
making the organisation work and certainly is not willing to cede much
sovereignty to the Union.25
A second problem is disagreement on several key issues which brings
to light the limited ability to resolve intra-EAEU disputes among EAEU
members. Armenia and Belarus disagreed with Russia about gas trans-
portation prices within the EAEU.26 In 2014, Belarussian President
Alexander Lukashenko did not support Russia’s position during the
Ukrainian crisis, for example, refusing to recognise Russia’s annexation
of Crimea, and for the next several years the two nations engaged in a so-
called ‘milk war’. The contested situation after the presidential election
in Belarus in August 2020 also created tensions among EAEU members.
Armenia’s recent doubts about participation in the EAEU further compli-
cate the integration process, despite the fact that the most of Armenian
agricultural exports are directed to Russia.27
A third area of concern encompasses carry over effects from Russia’s
2014 food embargo against the West. Several examples are discussed.
First, during the formation of the Customs Union between Russia,
Belarus, and Kazakhstan, negotiations on free trade agreements with
foreign countries outside the CIS were subject to coordination with
Customs Union partners. Since the creation of Eurasian Economic Union
in 2015, all trade agreements are to be signed on behalf of the block.
However, before 2014, Russia negotiated free trade agreements with a
wide range of partners. But most of those negotiations were either frozen
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or suspended or did not enter an active phase, which means that they
never rose to the level of including other EAEU members.
Second, the legal basis for economic relations between the EU and
Russia is the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA), which was
originally signed in 1997 and ran for ten years. It expired in 2007 and
was renewed annually after then. In 2007 the EU and Russia entered
into negotiations on a New Agreement. Russia proposed the creation of
a free trade area but this idea was not embraced by the EU.28 The New
Agreement was to provide a comprehensive framework for bilateral rela-
tions and would have been built on the basis of WTO rules and would
have included stable, predictable, and balanced rules for bilateral trade
and investment relations. Negotiations started in 2008, but they were
stopped in 2010 because no progress was made in the Trade and Invest-
ment part.29 Following the 2014 Ukrainian crisis, the negotiations were
suspended. Since 2014, the relationship between Russia and the EU are
sporadic and fragmented. The contact between the parties should have
be transferred to the EAEU level, but the EU has not been ready to
accept this position and deals with EAEU member countries on a bilateral
basis.30
Third, there were eleven rounds of negotiations between The Euro-
pean Free Trade Association (EFTA) and Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan
since 2011, but these negotiations were suspended in March 2014 over
the Ukrainian crisis.31 There have also been several attempts to negotiate
preferential terms of trade with countries in the Asia-Pacific Economic
Cooperation (APEC), like with New Zealand. The access to New Zealand
as a part of the APEC market was very important for Russia, but the
agreement faced opposition from Belarus who believed that free access
for New Zealand products to the EAEU market and the Russian market
would put its agricultural exports at risk. The negotiations with New
Zealand started in 2013, but they were suspended in 2014 because of
the West’s sanctions and Russia’s countersanctions.
Fourth, the Ukrainian crisis of 2014 and Russia’s countersanctions led
to the banning of food products from the United States, the EU, Canada,
Australia, Norway, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Albania, and Montenegro,
including meat, fish, milk, vegetables, fruits, and nuts. Russia’s coun-
tersanctions have been extended several times and in late 2021 were
extended through 2022. Russia’s food embargo has led to a reduction in
food imports in general as consumers buy more domestic food products;
and agri-food trading partners have changed. Domestic food products
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now account for more than 80 percent of was is sold in retail outlets,
compared to 60 percent before the sanctions regime was implemented
in 2014.32 However, when countersanctions were introduced in August
2014, Belarus and Kazakhstan refused to join the ban against Western
products.33 As a result, Russia’s import substitution programmes were
implemented exclusively in Russia, outside the Eurasian context, and
without any use of the resources and capabilities of the EAEU countries.
Belarus was, for instance, not in a position to participate in the import
substitution programmes, even though Belarus products have traditionally
had been approved for import substitution to Russia.34
The upshot is that at present, there is no comprehensive agricultural
policy among EAEU members, although they do have a common agree-
ment on tariff-rate quotas (TRQs) for meat imports into the EAEU.35
Further, there is evidence of movement towards greater cooperation and
coordination. When speaking about agricultural policy among EAEU
members, Russian President Vladimir Putin stated that, ‘We foresee large
reserves in expanding mutual supplies of food. It is hardly logical to
import vegetables, fruit, milk, and meat products from distant countries,
placing orders with foreign suppliers when our own producers are ready
and willing to work and enter a common Eurasian market with products
that are not inferior and, in fact, often superior in quality’.36
In August 2020, the Eurasian Economic Commission and Russia’s
Ministry of Agriculture discussed the creation of a single internal market
for agricultural products. This integration project is in its infancy, aiming
to foster cooperation in agricultural science, training of agricultural work-
force, and exchange of experience and knowledge in agriculture. There is
also in the works a treaty on creating a single market for organic agricul-
tural products within the EAEU. The purpose of the proactive approach
towards a common agricultural policy for organics is to maximise export
potential to meet growing global demand.37 The heads of the EAEU
states created ‘The Council for EAEU Agro-Industrial Policy’ to ensure
effective interaction between the ministries of agriculture of the member
countries and to coordinate their policies. In addition, the Council has
discussed food security in response to the coronavirus pandemic. A
comprehensive act is being drafted that will define general principles
and approaches to ensuring food security for the EAEU countries. The
minister in charge of the industry and agricultural sector in the Eurasian
Economic Commission, Artak Kamalyan, noted that, ‘in the context of
the coronavirus pandemic, issues of stable saturation of the market with
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food products are becoming increasingly acute and urgent. In addition
to maintaining the stable and uninterrupted functioning of the Union’s
internal agri-food market, we must join our efforts and take concerted
action to find new export niches’.38
4 Trade Agreements
Within the framework of the EAEU, Russia has concluded free trade
agreements with a number of countries: Vietnam, Serbia, Iran, and Singa-
pore, with other negotiations ongoing. The first such agreement has been
in effect since October 2016 between the EAEU and Vietnam, and in the
first year about half of all import custom duties were set to zero. Within
ten years, 90 percent of goods will be duty-free. For trade in general,
Russia has not been able to increase its exports to Vietnam as much as
Vietnam increased its exports to Russia, and thus Russia runs a trade
deficit with Vietnam.39
The FTA between the EAEU and Serbia was originally signed in
October 2019 and it was ratified by Russia’s Federation Council in
October 2020, with the agreement taking effect in November 2020.40
The FTA with Serbia fully harmonises trade terms with Russia, Belarus,
and Kazakhstan and establishes the same terms of trade for agricul-
ture with Armenia and Kyrgyzstan. However, Serbia excluded items like
some sugar, tobacco, and undenatured alcohol items and some tariff
quotas like for processed cheese and some spirits and tobacco prod-
ucts for the EAEU countries except Russia. The EAEU excluded some
poultry items, processed cheese, sparkling wine, undenatured alcohol,
and tobacco items. Furthermore, EAEU will apply tariff quotas for some
cheese, spirits, and tobacco products, but will allow a limited amount of
these goods to be imported duty-free from Serbia.
In October 2019 a Temporary Agreement on Free Trade between the
EAEU and Iran was signed. The temporary agreement with Iran was
expected to be replaced with a permanent free trade agreement by the
end of 2020.41 The FTA with Iran includes reductions on import duties
on 360 Iranian commodities and 502 commodities from the EAEU.
Concerning agri-food trade, Iran will reduce import duties on commodi-
ties such as beef, mutton, legumes, and vegetable oils. The EAEU gives
trade preferences to Iran on products such as cheese, plant items, nuts
and fruits, fresh vegetables, processed vegetables and fruits, confectionary,
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and bakery items.42 The EAEU-Iran agreement has benefited Russia–
Iran agri-food trade. In 2018, Iran was number eight on Russia’s top
list of export destinations for agricultural products. Unlike the United
States and the European Union, Russia has not imposed sanctions on
Iran and has aimed for buying up to 500,000 barrels a day of Iranian oil
in exchange for Russian equipment and goods.43
In addition, a Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic
Partnership between the EAEU and Singapore was signed in October
2019.44 Press coverage of the agreement noted that agreement with
Singapore ‘provides for duty-free trade in almost all the types of
goods except for the list of sensitive items from the EAEU member
states….[and] will also regulate the existing trade ties and will expand
the opportunities for cooperation’.45 The FTA with Singapore allows all
goods from the EAEU countries to Singapore duty-free. After a transi-
tion period ranging from three to ten years depending on the product,
87 percent of goods from Singapore will be exempted from duties to
the EAEU. Market access for food products is especially important to
Singapore, as the country has no agricultural sector. But Singapore cannot
supply the EAEU/Russian food market as it is fully dependent on food
imports. It is interesting to note that Singapore has made substantial
investments in the Russian agricultural sector by investing in grain manu-
facturing.46 A list of free trade agreements between the EAEU and other
countries is presented in Table 1.
Generally, Russia is shifting its attention to the East in the search for
new FTA partners.47 Negotiations are ongoing between the EAEU and
India, Egypt, Indonesia, Brunei, and Cambodia (see Table 2).
In addition, FTA negotiations have been opened with Israel. The
ability to increase its influence in the Middle East has been one of Russia’s
motives for starting FTA negotiations with Israel, from which Russia will
be the main beneficiary. According to Israeli Charge d’Affaires in Russia,
the deal could be completed by the end of 2020.48 Since the collapse of
the USSR, Russia and Israel have developed closer relations and not only
in trade, indicated by Putin’s visit to Israel in January 2020 during which
Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu referred to Putin as a ‘great friend’ and
said that he and his wife are ‘pleased to host you again at our home
here in Jerusalem’.49 Another country in North Africa that is a long-term
trading partner for Russia is Egypt (see Chapter 9), with whom negotia-
tions for a FTA started in 2017. Although there is no official information
about the negotiations, it is assumed that a traditional FTA is on the table.
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Table 1 EAEU-third country free trade agreements
Trade partners Type of agreement Year/status Comments on scope/coverage
Vietnam Free trade
agreement—FTA
2016 FTA including a wide range
of sectors/areas
Iran FTA 2019 FTA limited in scope (50%
of mutual trade), interim
agreement until 2021
Serbia FTA 2019 FTA including a wide range
of sectors/areas



















India MoU 2017, FTA negotiations
Israel MoU 2015, FTA negotiations
Egypt MoU 2016, FTA negotiations
Indonesia MoU 2019, FTA negotiations




South Korea MoU 2016
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Even without a FTA, Egypt is a large purchaser of Russian wheat on an
annual basis. In 2014 Egypt ranked third in dollar value for imports of
Russian food exports, rising to second place in 2018 at more than $2.1
billion USD. In November 2020, Russia received permission to export
dairy and fish products to Egypt.50 Once a FTA is concluded it may be
expected that the value of Russian agri-food exports will increase, perhaps
challenging China for first place.
In addition to the ongoing negotiations with the aforementioned
countries, there is a list of more than 20 Memoranda of Understanding
(MoUs) with individual countries (see Table 2). The EAEU has also
established MoUs with other trade blocks including ASEAN (2018),
Mercosur (2018), the Andean Community (2019), the Pacific Alliance
(2019), and the African Union (2019). MoUs are not binding inter-
national agreements, but declarations of intent to promote cooperation
and increase trade and investment between the parties. A typical MoU
includes areas of cooperation related to trade liberalisation and economic
integration with specific chapters on issues like trade facilitation, customs,
technical regulations, sanitary and phytosanitary measures, government
procurement, and sector-specific provisions such as cooperation between
the parties in the area of agriculture. All of the MoUs made publicly
available by the Eurasian Economic Commission have specific sections
on agriculture. Thus, liberalisation of agricultural trade is or will be an
important part of the free trade agreements between the EAEU and these
countries. We now assess the role of agri-food trade in current free trade
agreements and how agri-food trade relations have changed after 2014.
4.1 Agri-Food Trade
Russia’s list of top trading partners for agricultural imports and exports
has changed considerably after 2014, a result of Russia turning away
from the West.51 Regarding nations that exported agri-food products
to Russia in 2014, the top ten list of countries included Belarus, Brazil,
Ukraine, Germany, Turkey, China, Poland, United States, The Nether-
lands, and France. In 2018, Belarus was still number one, while China
advanced from number six to number two on the list. The United States
dropped out of the top ten between 2014 and 2018 (see Chapter 10).
Ecuador, Indonesia, and Azerbaijan were newcomers to the 2018 list,
but some European countries remained important agricultural suppliers
despite Russia’s countersanctions. For instance, even though the total
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value of Italy’s agricultural exports to Russia has declined, Italy is still
on the top ten list of countries supplying Russia with agricultural prod-
ucts. The reason is simply that there is a strong demand in Russia for
Italian food products like wine, pasta, peeled and pulp tomatoes, and food
oils, as well as other products not covered by Russia’s countersanctions.52
The top ten agri-food exporting nations to Russia in 2014 and 2018 are
shown in Table 3.
Belarus, being on Russia’s border and a former Soviet republic, has a
long-standing trade relationship with Russia. Belarus accounts for a large
percentage of Russia’s milk and dairy imports, as much as 80 percent
according to some calculations. In 2014–2015, the press in Russia humor-
ously noted that Belarus had become famous for its seafood exports to
Russia, even though the country is landlocked. For the Russian govern-
ment, however, the serious issue was that Belarus served as a transit
country for banned food products from the West, a fact that has been a
sore point in the relationship since 2014. Russia has also accused Belarus
of exporting more apples to Russia than it grows, implying that banned
apples from Poland are being re-exported. The food trade relationship
between the two has turned quite contentious, with periodic Russian
bans on Belarussian milk and dairy, as well as Russia’s Rossel’khoznadzor
Table 3 Top 10 countries of origin for export of agri-food products to Russia










1 Belarus 3,750.2 1 Belarus 4,046.9
2 Brazil 3,593.9 2 China 1,901.2
3 China 1,917.1 3 Germany 1,409.4
4 Turkey 1,765.3 4 Brazil 1,361.4
5 The Netherlands 1,571.6 5 Ecuador 1,288.6
6 Germany 1,547.8 6 Turkey 1,144.5
7 United States 1,394.3 7 Italy 1,118.4
8 Italy 1,303.1 8 Indonesia 896.8
9 France 1,290.7 9 France 850.7
10 Ecuador 1,240.5 10 Azerbaijan 526.2
Source Author’s calculations based on data from World Integrated Trade Solutions by the World
Bank, https://wits.worldbank.org
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essentially insisting on control over Belarussian dairy factories. The re-
export of banned food, unsafe additives, and counterfeit labelling has
been major drivers behind Russia’s push for digital labelling, truth in
content labelling, and the tracing of the origins of products, including
for grain.53
Turning to Russia’s agri-food exports, by 2018 China had become
Russia’s number one export market (see Table 4). The importance of
China for Russian trade will most likely continue to grow, as the Chinese
economy is growing and the conflict with the West continues.54 Russia’s
turn to the East also has clear geopolitical motivations. Considering first
total bilateral trade between Russia and China, we can see that it has
grown significantly since 2014. In 2014, gross bilateral trade turnover
between Russia and China was $90 billion USD, which fell to $64 billion
USD in 2015 as a result of the downturn in the Russian economy. In
2017 total trade turnover rose to $87 billion USD. In 2018, Russia–
China trade turnover exceeded $108 billion USD, of which $56 billion
USD was Russian export. In 2019 Russia–China trade turnover surpassed
$110 billion USD, with Russia exporting nearly $57 billion USD to
China. In September 2019, the two countries signed agreements to
increase bilateral trade to $200 billion USD by 2024. The agreements












1 Turkey 2,372.9 1 China 2,521.6
2 Kazakhstan 1,692.7 2 Egypt 2,147.4
3 Egypt 1,386.6 3 Turkey 1,860.9
4 Korea 1,192.0 4 Korea 1,584.9
5 China 1,095.0 5 Kazakhstan 1,524.6
6 Belarus 1,007.9 6 Belarus 1,253.5
7 Azerbajian 772.3 7 The Netherlands 869.8
8 Netherlands 649.7 8 Iran 791.3
9 Ukraine 584.8 9 Ukraine 671.8
10 Georgia 367.9 10 Vietnam 576.0
Source Author’s calculations based on data from World Integrated Trade Solutions by the World
Bank, https://wits.worldbank.org
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encompass trade, economic cooperation, aviation, infrastructure, agricul-
ture, and science and technology.55 For context, $200 billion USD in
trade turnover for these countries is not particularly large, but it does
represent movement in the desired direction. In comparison, for example,
American-Chinese trade turnover exceeded $659.8 billion in 2018 and
that was despite an ongoing trade war.
Russia’s goal to increase its agri-food exports will be greatly enhanced
if Russia continues to expand agricultural trade with China. Bilateral agri-
cultural trade turnover between Russia and China has risen since 2014.
Russian agri-food exports to China increased from less than $500 million
USD in 2000 to $1.1 billion USD in 2014. An important milestone was
reached in 2015 when the two sides signed an agreement that opened the
Chinese market to Russian wheat and soybean.56 Agricultural trade began
to increase steadily after 2015. By 2018, total bilateral agricultural trade
turnover reached about $4.5 billion USD, with Russian exports totaling
$2.5 billion USD. In 2019 bilateral agricultural trade turnover exceeded
$5 billion USD for the first time. During the first ten months of 2020,
Russia exported 3.7 million metric tonnes of agri-food products to China,
valued at $3.2 billion USD.57 The top ten list of nations to which Russia
exports agri-food products is shown in Table 4.
Going forward, from the Russian perspective there are several oppor-
tunities to increase agricultural trade with China even without a FTA
between the EAEU and China (see also Chapter 7). One opportunity
to increase agricultural trade is the general economic development of the
Russian Far East (RFE). From the Russian side, the Director of the Insti-
tute of Agricultural Market Conditions, Dmitry Ryl’ko, is quite optimistic
that RFE can increase its food exports to China. He indicated that ‘the-
oretically’ soybean exports could expand to 1.5–2 million metric tonnes,
up from 1 million tonnes that are currently exported from the region.
While admitting that climatic conditions in the Russian Far East make
the expansion of crop products modest, Ryl’ko maintains that the export
of poultry and pork to China has a ‘large potential’ and good growth
prospects, particularly of chicken feet and wings that are highly valued by
Chinese consumers and for which Russia does not face much competition
from Brazil or the EU.58
A second opportunity for Russian exporters is the enormous demand
for food from China’s urban middle class. No one knows exactly the size
of China’s urban middle class other than it is large and growing. At the
low end, the Economist Intelligence Unit estimates that 10 percent of
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the population is middle class, or about 132 million people.59 At the high
end, a different set of authors estimate that 50 percent of all urban house-
holds may be in the middle class, or more than 500 million people.60
Whatever its size, the gradual lowering of trade barriers following China’s
accession to the WTO was accompanied by rising income and living
standards as well as changes in consumption habits. By 2013, China
was importing nearly $26 billion USD in agricultural products from the
United States alone.61 During 2016–2018, China averaged more than 15
percent of total U.S. agricultural exports, more than any single country.62
Since then, China has become the world’s largest agricultural importer by
dollar value, with total annual agricultural imports reaching almost $140
billion USD in 2017 and 2018. Thus, there is an enormous opportunity
for Russian food exporters to increase their market share.
As Chinese consumers’ incomes rise, their preferences gravitate
towards higher-cost animal husbandry products and it is for that reason
that Russian animal husbandry exports will be more valuable than crop
exports. Pork is traditionally one of the most popular sources of protein in
the Chinese diet and China is the world’s largest producer and consumer
of pork. In 2019, China’s pork imports are estimated to have ranged
between 3.1 and 3.3 million metric tonnes in 2019 with projections to
reach 4.6 million metric tonnes in 2020.63 Against this context, Russia’s
pork production has increased substantially in the past decade, rising from
2.6 million tonnes in 2008 to 4.7 million tonnes in 2018 (all categories
of farms). Within this overall rise, the number of pigs and pork produc-
tion from households declined while pork production on corporate farms
rose and in 2018 comprised 61 percent of total production.64
The opportunity for Russian exporters to increase their share in
China’s pork market is supported not only by rising Russian output but
also by outbreaks of swine flu in China since 2016. In 2019 alone, the
number of pigs in China contracted by more than 50 percent, from nearly
5 million pigs in January 2019 to fewer than 2.5 million pigs by late
2019; and pork production plummeted from 60 million tonnes to less
than 30 million tonnes during that same period.65 That said, the oppor-
tunity created by falling domestic pork production in China is offset by
shifting consumer preferences away from pork due to health concerns and
more towards poultry and eggs.66
A final opportunity for Russia’s exporters grows out of the U.S.–China
trade war that during 2019 and into 2020 decimated American exports
of soybean to China. Although Russia will not be able to fill the void
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completely, the Foreign Agricultural Service forecasts total Russian soy
exports rising from 930 thousand metric tonnes in 2019/2020 agricul-
tural year to 1 million metric tonnes in the 2020/2021 agricultural year,
of which somewhere between one-half to three-quarters will be sold to
China.67
In addition to food trade with China, trade with Vietnam has also
expanded significantly. Above we noted that for total trade Russia runs a
deficit vis-à-vis Vietnam, but if agri-food trade is considered the picture is
more positive. Data from the World Bank show that there has been a sharp
increase in Russia’s agricultural exports to Vietnam after the FTA entered
into force.68 In 2018, Vietnam was number ten on Russia’s top list of
export destinations for its agricultural products, (see Table 4). Prior to the
FTA between Russia and Vietnam, agri-food trade was minimal, less than
$1 million USD a year in 2000 and there was not much improvement
over time. Once the FTA was signed in 2016, however, Russia’s agri-food
exports to Vietnam increased quickly to $400 million USD in 2017, and
since 2017 Russia’s exports have surpassed the value of agri-food imports
from Vietnam. Overall, Russia’s agri-food exports grew from less than $1
million USD in 2008 to almost $600 million USD in 2018.69
5 Outlook
Taking a long view of Russia’s agri-food trade policy and partners reveals
a high degree of resilience on the part of Russia to changing geopolitical
and geoeconomic conditions. Since the 1980s, Russia has gone through
at least three iterations in trading partners since 1992. The first iteration
was the change from a concentration on intra-bloc trade in the Soviet
period—nations that would become CIS members in 1992—to the devel-
opment of trading relations with the West, most notably the EU, although
that relationship was based neither on RTAs nor FTAs. During the 1990s
agri-food trade with the EU overtook that with CIS members despite
the latter having integrative advantages that continued from the Soviet
period. The EU in particular became Russia’s most important trading
partner by volume and value, including agricultural and non-agricultural
goods. That trade relationship continued during the 1990s up to 2014.
The second iteration dates from the introduction of Russia’s counter-
sanctions against Western nations in August 2014. This period is marked
by Russia’s turn away from agri-food imports with the West and the EU,
although Russia continues to export food to EU members. Flowing from
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the second iteration, a third iteration has been the expansion of trade
partners and actual trade beyond the EAEU, beyond the EU, and encom-
passing new partners in the Middle East and Asia, especially China. This
third iteration is characterised by RTAs and FTAs that were examined in
this chapter. The composition of countries in the third iteration—non-
Western, some developing economies—is important because it reflects
new political alignments. The composition also reflects the consolidation
of trade relations with non-Western nations, which raises the question
of not just when but whether Russia-Western trade can ever be revi-
talised. Further, the composition of trade partners in the third iteration
holds importance for Russia’s food security in that imports from devel-
oping nations are cheaper, thus benefiting consumers, but also may raise
food safety and phytosanitary concerns, which obviously is not good for
Russian consumers.
Across all three iterations, Russia has been an active participant in the
global agri-food trade system as both an importer and exporter. Going
forward, we do not expect Russia’s role in the international food trade
system to decrease in the years ahead. Although Russia is a relative late-
comer to RTAs and FTAs, it has been active since 2014. Russian officials
claim that the EAEU has received more than 50 proposals from various
countries to establish or expand trade and economic relations. With a
large number of MoUs, plus ongoing negotiations with Egypt, Ecuador,
and Indonesia, we expect Russia to continue to expand its RTA profile.
In essence, Russia’s trade resilience entails a three-part strategy since
2014. First, Russia has not severed relations with the WTO and continues
to make periodic reports about its phytosanitary standards and other
information as required by WTO rules. But agri-food trade with the West
has diminished considerably, even to the point of irrelevance in the case
of the United States (see Chapter 10). Second, Russia has increased the
number of RTAs and FTAs that it participates in, whether temporary or
permanent, preferential or non-preferential, and we expect the number to
continue to grow. Third, Russia is committed to using the EAEU as an
instrument to increase trade and various agreements, although it also is
trying to increase bilateral ties as well. In this regard, analysts claim that
the EAEU as well as EAEU external trade agreements primarily serve
Russia’s geopolitical agenda.70
All of the above is notable because a decade ago one would have
expected that if Russia increased its RTAs and FTAs, it would be with
the Western nations. Today, we know that is no longer true and Russia is
CHAPTER 6: RUSSIA’S REGIONAL FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS … 185
putting most of its energy in developing trade with non-Western nations.
While it is true that the EU is still Russia’s most important trade partner
as a recipient of Russia’s exports (mainly energy), a free trade agree-
ment is unlikely in the foreseeable future. At the same time, Russia’s turn
to the East holds major implications for its trade relations, the volume
and direction of its agri-food trade, and the overall global geostrategic
balance.
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Chapter 7: Prospects for Agri-Food Trade
Between Russia and China
Jiayi Zhou
1 Introduction
Amidst the backdrop of ever heightening tensions between the United
States and China, a June 2019 meeting of the Russian and Chinese presi-
dents witnessed their bilateral relationship upgraded to a ‘comprehensive
strategic partnership of coordination in a new era’. In the summit’s joint
statement, Russia and China agreed to expand bilateral agricultural coop-
eration, including for soybean trade. President Vladimir Putin later that
year would remark that the U.S.–China dispute offered a window of
opportunity for Russian producers to fill gaps in the Chinese market,
a market from which he claimed the United States had ‘voluntarily
withdrawn’.1
The China–U.S. trade war paused in the beginning of 2020 with the
signing of the Phase One economic and trade agreement. However, ques-
tions remain as to how the shifting geopolitical landscape is impacting
trade in general, and food trade in particular. Indeed, the politicisa-
tion if not weaponisation of food trade among the great powers is
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evidenced not only by the China–U.S. soybean battle, but also by Russia’s
ongoing countersanctions against Western food imports. Unsurprisingly,
Russia–China agricultural cooperation is framed and interpreted within
the broader context of both countries’ tensions with the West.2
This chapter explores Russia–China agri-food trade as part of that
context, as part of a relationship marked by increasingly close rapproche-
ment if not entente. However, in agricultural trade as in the broader
political relationship, high-level declarative cooperation is tempered by
the countries’ respective national and domestic priorities, which are not
always aligned. China is and will remain an important trade partner for
Russia to reach its main export goals for 2024. However, the chapter
thus cautions there are a number of technical as well as political hurdles
to enhance trade cooperation.
The chapter proceeds with an overview of Russia–China economic rela-
tions, before turning to agri-food trade relations in particular—which
has only recently begun to feature as a priority in that relationship. The
chapter then turns to their respective national priorities in the agricul-
tural trade sector. On the Russian side, priorities are marked by ambitious
export-oriented targets as well as a broader economic turn to the (Far)
East. On the Chinese side, authorities emphasise self-sufficiency and
prioritise domestic production, particularly in terms of grain. However,
China has also become irreversibly dependent on foreign markets, and is
also interested in mitigating overseas supply chain risks through the diver-
sification of its agricultural trade partners. The fourth section outlines the
prospects and challenges of deepened trade cooperation in specific agri-
cultural commodity and product groups, with an emphasis on Russian
exporters’ access to Chinese markets. The chapter finally turns to a
number of broader structural barriers to deepened bilateral agri-food
trade, before concluding with a medium-term outlook.
2 Bilateral Relations
In the more than three decades since the normalisation of diplomatic rela-
tions between the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China,
relations between the neighbouring powers have grown to become a
constitutive feature of international relations.3 Long-standing territorial
and border demarcation issues were worked out throughout the 1990s,
and definitely resolved in 2005. Already by 1996, the relationship had
formally become a ‘strategic partnership’, entailing the establishment of
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annual meetings of prime ministers with policy consultation along with
a number of issue domains. And in 2001, at the beginning of Putin’s
first term, a Russia–China ‘Treaty of Good Neighbourliness, Friendship
and Cooperation’ was signed, which also included a number of strategic
provisions, including strengthened bilateral military cooperation as well
mutual defence consultation.
The two powers have, over the past three decades, aligned in their crit-
icism against Western military interventionism, and become outspoken
proponents of a ‘multipolar’ world order. They often hold joint positions
on key global issues—including as permanent members of the UN Secu-
rity Council. The two also have common if not shared foreign policy
emphases on state sovereignty and similar threat perceptions, as well as
domestic political governance models antithetical to the Western liberal
democratic norms. There is a considerable amount of speculation and
analysis as to whether a formal alliance is in the cards for the future:
though officials’ statements suggest that it is not (indeed, this would
violate basic tenets of China’s non-alignment foreign policy).4 But there
also remains a degree of ambivalence regarding the nature of the rela-
tionship. Throughout the early 2000s, Russian foreign and economic
policy was oriented towards the West rather than East. Russia policy-
makers exhibited concerns over sensitive technology transfers, Chinese
migration in the Russian Far East, as well as Chinese encroachment in
the broader post-Soviet space. Meanwhile, China’s own priorities centred
around maintaining a stable external environment for domestic economic
growth; its foreign policy attention was therefore primarily oriented
towards its main trade and investment partners in the United States and
other developed countries. Many aspects of the relationship thus remained
declarative: high-level, but with limited operational substance.
By the late 2000s, however, it was increasingly clear that Russia’s exper-
iment with the Western integration had reached a limit. A pivot to the
East took shape, one that coincided with the emergence of China as
economic powerhouse. Since the 2014 crisis in Ukraine, Russia’s drive to
improve ties with China has intensified. Previous ideas that the relation-
ship with China constituted an ‘axis of convenience’ rather than a strategic
priority for Moscow, have become less relevant.5 Indeed, previous stum-
bling blocks in the bilateral relationship have since been resolved. In
addition to the 2014 signing of a long-term gas deal, Russia has also
begun selling its most advanced weapons systems the S-400 anti-aircraft
system and its Su-35 fighter jets to China.6 Russia invited China to
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participate in Vostok-2018, held in the Russian Far East and its largest
military exercise since 1981, and the two have conducted joint air patrols
since.7 In 2015, their respective flagship foreign economic initiatives, the
Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and China’s Belt and Road
Initiative (BRI) also signed a cooperation agreement.
On the Chinese side, economic and political tensions with the United
States have visibly worsened since 2018, which have likewise stimulated
a desire for deepened cooperation with Russia. In declarative terms,
the relationship between the two countries had by 2011 already been
upgraded to a ‘comprehensive strategic partnership of cooperation’, a
singular category in China’s foreign relations that applies to Russia alone.8
President Xi Jinping, who came to power in 2012, has embarked on more
state visits to Russia than any other country.9 On his state visit to Moscow
in June 2019, Xi referred to Putin as ‘my closest foreign colleague, and
best friend’, while Putin referred to the relationship as a ‘truly compre-
hensive partnership and strategic interaction’ and as having reached an
‘unprecedentedly high level’.10
At the same time, however, the high-level pronouncements by Moscow
and Beijing are belied by more anaemic cooperation on the ground.
This is particularly the case in the economic realm where programmes
and plans usually face disappointing follow-up and delivery in practice.11
Latent tensions remain, including Sinophobia and concerns over territo-
rial sovereignty.12 Economic relations have long been asymmetric, with
Russia frequently referred to as the ‘junior partner’ in the relationship:
the Chinese economy has only grown and improved while Russia’s is
stagnant and remains largely based on extractive commodities. Indeed,
while China has been the largest trade partner for Russia outside of
the European Union (EU) since 2010, Russia ranked only 10th among
China’s trade partners in 2019, rising from just 0.8 percent in 2018
to just under 3 percent of China’s overall trade turnover.13 Meanwhile,
China accounted for about 15.8 percent of Russia’s total trade turnover
in 2018, at about $108.2 billion USD. For comparison, U.S.–Chinese
trade exceeded $659.8 billion USD in 2018, over six times the Russia–
China level. Russia, moreover, largely supplies the Chinese economy with
raw materials, with Russia becoming China’s largest supplier of crude oil
in 2018.
Meanwhile, the extent and success of Putin’s pivot eastwards have been
debated, given unmet expectations that China would be able to fill the
gap of Western investors and trade partners.14 Russian actors also tend
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to emphasise that their pivot eastwards is not limited to China, but is
also oriented towards strengthening partnerships with Asian governments
including South Korea and Japan. Concerns of overreliance and becoming
outcompeted domestically, are present for both Russian policymakers
and in EAEU-BRI negotiations regarding free trade.15 Nevertheless,
enhancing trade is a policy goal on both sides. At the September 2019
Heads of Government meeting in St. Petersburg, the countries agreed to
nearly double the current level of trade, to a targeted $200 billion USD
by 2024.
2.1 Bilateral Agricultural Trade Relations
During the first half of the 1990s, up to 1997, Russia was a net importer
of agricultural goods from China. The agricultural trade balance began to
even out in the rest of the decade, but the overall volume remained low,
peaking at just over $1 billion USD in 1993.16 From the 2000s onwards,
however, the volumes of agri-food trade have seen steady growth in both
directions, increasing approximately 16 percent annually between 2000
and 2014—when the bilateral agricultural trade volume reached $3.85
billion USD. Prior to the Ukraine crisis, Russia counted as China’s 15th
largest agricultural trade partner, amounting to approximately 2 percent
of China’s agricultural trade.17 In terms of agricultural commodities,
Russian trade with China has been relatively balanced (see Fig. 1).
Agri-food exports from Russia to China show a steady increase since
2014, and then a big jump in 2018 to just under $3 billion USD, a result
of Russian opportunism during the U.S.–China trade war (see Fig. 2).
While China is the largest export market for Russian agri-food products,
Russia accounted for only 2 percent of China’s agricultural imports in
2018, reflecting the overall direction of economic dependency.18 More-
over, agriculture still represents a rather small proportion of Russian
exports to China, amounting to only 4.5 percent of the total in 2018.19
In the first half of 2020, Russian exports increased to $1.9 billion USD
worth of agricultural products, a pace that would lead to a record level if
maintained for the duration of 2020.20 Going forward, there is ambition
by both sides to raise the level of agricultural trade and cooperation as
part of the broader economic, political, and strategic relationship under
a so-called ‘new era’ of bilateral cooperation between China and Russia.
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Fig. 1 Russia-China agricultural trade balance (Source Author’s rendition from
data in Chatham House, ‘Exploring Interdependencies in Global Resource






















Russian Agricultural Exports to China
Imports from Russia As % of Total Russia Agri-Exports
Fig. 2 Russian agricultural exports to China (Source Author’s rendition from
data in Chatham House, ‘Exploring Interdependencies in Global Resource
Trade’, 2018. http://resourcetrade.earth/, accessed 29 October 2020)
there is likely to be increased policy support for enhanced cooperation in
agricultural trade.
The main Russian agricultural export to China during the past two
decades has consistently been fish and seafood. Exported largely as raw
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materials for Chinese processing, these products consisted of up to over
90 percent of Russian agricultural exports to China up until the early
2010s.21 Since then, there has since then been some diversification in
the structure of Russian agri-food exports to China, particularly in the
direction of oilseeds and fat products as well as some processed food-
stuffs. In 2018, fish and crustaceans accounted for 59 percent of agri-food
exports to China; oilseed and oilseed products 15 percent; and higher-
value-added processed food products at 13 percent.22 Russian imports
of Chinese agricultural goods, on the other hand, have strongly reflected
Chinese comparative strengths in labour-intensive goods such as vegeta-
bles and fruits. In 2018, those two categories accounted for nearly half of
Chinese exports to Russia.
3 Respective National Priorities
There are important domestic drivers for agricultural cooperation on both
sides. At the same time, however, those self-same national domestic prior-
ities also create certain limiting conditions for the future. For example, it
is important to note that both Russian and Chinese agri-food policies are
marked by strategic considerations, in particular, national self-sufficiency.
Since at least the early 2010s, the Russian state has embarked on an
ambitious import substitution campaign, of which agriculture features
prominently.23 Contours of this policy were outlined in the 2010 Food
Security Doctrine, which set self-sufficiency targets in various agricul-
tural product categories. These were made more stringent in a 2020
update. Russia’s import ban against Western agricultural products in 2014
was also framed as contribution to those goals; the Russian Ministry of
Agriculture has celebrated the reduction of agricultural imports by one-
third since the ban was imposed.24 In short, Russian leadership, while
reorienting its trade relations away from the West, has simultaneously
endeavoured to limit imports more generally. At the same time, there
are ambitious agri-export targets, as exemplified by Putin’s statement in
2012, that ‘in the next four to five years we must fully ensure our inde-
pendence in all major types of food production, and Russia must then
become the world’s largest producer of food’.25
China has likewise held a long-standing policy of self-sufficiency in
staple grain products, including wheat, corn, and rice, since the mid-
1990s.26 These priorities limit the complementarily of the two markets,
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given that the current structure of Russian agricultural exports is concen-
trated in grain. However, Chinese remains a significant agricultural
importer outside of the grain category, and demand is growing. China
is actively seeking to diversify its suppliers for key agricultural commodi-
ties, as well as seeking further agricultural investment opportunities and
markets abroad, not least due to the trade tensions with the West. The
following subsection describes their respective policies and priorities in
greater detail, focusing on Russia’s export strategy as it relates to China
as well as its vision for internal agricultural development, for which China
is seen as a key partner. It also details Chinese policy priorities in this
regard.
3.1 Russian Export Targets and RFE Development Priorities
Current Russian export goals are defined by the 2018 Executive Order
‘On national goals and strategic objectives for the development of the
Russian Federation for the period up to 2024’. This tasks the Russian
government with increasing the volume of exports of non-primary non-
energy goods to $250 billion USD by 2024. Specific sub-targets include
increasing exports of agricultural products to $45 billion USD, more than
double the export value in 2017.27 In late 2020, Russia’s Ministry of
Agriculture acknowledged that the $45 billion USD goal was unlikely to
be reached and the deadline needed to be extended, although the general
trend in agri-food exports was upwards. As defined by the Ministry of
Agriculture’s plan ‘Exports of AIC [agro-industrial complex] Products
(2018–2024)’, agri-exports of all categories should grow, but with a
reduction in the proportion of grain exports towards meat and dairy,
oilseed products, and processed goods.28 The plan also sets a target for
agricultural exports to China to increase to $7.7 billion USD by 2024,
and China also features as an explicit target market in individual product
categories.29
Related to these ambitious export targets, a priority for the Russian
state is agricultural development in the Russian Far East (RFE), which
borders China. While the underdevelopment of the RFE has been a
historic issue for authorities in Moscow, it began to receive more sustained
attention alongside the broader pivot eastwards.30 A specialised Ministry
for the Development of the Far East was established in 2012, and Putin
would highlight the development of Siberia and the Russian Far East as
a ‘national priority for the entire twenty-first century’.31 This has been
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recently reconfirmed at, among other venues, the 2018 Eastern Economic
Forum (EEF) during which Putin reiterated that ‘the development of the
Far East is an absolute priority’ and part of a ‘consistent, long-term policy
for the country’. He also singled out agriculture as a particular sector
for investment as well as part of the region’s comparative advantage.32
A follow-up draft ‘National programme for the development of the Far
East for the period up to 2025 and to 2035’ was developed in 2019.33
The Russian government plans to increase agricultural exports from the
RFE from $3.8 billion USD to $5.9 billion USD by 2024.34 Much of
that increase is expected to come from fish, seafood, and soybean, whose
production is concentrated in the RFE. However, whether those goals will
be reached substantially depends on whether promised levels of federal
funding and support will be dispersed. RFE development programmes
have a habitual tendency to be underfunded; during a 2019 Presidium,
it was noted by RFE regional officials that such programmes very often
do not have sufficient implementation mechanisms, and that sources of
funding have in the past been dispersed only at the level of 10–20 percent
level of original promises.35
To facilitate development, foreign direct investment into the RFE
has long been sought, particularly from Northeast Asian partners and
not limited to China.36 However, Chinese investment in the region is
most notable, and still is considered critical. In 2016, for example, a
Russia-Chinese Agro-Industrial Development Fund of $10 billion USD
was announced, of which nearly 90 percent of the capital was to be
provided by Chinese investors.37 At the 2018 EEF—a forum set up to
attract foreign investors—Putin estimated that the Chinese were involved
in around 30 ongoing projects in the RFE, with an investment volume
of approximately $200 billion USD.38 However, it is important to note
that data about foreign investments tend to be incomplete, with underre-
porting across both Russian and Chinese governmental departments and
agencies.39
Agriculture has featured in bilateral regional development plans,
including the Program of Cooperation between the Regions of the Far
East and Eastern Siberia and the Northeast of the People’s Republic
of China (2009–2018), the first long-term regional cooperation plan to
include agriculture.40 The Sino-Russian Cooperation and Development
Plan in Russia’s Far East Region (2018–2024) also contains provisions on
agriculture. The document recognises that the lower food self-sufficiency
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of the RFE creates opportunities for increased Chinese investment, while
also aimed at increasing RFE agricultural exports to China.41
In addition to providing investment, Chinese individuals and compa-
nies also farm a significant amount of RFE territory.42 Much of China’s
agricultural activity in Russia is concentrated along those border regions,
and there are estimates that this constitutes anywhere from 350,000
hectares to 400,000 hectares of farmland. There is some uncertainty due
to the informal nature of some leasing arrangements: the governor of
the Jewish Autonomous Oblast, where Chinese presence is purported to
be the largest, notes that official land titles do not reflect the reality of
Chinese production, due to informal leasing practices.43
Thus, Russia’s desire for development in the RFE for which both
Chinese capital and labour are critical, juxtaposes with concerns about
economic overreliance as well as the encroachment of Chinese nationals
on domestic territory. Agriculture-specific concerns also include puta-
tive predative exploitation by Chinese farmers, and possible longer-term
reduction of soil fertility due to intensive agricultural practices and use of
chemical fertilisers.44 This leads to a fickle and uncertain policy environ-
ment for Chinese investors.45 For example, the aforementioned bilateral
agreements to enhance imports from China contradict other domestic
guidelines to make the region less reliant on imports from China.46
4 Prospects for Increasing Russian Exports
As noted in Fig. 2, since 2014 there has been significant growth in the
volume of agricultural trade between Russia and China, and in particular
in the volume of Russian agricultural exports to China. One impor-
tant driver of the increase has been the devaluation of the ruble.47
But the increase also reflects that Russia has now gained access to the
Chinese market in key product categories, with the clearing of impor-
tant phytosanitary hurdles in the past five years when protocols for grain,
soybeans, poultry, beef, and dairy, and other items have been signed. This
certainly bodes well for the future of Russia–China agricultural trade.
However, it is worth pointing out that the current increase is from a
negligible baseline.
Separate from market access is a question of market competitiveness,
for which according to Karlova and Serova Russia’s advantages are ‘fairly
limited’.48 As officials in Russia’s Ministry of Agriculture acknowledge,
‘China is the country to which all export-oriented countries want to
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supply their products. We are no exception’.49 Rising living standards and
changing dietary patterns in China will continue provide to Russia oppor-
tunities to increase food exports. But Russia faces competition against
already-dominant exporters of soybeans, oilseeds, meat, and dairy, as well
as from emerging markets with whom China has been concurrently culti-
vating closer agricultural trade ties in recent years. The westernisation of
Chinese consumption entails greater demand for higher-value products—
with a commensurate focus on quality—which are not historically Russian
strengths although that situation is changing.
In addition, the Chinese economy is not only marked by significant
demand. China also dominates in the global production of many agricul-
tural commodities. Besides being the world’s largest single producer of
grain, it is also one of the world’s largest exporters of fruits and vegeta-
bles, and fish and seafood. The latter it exports at twice the level of
Russia, even while serving as Russia’s largest buyer. Further, for a number
of sensitive commodities, including by not limited to wheat, corn, rice,
sugar, and wool, China applies strict tariff-rate quotas (TRQs). In the
long run, this puts an upper limit on what Russian producers can hope
to export. Given these considerations, the following analysis discusses
Russian prospects for increasing the presence of the Chinese market in
a few important product categories. I then return to broader structure
barriers to enhancing agri-food trade.
• Grain: The Chinese market was closed to Russian wheat export
since 1997 due to discovery of karnal and dwarf bunt pathogens.
However, phytosanitary barriers were resolved in 2015 after the two
sides signed a protocol for wheat, corn, rice, soybeans, and rape-
seed.50 As of 2020, wheat exports are allowed from seven Russian
regions, including Chelyabinsk, Novosibirsk, Omsk, Amur, Krasno-
yarsk, Altai, and Kurgan.51 Current volumes of export are limited.
In 2018, Chinese imports amounted to a mere 86.7 thousand
tonnes. Corn imports were equally limited at 40 thousand tonnes.52
However, in general more and more grain categories are open for
Russian exporters. In 2018, a protocol on allowing Russian exports
also of buckwheat, oats and oatmeal, millet, as well as other products
including semolina and rye flour to China.53
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China regulates grain trade through TRQs. Within quota tariffs for
edible grains are set at a low 1 percent but outside the quota tariffs
are a prohibitive 65 percent, and with limited licences that usually go
to the major Chinese state-owned enterprises.54 What imports do arrive
are usually of very high quality and for a niche market. There is little indi-
cation that Chinese authorities will loosen their food security principles.
At the same time, basic staple commodities such as corn, rice, wheat, are
also becoming less important for the Chinese diet. Thus, according to
Arkady Zlochevsky, the president of the Russian Grain Union, ‘there are
no particular prospects for the growth of grain sales’.55
• Fish and seafood: One of the areas where Russia has a strong
foothold in the Chinese market is fish and seafood and these have
comprised the bulk of Russian agricultural exports to China for a
long time. In 2018, China accounted for 47 percent of Russia’s
fish and seafood exports, with an export value of $1.2 billion USD.
China serves as Russia’s main fish and seafood market, meanwhile
Russia serves as China’s largest foreign source of frozen fish. Russian
fish exports to China are dominated by frozen pollock, approxi-
mately half the supply, as well as crabs. However, currently these
Russian exports are for the most part unprocessed and low value
added.
• Meat: China is one of the world’s largest meat producers as well
as importers.56 Pork is the main source of animal protein in the
Chinese diet, for which China has historically been more or less
self-sufficient. But starting from 2018, the African Swine Flu (ASF)
and decimation of China’s pig stocks have led it to turn more to
international markets, as well as to alternative meats. China has only
recently opened as a destination for Russian meat exports, but as of
the first half of 2020 it has already become the main destination.57
At a September 2019 Russian Ministry of Agriculture meeting dedi-
cated to the export of meat products, China was identified as one of
the most promising markets, with an emphasis on poultry.58 Poultry
indeed exports currently comprise the bulk of meat exports to China.
After being banned in 2005 due to outbreaks of avian influenza, the
two countries signed a protocol for mutual trade of frozen poultry in
November 2018. In February 2019, the first shipment of 54 tonnes
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came from the Russian company Miratorg.59 The company Cherkizovo,
Russia’s largest poultry producer, also began exporting chicken in May
2019.60 By the end of 2019, Russia had exported approximately 62 thou-
sand tonnes, worth $143.4 million USD, to China. Currently, chicken
wings as well as chicken feet are primary parts being sold, in light of
competition against dominant poultry exporters for parts for which Russia
is not competitive. A number of requirements unique to the Chinese
market, including on the processing side, however, remain to be met
across the poultry industry.61 Despite being the second largest producer
in the world, China’s poultry consumption and its imports are also
expected to continue to grow.62
In January 2020, Cherkizovo also began to export turkey meat to
China with an initial volume of 27 tonnes. In terms of beef, China
has become one of the world’s fastest growing markets: from a low
starting point of 20,000 tonnes of beef imports in 2011, China imported
nearly 1.7 million tonnes in 2019 and is now the world’s second largest
importer behind the United States.63 In 2020, the companies Miratorg
and Zarechnoe were provided licences to export beef to China, and a first
shipment of 21.4 tonnes arrived in Shanghai in May.64 Chinese imports
of Russian beef will certainly grow from such a small baseline. However,
Russian beef production is currently not produced at a competitive price,
and in scale it is unlikely to challenge Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, and
Australia for any significant share of the Chinese market.
Growth in Chinese demand for poultry and beef is partly due to a
substitution effect. ASF had decimated China’s pig stocks by at least half
(one-quarter of the world’s production) by the end of 2019.65 China’s
pork imports rose that year to 2.11 million metric tonnes and were
expected to peak in 2020 before domestic production can recover.66
Whether and how much the crisis-induced diversification towards other
meat products will continue long-term remains to be seen. However, it
is notable that even in 2018, analysts were predicting that China had
reached ‘peak pork’, due both to a switch to alternatives in beef and
poultry, but also due to government emphasis and consumer interest in
reducing meat intake in general.67
As of mid-2020, Russia does not export any pork to China; pork
exports to China were banned in 2008 due to ASF concerns. Russia’s
comparative advantages against larger exporters like the EU, Brazil, and
Canada that are interested to taking advantage of the increased demand
are also not obvious.68 Nevertheless, projections by the Chinese Ministry
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of Agriculture are that meat imports will continue to increase during the
next decade.69 To the extent that Russian meat production keeps pace,
the Chinese market will continue to represent an opportunity for growth.
• Dairy: Since 2010, China has also been the world’s largest importer
of dairy products, amounting to over one-fifth of the global
market.70 At the end of 2018, an agreement on the import of 22
categories of Russian dairy products was also reached. Until then, ice
cream was the only dairy product entering into the Chinese market.
However, due to logistical factors including cold storage, high trans-
port costs, quality control issues, as well as consumer preferences,
traditional dairy products such as milk or yogurts from Russia are
less competitive.71 However, more processed dairy products may
have room for growth—though falsification and quality control here
remains an issue.72
• Soybean and oilseeds: A category of significant attention by poli-
cymakers on both sides is soybeans, largely imported for animal
feed in China. Since China abolished its import quota system for
soybeans as part of its WTO accession commitments, it has become
the world’s leading importer and accounts for two-thirds of the
international market. Due to insufficient if not diminishing arable
land, water, and other resource constraints, dependence on foreign
soybeans is viewed as largely irreversible. In mid-2018, China placed
an effective ban on soybean imports from one of its largest suppliers.
Since then, Chinese authorities and state-owned enterprises have
been explicit about the need to diversify China’s soybeans import
structure, to involve more South American states, Canada, as well as
the Black Sea region encompassing Russia and Ukraine, as well as
Kazakhstan also.73 As the president of state-owned China Oil and
Foodstuffs Corporation (COFCO), China’s largest grain trader and
food processing company Yu Xubo stated, longer-term supply diver-
sification of soybeans will present a ‘historic opportunity for other
countries’.74
Five Russian provinces were allowed to export soybeans to China in
2015, after phytosanitary approval by Chinese authorities. That year was
the first in which any meaningful volumes were exported by Russia to
China; by 2018 the volume reached 817 thousand tonnes. During Xi’s
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visit to Moscow in June 2019 the two sides signed a ‘Plan for Deep-
ening Cooperation between Russia and China in Soybeans’ according to
which the goal is for China to import 3.7 million metric tonnes of Russian
soybean by 2024.75 This has since been connected to the larger project
of reaching $200 billion USD in total bilateral trade by 2024.76 In July
2019, the Chinese General Administration of Customs approved imports
of soybeans from all territories of Russia, as well as expanding modes of
transport to include sea shipping.77
China is the primary buyer of Russia’s soybean crop. The volume,
however, is notably small when compared to China’s overall imports of 88
million metric tonnes. Russian targets are expected to more than double
the value of soybean exports from 2018, to $600 million USD by 2024.78
Estimates regarding the potential of soybean export vary, however. Some
experts are sceptical that 3.7 million metric tonnes to China can even
be reached considering climate, geographic factors, and the scarcity of
available arable land.79 According to Dmitry Ryl’ko, head of the Insti-
tute for Agricultural Market Studies, the RFE’s potential for soybean is
already ‘practically exhausted’ and a maximum of 2 million metric tonnes
is more likely.80 Finally, Russian soybeans are non-GMO. There are also
advantages to this (see below), but among other issues, including pests
and lower yields, Russian soybeans are not competitively priced against
other major exporters.81 Thus, while there are prospects for growth, it is
likely that Russian soybeans will remain a negligible part of China’s overall
demand.82
As for other oilseeds and oilseed products, sunflower oil has notably
been competitive in the Chinese market. Sunflower oil is a relatively
niche product, viewed as a healthier alternative to standard cooking oils.
Different packaging standards and expectations—for example litre size—
however, can limit its appeal.83 Moreover, Russia faces high competition
from Ukraine, including due to infrastructural issues and port capacity.84
Regarding other intermediary products, a 2019 protocol for Russian
export of soybean, rapeseed, sunflower meal was also signed.85
• Ecological products: Genetically modified (GM) foods are seen in
a negative light by a substantial proportion of Chinese consumers.
Since GM production was banned in Russia in 2016, an opportunity
exists for Russia to expand its non-GMO exports to China.86 For
example, soybean imports are suitable for niche ‘ecological’ markets,
in particular for non-animal feed uses of soybean.87 Other niche
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markets include processed products such as soy milk, soy sauce, tofu,
and other seasonings. Non-GMO food presents an advantage for the
marketing of healthy products for higher-end markets. Russian legis-
lation including the 2020 federal law ‘On Organic Products’ on this
should assist with labelling and quality standards in this regard.88
Notably, the development and marketing of ecological products is
also a part of Russian export strategy.
• Higher value-added products: Russian leadership is quite clear about
the need to move up the supply chain, towards processed and
value-added products rather than raw agricultural materials and bulk
commodities export. In this area, Russia’s chocolate confectionary
products have a strong showing on the Chinese market, comprising
$112.6 million USD of $438 million USD total Chinese imports of
chocolate products in 2019.89 Russian brands of beer and ice cream
have also made inroads into the Chinese market.90
Overall, to reach its export targets for 2024, Russia’s exports will need
to move beyond bulk commodities and raw agricultural materials exports.
This requires not only domestic processing, but also vertical integration
both at industrial and regulatory levels, across the wider value chain. This
includes quality control, monitoring, and inspection, but also packaging,
product promotion, and retail, in order to raise the profile, reputation,
and overall competitiveness of Russian products on the Chinese market.91
5 Agri-Food Trade in Context:
Remaining Obstacles
It is clear that the agricultural trade relationship between the two coun-
tries is deepening. At the same time, however, declarative statements from
officials, such as the putative bilateral ‘soybean industry alliance’, belie
the fact that cooperation is proceeding from an extremely low starting
point. The removal of phytosanitary barriers for a range of products is
very recent. This might invite some speculation that the opening of the
Chinese market is motivated by geopolitical factors. However, negotia-
tions and groundwork for such agreements take place over several years,
the fruits of which are only now starting to be realised. Russian producers
and distributors themselves point to growth being driven by their better
understanding of the ‘rules of the game’, and their adaptation to Chinese
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demands over a longer period of time.92 Finally, any increased accommo-
dation and policy facilitation for Russian exporters should be placed also
in the context of China’s opening towards a broader range of countries.
In 2019 alone, China expanded access to its market to meat imports for
an additional 16 countries.93 Moreover, it is ironically under conditions of
strained U.S.–China relations that China has been locked increased vastly
increased purchases of U.S. agricultural products under the Phase One
trade deal. However, Russian exporters will not be substantially affected
due to dissimilar trade profiles vis-à-vis the United States.94
Indeed, Russia–China agri-food trade over the last several years has
more been marked by the removal of existing political and technical
bottlenecks to the point of more normalised market-based relations.
Thus, while wider geopolitical dynamics and any broader Russia–China
entente are not irrelevant to the agri-food trade, other factors loom larger.
These include, for the medium if not long term, obstacles including
broader policy misalignment, market dynamics, as well as operational
barriers of both hard and soft infrastructure.
At a basic level, Russian export strengths are not necessarily well
aligned with Chinese demand due to China’s grain self-sufficiency poli-
cies. The ‘Export of AIC Products (2018–2024)’ plan also explicitly notes
the difficulty of gaining access to the Chinese market due to domestic
protectionism. But similar policies on the Russian side also limit the
prospects for increasing Chinese exports to Russia, where there has been
increasing focus on substituting imports of fruits and vegetables. And
despite other Russian statements to the contrary, Chinese demand for
unprocessed soybeans is also potentially misaligned with Russian goals
to increase the export of higher-value products, as Russian Minister of
Agriculture Dmitrii Patrushev has noted.95
Non-tariff barriers also hinder trade. According to a joint report
by authors from the Russian International Affairs Council and Chinese
Academy of Social Sciences, these ‘have the greatest negative impact
on mutual trade in agricultural products’.96 Sanitary and phytosanitary
measures for export to China are extremely strict. Though new protocols
have been signed, in many cases Russian companies still need to obtain
individual export licences. China follows the principle of regionalisation
for some product categories. While this is better than wholesale bans, it
also means that individual Russian regions need to be cleared for export.
Other categories are on the whole not allowed into the Chinese market.
Russian exporters must also comply with tough technical regulations
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regarding quality certification, specific packaging and labelling require-
ments, as well as complicated customs formalities.97 This goes both ways:
in 2019 and 2020 alone, there were a number of restriction imposed on
Chinese agricultural exports to Russia, including a ban on stone fruits
from China in August 2019, and in January 2020 restrictions on citrus
fruits as well as certain fish and seafood products. During early 2020,
many Russian food retailers also suspended Chinese agricultural supplies
due to concerns over COVID-19.98
On the market side, China is often idealised as having unlimited
absorptive capacity, but it is also among the ‘most demanding’ markets
in the world not only to penetrate but also navigate.99 Understanding if
not meeting specialised Chinese tastes and consumer preferences requires
investment in baseline market analytics. As Patrushev has admitted, ‘the
Chinese are a difficult people, it takes a very long time to convince
them that our products are better. They are picky and, of course, self-
interested’.100 In terms of competitiveness in higher-value products,
particularly in the oilseeds, livestock, and dairy sectors, Russia lags well
behind established players.101 Russia must also compete with as well as
emergent agricultural players and fellow CIS countries such as Ukraine,
Kazakhstan, as well as a range of other countries that are seeking to
increase agricultural exports to China in areas where Russia has advan-
tage. Meanwhile, growing consumer emphasis is on the quality of food,
to include food safety, healthiness, as well as organic production.102
Quality control including resolving issues with counterfeit products for
eco-brands or dairy will be important.103 How much Chinese consump-
tion will continue to grow in volume is another question. Most recently,
Xi Jinping’s August 2020 directives which place responsibility on indi-
vidual citizens to cut (wasteful) food consumption, may also soon be
reflected in the market.104
Another important obstacle is infrastructure. The bulk of Russian agri-
cultural production is currently concentrated in the European part of the
country. Transport either proceeds via freight, which is quicker but more
expensive, through the body of the continent, or via marine shipping
from the West passing Europe, Africa, and the Indian Ocean. From the
western part of Russia, it can take up to 60 days for products to reach their
destination in China’s eastern seaports.105 The Ministry of Agriculture’s
export plan entails an additional R30 billion of development of ‘transport-
oriented agricultural logistics’ by 2024. For the time being, however,
even RFE’s proximity to China does not necessarily translate to cheaper
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or more efficient logistics. Lack of, or underdeveloped infrastructure,
including grain terminals and port facilities, makes a range of invest-
ment, development, storage as well transport activities more expensive.106
Current vehicle-based transport modalities, slow customs procedures, and
outdated facilities in the RFE add to the inefficiency. Lengthy customs
procedures can hinder the transport of perishable products.107
Finally, RFE agricultural development in general continues to face deep
challenges, with or without Chinese capital.108 There has been a long-
term shortage of local labour in the region, and although the region
has depended on Chinese immigrants for labour, their contribution was
waning even before the COVID pandemic.109 During the COVID-19
pandemic, the Minister of Agriculture for Primorskii krai, Andrei Bronz,
reported that due to the lack of Chinese and other foreign migrants
usually engaged in vegetable cultivation, alternative labour was found
through the use of students and convicts.110 This practice also affects soy
cultivation.111 Finally, extreme weather events, including massive floods
in the RFE in 2013 and again in 2019, which took tens of thousands of
hectares of farmland out of commission and decreased crop yields, may
increase as consequences of climate change worsen.112
6 Outlook
While there are elements of market complementarity between the two
markets, overall trade is strongly shaped by domestic political priorities
on both sides, which are not always aligned. The evolution from adver-
saries to strategic partners in recent years means that politics continue to
influence trade in general and agricultural trade, both directly and indi-
rectly. Moreover, self-sufficiency policies are unlikely to change on either
side. Russian officials are less interested in the level of bilateral trade than
they are in increasing exports. And it means that there is limited scope
for expanding grain (soy) exports to China. So far, Russia does not yet
feature as a significant player in Chinese agri-food markets outside of fish,
seafood, and chocolate confectionaries.
Nevertheless, with the recent opening of the Chinese market to a range
of Russian products, prospects are certain that agri-food trade value will
grow in long if not medium term, and in the export-oriented direction in
which Russian policymakers are seeking. Whether the current trajectory
is sufficient to help meet the 2024 export target of the Russian govern-
ment remains to be seen. On the Chinese side, its demand for Russian soy
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will surely be influenced by trade relations with the United States and the
fulfillment of the Phase One Trade Deal. On the Russian side, funding
for overcoming the range of obstacles to enhance agri-food trade listed in
this chapter, including infrastructure, will be necessary. Finally, beyond
accessing the Chinese market, the broader competitiveness of Russian
agri-food products on the Chinese market will also require substantial
work by Russian industry players themselves.
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Chapter 8: Russia’s Agri-Food TradeWithin
the Eurasian Economic Union
Rilka Dragneva
1 Introduction
The pursuit of economic integration has been a key dimension of Russia’s
policies in the post-Soviet region. After several failed initiatives, the first
real achievement was the creation of a Customs Union (CU) with Belarus
and Kazakhstan in 2010. It was followed by the launch of a Single
Economic Space (SES) in 2012, ultimately culminating in the formation
of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) in 2015, to which Armenia
and Kyrgyzstan also acceded.1 As its predecessor, the EAEU aims at
‘deep’ economic integration: one where not only mutual trade in goods
is liberalised, but the formation of a common market is pursued through
the harmonisation of domestic regulatory requirements and other non-
tariff barriers. In the external plane, the objective has been to exercise
a common policy through the adoption of a Union external tariff, a
common trade protection regime and the engagement in trade agree-
ments with the rest of the world as a unified trading bloc. To achieve
these goals, the EAEU member states have endowed the organisation
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with a system of bodies with delegated powers and an international legal
personality.
Such an ambitious project is bound to affect the economies of its
member states, including the production and trade of food, in tangible
and fundamental ways. Therefore, the understanding of Russia’s role in
the international food trade system will be incomplete without taking into
account the agency of the EAEU and the opportunities created by it.
Yet, while undoubtedly significant, this relationship is not straightforward.
Firstly, despite some notable achievements, developments on the ground
have been modest or outright disappointing. In mutual trade, in partic-
ular, the results have been described as erratic, with significant variations
across sectors and member states.2 Notably, relations have been inter-
laced with high-profile trade conflicts and back-tracking from previous
achievements. Secondly, while some of these dynamics can be explained by
external conditions or natural ‘growth pains’, it is largely symptomatic of
the structural problems of the EAEU as an integration project: its highly
politicised and decentralised nature, the limitations of its legal regime and
the weakness of its common bodies.3 This has allowed Russia to use its
power preponderance in the region to assert its policy priorities and espe-
cially its geopolitical considerations through the EAEU, where possible,
but also despite the EAEU, where necessary.
This chapter will unpack this dynamic by analysing the role of the
CU and EAEU in Russia’s agricultural food trade. In particular, the aim
will be to discuss: (1) To what extent has the formation of the EAEU
impacted on Russia’s food trade with its neighbours, both in terms of the
institutional regime set up and the resulting ability of the organisation
to affect its members’ trade practices? (2) In what ways has the EAEU
affected Russia’s options as a player in the international food system?
Given that the birth of the EAEU coincided with a major reversal in
Russia’s trading behaviour as a result of the sanctions’ war with the West,4
what role has the bloc performed in this process?
The chapter will begin by providing a background of the key relevant
institutional features of the EAEU. It will then focus on some of the most
important yet also problematic ways in which the EAEU affects agri-food
trade and production, namely the EAEU’s food safety regime, the effects
of Russia’s food import ban, the agenda for agricultural cooperation,
including the coordination of food security policy, and the opportunities
provided by concluding EAEU free trade agreements with third parties.
In conclusion, the chapter will examine some of the changes in agri-food
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trade flows since the launch of the EAEU, before offering some thoughts
on the outlook for the future.
2 The EAEU and Its Institutions
To understand the role of the EAEU in affecting Russia’s role in regional
and international agri-food trade, it is necessary to point out some of its
general characteristics as an institutional regime. The EAEU was set up as
an independent interstate actor operating through its bodies on the basis
of the powers delegated by its member states. Of particular significance is
the Eurasian Economic Commission (EEC), the Union’s regulator tasked
with the development of integration. The Commission is a two-tiered
body consisting of a Council that is composed of the deputy heads of
national governments, and a Collegium that is composed of Ministers
nominated by the member states who head specialized departments.5
Despite the intention to model it on the European Union Commission,
however, the EEC’s autonomy and authority are highly limited.
The EEC has been endowed with significant powers in the area of
tariff and customs regulation, technical regulation and the imposition of
trade defence measures. Many other areas, such as transport or agricul-
tural policy, are reserved for the member states. In relation to those, the
Commission’s role is to facilitate cooperation between the member states.
Even within the area of delegated powers, however, there is complex mix
between Union and national legislation and between Commission and
national competences to navigate, as the area of food safety illustrates.
Furthermore, the decision-making process that the EEC follows even
in such areas is deeply intergovernmental, putting member states firmly
in control. The most important powers of the EEC are exercised by its
Council by consensus. The Collegium is the permanent and most profes-
sional and independent body of the Union, consisting of departments
dealing with day-to-day matters. Its decisions, however, can always be
challenged by member states and escalated to the Council of the Commis-
sion or the higher bodies of the EAEU, the Inter-Governmental Council
(heads of government), and the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council
(heads of state), and revoked or reversed by them.
Notably, the powers of the Commission are particularly curtailed by its
weak enforcement functions. It can, subject to capacity, monitor member
states’ practices and notify them of a lack of implementation or breach
of Union requirements. Yet, in a reversal from the CU regime, it cannot
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bring them before the Court of the EAEU. It is notable that the EAEU
Treaty asserted the primacy of the member states in several key ways,
including by restricting the Court’s powers and ensuring that its rulings
do not become part of EAEU law.6
In this context, the Commission has acted cautiously and conser-
vatively. Even when it demonstrates activism, the fate of its initiatives
rests at the highest level of domestic power. Thus, politicised interstate
bargaining is the main path to secure progress or resolve disagreements.
This characteristic matters for a number of reasons.
Firstly, there is a mismatch between the institutional regime in place
and the stated ambition of integration. There is an ‘attainment gap’ built
into the system which is particularly critical in relation to the removal of
non-tariff barriers and regulatory alignment. In part, this is connected to
the preference for harmonisation similar to the European Union (EU),
which is an inherently complex process.7
Secondly, it can be argued that the institutional set-up behind the
mismatch was the result of the member states’ deliberate preference. As
the drafting of the EAEU Treaty coincided with the eruption of the
Ukraine crisis in early 2014, Russia’s partners were keen to limit the scope
of integration and, particularly restrict the power of common bodies. With
sovereignty sensitivities ignited, Belarus and Kazakhstan were concerned
about Russia’s ability to dominate the Union and develop a political
dimension to economic integration.8
Finally, the functioning of the EAEU as well as any improvements of
the regime depend on the engagement and continued commitment to
the integration of its member states. This is particularly crucial given the
large number of areas of cooperation, including the completion of the
common market, which are ‘in progress’ and depend on future actions
being taken. Indeed, despite the fact that it inherits developments set in
motion with the 2010 Customs Union and 2012 Single Economic Space,
the EAEU is best understood as a ‘road map’ for cooperation.
This links to another important point. In law, the EAEU operates on
the basis of formal parity between its members reflected in their voting
power and composition of common bodies. Nonetheless, Russia’s lead-
ership in the operation of the Union is hard to dispute. It is evident in
the staffing of the Collegium of the EEC and Russia’s superior ability
to lead and participate in various working groups and joint missions,
particularly in the area of food safety.9 It is also a result of its massive
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structural preponderance within the economy of the EAEU, which trans-
lates into a high degree of identification of the EAEU interest with
Russia’s interest.10 Ultimately, it represents the political reality behind the
EAEU, which is largely based on bilateral, Russia-centred hub-and-spoke
patterns of interactions, where the loyalty of members is procured by the
provision of collateral benefits, including political support, cheap energy,
or enhanced security.11
In this sense, it is of particular importance that Russia’s key interest in
the Eurasian project is primarily (geo-) political. The economic benefits of
EAEU integration for Russia, even with the removal of non-tariff barriers,
have been estimated as trivial.12 Russia certainly derives little economic
advantage from the bloc above and beyond what it can achieve through
bilateral dealings. It is not surprising that Russia has been prepared to
let geopolitics trump the constraints of integration at the expense of the
Union, but also that its interest in the technical minutiae of integration
has not paralleled its enthusiasm for more symbolic wins, such as the
launch and expansion of the bloc. It has certainly been selective in driving
integration, investing primarily in areas where geopolitical considerations
or other domestic priorities have been most prominent.
All this is aptly demonstrated by the case of agri-food trade. In terms of
mutual trade in goods, the EAEU inherited the tariff-free trade arrange-
ments already put in place between its members in a web of bilateral
free trade agreements and related agreements facilitating trade cooper-
ation. These arrangements were critical in eliminating the various annual
exemptions to free trade, which created high uncertainty in bilateral deal-
ings. They did not, however, tackle non-tariff barriers and particularly,
the possibility to apply Sanitary and Phyto-Sanitary Measures (SPS) as
barriers to trade. Despite Belarus’s close alliance with Russia, for example,
it periodically experienced food bans and customs restrictions, largely
perceived as discriminatory and politically motivated.13 The launch of
the Customs Union in 2010 consolidated the free trade arrangements
already in place, brought about a common Customs Code and the
highly symbolic removal of internal customs controls in 2011. It also
created a new momentum for deeper integration, including the adop-
tion of common technical requirements and other coordination measures.
The EAEU inherited these developments with the idea to embed them
in a more coherent legal and institutional framework and map out an
ambitious agenda for achieving a genuine common market. Nonethe-
less, agri-food trade under the EAEU regime remains inhibited by several
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important obstacles linked to the nature of its institutional regime and
its limited ability to constrain the diverging preferences of its members,
Russia, in particular.
3 Food Safety Requirements
While food safety is fundamental to the functioning of the common
market, it is one of the areas where the obstacles to internal trade are
most pronounced with disputes between the EAEU members continuing
to proliferate. This is largely attributed to the fact that, as aptly described,
the EAEU regime does not amount to a workable single food safety
system but rather a conglomeration of the national systems of its member
states.14
To start with, it should be pointed out that at the level of the
WTO and the practice of various countries, the regulation of technical
barriers to trade and the use of SPS measures are clearly distinguished
and defined. Russia, however, has followed an approach where in regu-
lating food safety, the boundaries between the two have been blurred.15
This approach influenced the practice of the Customs Union,16 and was
then inherited by the EAEU. Thus, food safety in the EAEU straddles
issues related to the adoption of Union ‘technical regulations’, which have
included sanitary requirements and procedures with regard to an agreed
list of commodities as well as the framework for SPS control.
In this sense, the area of food safety presents some complications in the
applicable regimes, particularly in relation to products of animal origin.17
With regard to technical requirements, the EAEU pursues maximum
harmonisation. In law, regulations need to be applied directly in the
member states, without the need of implementing legislation, thus aiming
to reduce the possibility for divergence. In the area of SPS, however,
member states are allowed to impose additional requirements and put
in place additional processes for assessing conformity.18 Indeed, in terms
of SPS controls, the EAEU operates an agreed (soglasovannuiu) policy,19
a term which was deliberately used in drafting the Treaty to designate the
lowest level of interstate cooperation.
In principle, the EAEU Treaty lays down the fundamentals of food
safety policies in line with WTO requirements, dealing with the purposes
of food safety measures, scientific risk assessment, regionalisation of food
safety risk, transparency and the importance of international standards.20
The EAEU system is based on the provision of common mandatory
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requirements and general procedures applying to an agreed list of goods
placed under regulatory control. General sanitary requirements and
procedures for sanitary control were agreed upon by the CU Commission
in 2010.21 They were developed in a number of horizontal technical regu-
lations, such as the 2011 Technical Regulations ‘On Food Safety’, ‘On
the safety of packaging’, and ‘On food products in relation to labelling’.
More detailed mandatory requirements to the products subject to sani-
tary controls were envisaged in specific technical regulations dealing with
certain types of food products, such as meat, milk, grains, fat and oil
products, and fruits.22 These were accompanied by the provision of
common rules on conformity assessment, standard forms of documents
of compliance, and a register of certification bodies. Similarly, in the
area of veterinary controls, there were adopted common requirements
applicable to the commodities subject to veterinary control and agreed
veterinary control procedure to be applied at the EAEU customs border
and throughout its customs territory.23 This also involved the adop-
tion of uniform veterinary certificates, as well as general rules applying
to different aspects of the veterinary control process, such as laboratory
controls and joint inspections.
These mandatory requirements and procedures have been developed
and continue to be updated at the EAEU level by the EEC, as they were
by its predecessor, the Commission of the CU. Nonetheless, the progress
in adopting and upgrading technical regulations has been slow and
complicated: in the Commission’s own assessment, this is an area plagued
by the delays and perfunctory attitudes of EAEU member states.24
Related to this is the problem of the control over the compli-
ance with technical regulations. This is an area where discrepancies and
inconsistencies are common. In a recent example, Russia adopted require-
ments regarding the marking and marketing of wine, in addition to the
EAEU technical regulation ‘On the safety of alcohol production’, due
to enter into force in 2021.25 However, the EEC has no powers in this
regard: control is a prerogative of national authorities in accordance with
national systems of food control.26 Inspection, enforcement, or indeed
the pursuit of liability in the case of breaches takes place subject to
domestic legislation and procedures, and is open to significant divergence.
The EAEU Treaty provides that a future international agreement may
harmonise domestic legislations dealing with control over compliance.27
This, however, has not materialised, nor is there an indication that such
a harmonisation will result in more powers of the Commission. Instead,
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the Commission has sought to respond to problems in this field by issuing
recommendations for improved cooperation between member states.28
Similarly, the exercise of sanitary and veterinary control is carried out
by domestic authorities applying Union as well as national rules. The
Commission does not participate in joint inspections nor has the authority
to audit the national systems of control.29 Even more importantly, in
contrast to the EU regime,30 the Commission does not have the right
to adopt temporary SPS measures under any circumstances.
The imposition of temporary SPS measures is the exclusive right of the
member states. It can be triggered by notification by another member
state of problems or measures adopted on its territory, but also by the
imposing state’s own finding of a violation of technical regulations or a
‘deterioration of the sanitary-epidemiological situation on the territory
of member state’.31 This allows for a wide discretion in the imposition
of temporary SPS measures, subject only to the requirement to follow
a process for mutual notification and consultation, introduced in May
2016.32 This is especially problematic given the important gaps in the
common SPS regime in key areas, such as the definition of deteriora-
tion or threat, or how a risk analysis should be conducted.33 Indeed, in
the Commission’s own assessment, ‘Union law does not define the key
terms related to temporary SPS measures, the justification for their intro-
duction and contents, which can give rise to inappropriate use of such
measures’.34
All this gives rise to two important problems. Firstly, food safety ulti-
mately depends on the capacity and effectiveness of the domestic systems
for inspection and enforcement. This underscores the importance of the
quality of domestic institutions and the need for their modernisation.
However, this conclusion jars against the fact that the EAEU project
explicitly lacks a ‘governance’ dimension. Accession to the EAEU, for
example, does not depend on preparedness to implement the various
EAEU requirements, nor is support for developing domestic capacity a
part of any EAEU equivalent of the EU structural and regional funds.
The rudimentary state of SPS control facilities of Kyrgyzstan, for example,
was well known to members of the EEC,35 yet Russia’s geopolitical prior-
ities prevailed in pressing for its fast accession. It is telling that Kazakhstan
refused to remove its phytosanitary posts from the border with Kyrgyzstan
until October 2016, following pressure at the EAEU level.
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A closely related problem is that of the corrupt practices of the various
national agencies for inspection and certification. Indeed, there have been
abundant demonstrations that a domestic ‘market for documents’ has
developed in several countries,36 undermining the integrity of the system.
This is particularly problematic in areas, such as the issuance of veterinary
certificates, which are subject to mutual recognition across the Union.37
Secondly, this decentralised nature of the SPS regime opens the possi-
bility for arbitrary or opportunistic use of restrictions. The EAEU Treaty
provides that SPS measures and import bans should not represent unjus-
tifiable discrimination of a disguised restriction on trade and should only
serve a list of agreed purposes.38 Yet, Russian SPS measures continue
to be perceived by Belarus as driven by protectionist or political moti-
vations. Russia’s 2018 ban on dried milk, for example, was interpreted
as an attempt to curtail the entry of the cheaper, subsidised Belarussian
products.39
Both these problems culminated in the context of Russia’s food
embargo, as will be examined next.
4 Russia’s Food Import Ban
and Its Effects on EAEU Relations
It is not an exaggeration to say that at the same time as the EAEU
was being launched as an integration-enhancing project, it was crippled
by the consequences of Russia’s decision to ban food imports from the
EU, the U.S. and a range of other countries, initially imposed in August
2014 and extended to the end of 2022.40 Given the refusal of Belarus
and Kazakhstan to agree on a Union-wide ban, this unilateral action
meant that the very logic of functioning as a customs union based on a
common external trade policy was undermined.41 Similarly, complications
arose following an import ban on Ukrainian agri-food products in 2016
and also extended to the end of 2022. There were also transit restric-
tions through Ukraine so that Kazakh and Kyrgyz importers faced higher
transaction costs, leading to the actual economic detriment.
In the absence of an EAEU-wide framework, Russia’s options to
enforce its import ban have been limited. To start with, Belarussian
President Lukashenko pledged to cooperate in securing the control of
the EAEU external borders.42 This was also an opportunity to increase
Belarus’s food exports to Russia as well as help alleviate Russian consumer
losses from the collapse in imports. Yet, as widely discussed, the reality was
234 R. DRAGNEVA
a boom in ‘contraband’ trade in dairy, fruit, fish products, and others,
using a variety of schemes, such as relabelling, falsifying certificates of
origin, and violating transit rules. While the case of Belarus has been
publicised most, the other partners did not shy from seeking to profit
from the sanctions regime either.
With its initial offers to set up joint missions at the Union customs
borders and engage in other forms of customs cooperation rejected,
Russia resorted to introducing customs and food safety checks in areas
bordering on Belarus and Kazakhstan. In effect, this not only caused
traffic delays but rolled back the integration achievements already made,
resulting in the emergence of a de facto two-tier customs regime.43
Furthermore, Moscow sought to defend its market as well as place pres-
sure on Belarus to abandon its policy of profiting from the sanctions
through the extensive use of temporary SPS measures. For example, while
pointing out the presence of antibiotics in violation of EAEU food safety
requirements, Rosselkhoznadzor also referred to a systemic, organised falsi-
fication of milk products and the certificates accompanying them.44 This
pushed the agency to move from enterprise bans to a sectoral ban on the
import of some milk products in the spring of 2018, which was eventually
retracted.
Given the decentralised nature of the SPS system, throughout this
period, the main form of seeking progress in resolving the recurrent
disputes was through bilateral dealings, with joint working groups being
set up and annual road maps adopted. At the same time, both sides also
sought to use the EAEU platform, which exposed the deficiency of the
common institutions even further. Belarus was successful in mobilising its
Commissioners to lobby for its case, arguing that ‘violations unconnected
to veterinary risks should not be the basis for the imposition of restric-
tive veterinary measures’.45 Following the 2018 ‘milk war’, the EEC
Collegium sided with Belarus adopting several decisions calling on Russia
to remove various measures representing obstacles to the functioning of
the internal market contrary to the requirements of the EAEU Treaty.46
In particular, the Commission took the view that there is no EAEU legal
mechanism for a country to refuse to recognise a veterinary certificate
adopted by other country’s authorities.47 Given the limited powers of the
Commission, however, the effect of its notifications to Russia remained
largely symbolic, with disputes entering the province of highest level of
political bargaining.
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At the same time, Russia sought to address the problem of contra-
band goods or ‘grey’ trade (seryi oborot ) at the EAEU level by leading
on key developments. For example, in February 2018, an agreement on
product marking was successfully signed by the EAEU member states.
It aims at unifying the different countries’ approaches to the product
marking and, thus, improving the traceability of certain products. In May
2019, an Agreement on the traceability of products imported into the
EAEU customs territory was also signed. It is expected to help reduce the
circulation of illegal goods and increase business transparency. It is also
unsurprising that Russia has seen the development of the digital agenda in
the EAEU as one of its top priorities over other areas in need of attention.
Yet, as Kofner points out, there remain a range of technical difficulties
in harmonising domestic digital tracing systems, not least because of the
prominence of private business interests involved in their operations.48
5 Cooperation in the Food Security Agenda
As extensively discussed elsewhere, over the last decade, Russia’s food
policy has been defined by its food security agenda.49 Russia’s Food Secu-
rity Doctrine, adopted in 2010, pursued self-sufficiency through assistance
for domestic agricultural production in addition to restrictions on specific
imports. This was given a new impetus by the food embargo of August
2014, which was followed by Moscow’s launch of an extensive import
substitution policy in October 2014. Against this background, food secu-
rity acquired a distinct political and security importance, affecting Russia’s
preferences vis-à-vis developments in the EAEU.
This is an area where Russia’s leadership has been in full display. This
was possible also because food security was already an important issue
in the region. For example, Armenia adopted a food security law in
2002; Belarus adopted its own Food Security Concept in 2004; Kaza-
khstan included food independence in its 2005 Law on state regulation
of the development of the agricultural complex and rural territories;
and Kyrgyzstan passed a law on food security in 2008. These acts were
followed by various programmes, concepts, and strategies detailing and
updating the food security agenda. While the definitions of food secu-
rity, the targets set for self-sufficiency of the domestic production of
different commodities and the domestic support measures to achieve
them varied widely,50 the general concern was shared as was its asso-
ciation with the wider issue of national security. Furthermore, Food
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Security Concepts were adopted at the regional level of some of the
preceding integration projects, namely the Eurasian Economic Commu-
nity in 2009 and the Commonwealth of Independent States in 2010,
which to a large extent reflected the Russian concept and food security
targets. Recently, a EAEU-wide Concept was drafted and distributed for
consultation. As a result, the EEC has monitored the levels of domestic
self-sufficiency, producing ‘league tables’ of the progress of the different
countries towards this goal.
Against this background, the EAEU Treaty provided somewhat
broadly for the achievement of a coordinated agricultural policy ‘to opti-
mise the volumes of production’, ‘satisfy the needs of the common
agricultural market’, and ‘increase the export of agricultural products and
food’.51 This was a distinctly decentralised policy, carried out by ‘reg-
ular consultations of the representatives of the member states, organised
by the Commission’ and followed by the adoption of recommenda-
tions.52 The centrepiece of this coordination was the mutual sharing of
the programmes to support the production of an agreed list of sensitive
agri-foods. This list adopted in 2016 included milk and milk products,
meat and meat products, vegetables, fruits, rice, seeds, sugar, cotton, and
tobacco.53 Furthermore, the Treaty in its Annex 29 attempted to formu-
late some common principles for the adoption of state support depending
on their effect on mutual trade, requiring member states to abstain from
the adoption of certain measures. Nonetheless, as in other cases, any
disputes with regard to this area of cooperation are to be resolved by inter-
state consultations, with the Commission performing a purely facilitating
function.
The Commission has argued that national import substitution
programmes should be developed with a consideration of EAEU imports
so as to help the specialisation and competitive advantage of the different
member states.54 In this area, Russia has shown some interest in
expanding the import substitution agenda to the level of the EAEU.
In July 2020, a EAEU Road-Map on the development of agricultural
industry was adopted, which moves forward cooperation in this field.55
However, Russia was reluctant to open its public procurement market
to EAEU companies, which attracted many complaints, especially by
Belarus, alleging distortion of the common market. In 2018 Russia finally
admitted EAEU companies to its import substitution programme. Never-
theless, as commentators point out, there remain numerous substantial
obstacles to EAEU companies taking part in Russian tenders.56
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6 EAEU’s External Agreements
One area where the EAEU boasts a potential to make a difference to its
members’ external trade is in fostering relations with third parties. Indeed,
the EAEU has been active in signing various cooperation memoranda and
negotiating trade deals across the globe. To date, the EAEU has success-
fully signed free trade agreements with Vietnam (2015), Iran (2018),
Singapore (2019), and Serbia (2019). Certainly, one might expect that
such agreements might contribute to Russia’s geographical reorientation
of post-sanction imports as well as crate new export opportunities. Yet,
the benefits of these agreements so far can be described as marginal.
The agreement with Vietnam is a case in point (see also Chapter 7).
It provides for the liberalisation of 88 percent of trade in goods, with 59
percent of tariff eliminated upon entry into force and 29 percent removed
over a five to ten-year period.57 In terms of export opportunities, the
agreement hailed the possibility of reaching a market of 90 million people.
It secures the immediate removal of tariffs on key commodities, such as
wheat and linseed. It also creates opportunities for growing markets in
products, such as milk, poultry, and confectionaries, subject to transi-
tion periods. In terms of imports, the agreement liberalises the access of
goods, such as fish, rice, and fruit. Yet, it excludes competing ‘sensitive’
commodities, such as meat, milk, tea, coffee, and sugar, thus protecting
domestic producers. Furthermore, the EAEU reserves the asymmetric
right to apply trigger safeguard measures to control the volume of some
imports, such as rice. It similarly relies on quotas and the application of
non-tariff barriers, including SPS measures.58 Protectionist measures were
particularly relevant to the case of Belarus, which stood to lose most from
free trade with Vietnam.59
Five years on, not all EAEU members have benefitted from the agree-
ment.60 Trade data shows that Russia’s total imports from Vietnam have
grown, while its exports have been more erratic.61 Yet, ultimately, the
economic significance of this agreement is limited given Vietnam’s share
in the EAEU members’ external trade. Even for Russia, which accounts
for the highest volume of EAEU trade with Vietnam, this share is less
than 1 percent.62
The picture is similar in terms of the temporary FTA with Iran,
accounting for 0.28 percent of Russia’s external trade in 2018. During
the first eight months of 2020, total trade between the EAEU and Iran
totalled about $2 billion USD, of which, food and agricultural goods
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amounted to $939 million USD.63 Furthermore, the temporary agree-
ment with Iran is limited in its scope and commitments on both sides.64
It applies to a short list of commodities, representing about 50 percent of
existing trade. The EAEU liberalises tariffs on mostly non-sensitive goods,
whereas trade in some competing goods, such as vegetables, is restricted
to seasonal preferences. In November 2020, however, it was reported that
the EAEU and Iran would sign a permanent free trade agreement, which
presumably would increase trade and remove current restrictions.65
This trend is even more pronounced with regard to the recently signed
FTAs with Singapore and Serbia. As Singapore already operates a duty-
free access, in the words of the Commission, an FTA ‘is not of interest
to the CU members by virtue of its foreign trade effects’.66 Similarly, the
agreement with Serbia consolidates existing agreements and offers few
new advantages to bilateral trade with Moscow.
The EAEU has also been negotiating agreements with Israel since
2015 and with Egypt and India since 2016. In terms of the attrac-
tion of Israel, like with Singapore, its key benefits lie outside trade in
goods. While Russia is likely to benefit from grain exports and fruit
and vegetable imports from an agreement with Egypt, negotiations have
been slow. Reaching an agreement with India is even more problematic.
EAEU assessments show significant negative effects of deepened engage-
ment with India particularly for Belarus, short of exemptions relating to
dairy and meat products.67 At the same time, given India’s protectionist
record, the extent of market access concessions to obtain should not be
overestimated.
While some opportunities are created by these agreements, they are not
concluded with major trade partners and the primary reason for pursuing
them has not been economic. Above all, they align with Russia’s partic-
ular geopolitical objectives in the respective regions, while promoting an
agenda to establish the EAEU as an internationally recognised player.68
They are more about Russia’s regional clout and the economic alignment
with important geopolitical shifts rather than about trade liberalisation.
Improved market access has been more part of their justification rather
than their impetus. Ironically, the very fact that they cover small volumes
of trade has helped make them possible in achieving the consensus for
signing them in the face of domestic protectionist pressures.69
In this sense, it is notable that the bulk of the growth in Russia’s
external markets since 2014 has been outside the framework of EAEU’s
free trade agreements. At the same time, while the prominence of trade
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with China has grown and cooperation opportunities at the level of the
EAEU have been explored, the possibility for a free trade agreement is
not on the table. Instead, in 2018 the EAEU signed a non-preferential
agreement designed to serve as the basis for future economic relations.
Yet, in terms of its contents, this is primarily a politically symbolic agree-
ment, with little added value to cooperation other than restating existing
WTO commitments.
7 How Trade Flows Have Changed
Against this background, it is not surprising that the picture of agri-food
trade in the EAEU presents mixed results. To start with, the EAEU inher-
ited a rising trend in mutual agri-food trade between Russia, Belarus, and
Kazakhstan despite declines in total trade in 2012.70 The launch of the
EAEU was marked by a sharp currency depreciation against the U.S.
dollar, and the entry into force of Russia’s import food ban, which led
to a reduction in Russia’s total agri-food imports in 2014 and 2015.71
This trend was also reflected in trade with Russia’s EAEU partners (see
Fig. 1), even though as the EEC notes, the fall in agri-food trade was not
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Fig. 1 Value of Russia’s agri-food imports from the EAEU (million USD)
(Source Author’s calculations based on EEC’s Statistics on trade in agri-food
products)
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Since 2015, there has been a gradual yet important increase in Russia’s
agri-food imports from the EAEU, indicating that geographical reorien-
tation as a result of the sanctions war has taken place. This increase has
been fairly unequal across EAEU partners: imports from Armenia and
Kyrgyzstan have grown at a higher rate than imports from Kazakhstan and
Belarus. Nonetheless, imports from Belarus continue to account for the
largest share of Russia’s food supplies, particularly in commodities such as
milk and meat. Indeed, Belarus has been seen as one of the distinct ‘win-
ners’ in increasing its share of food imports to Russia, even though there
has been some scepticism as to how much of this trade has represented
re-export of EU foods.73 A closer look at the dynamics of imports from
Belarus (see Fig. 2) suggests that the effect of trade disputes has been
significant and USD dollar volumes of trade have still not matched the
peak years of 2013–2014.
It should be noted that the value of agri-food imports from the EAEU
has grown at a faster rate than imports from the rest of the world (see
Fig. 3). Yet, as with external trade, this rate has slowed down significantly
after 2017, which may also be attributed to the effects of Russia’s import
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Fig. 2 Dynamics of Russia’s agri-food imports from Belarus (million USD)
(Source Author’s calculations based on EEC’s Statistics on trade in agri-food
products)
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Fig. 3 Russia’s agri-food imports and exports from the EAEU and rest of
the world (RoW) (million USD) (Source Author’s calculations based on EEC’s
Statistics on trade in agri-food products)
significantly lower than external agri-food trade, pointing to the promi-
nence of other geographical regions in replacing the countries subject to
the import ban.
Russia remains a net food importer from the EAEU. It has increased
its exports to the EAEU albeit at a rate slower than its exports to the rest
of the world.74
8 Outlook
Over the last decade, Russia sought to increase its influence in the global
food trade while promoting its geopolitical priorities. At the same time,
it committed to deep economic integration within the 2010 Customs
Union and the EAEU, including the creation of a common internal
market and the pursuit of a common external trade policy. In this sense,
the EAEU has the potential to enhance Russia’s policy options in the
international arena while growing regional trade.
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As the discussion in this chapter shows, however, the EAEU has had
a trivial role in affecting Russia’s policy choices. Given the bloc’s insti-
tutional characteristics and structure, Russia’s has proved able to deviate
from the constraining obligations under the EAEU regime. It has been
able to assert its interests regardless of the costs to its partners and the
integration project as a whole. At the same time, it has allowed Moscow
to use the EAEU platform to further its own priorities with limited
commitment to its partners, as the example of the import substitution
agenda demonstrates. Given Russia’s leadership within the organisation,
the EAEU has provided it with the regional clout to enter FTA with
politically strategic partners. Yet, in trade terms, the potential of these
agreements has been limited.
At the same time, for Russia, dealing in the context of the EAEU
framework has not been problem-free. Ironically, the decentralised nature
of the EAEU agri-food regime combined with the weakness of domestic
institutions in the EAEU member states has meant that Moscow has
struggled to enforce its import food ban. Furthermore, the weakness of
the common regime has also meant that the EAEU continues to perform
below its potential, particularly in growing mutual trade through the
elimination of non-tariff barriers.
The problems of the EAEU have often been attributed to ‘under-
integration’, or the insufficient extent to which member states have
committed to creating a robust institutional regime for eliminating
internal obstacles to trade.75 The latest ‘Strategy for the Development of
Eurasian Integration Until 2025’ has reflected on this issue, declaring the
importance of the completion of the common market and the improve-
ment of the EAEU regulatory regime.76 Nonetheless, it is questionable
if these issues can be sorted out without a radical change in the institu-
tional setting of the Union, even if plans and programmes continue to
proliferate. Indeed, as wisely observed, drawing up a roadmap to address
sticking points, is ‘the EAEU’s favourite method for kicking things into
the long grass’.77
Against this background, it can be expected that some improvements
of the Union regime will take place: particularly in areas aligning with
Russia’s interest, such as digital tracing of origin. However, the deeper
structural problems behind it, both at Union and domestic governance
levels, are likely to persist without a change in the fundamental prefer-
ences and modes of operation of the EAEU member states. In this sense,
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while the EAEU will continue to add to Russia’s image as a bloc leader,
it is unlikely to make a major difference to the essence of its policies.
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Chapter 9: Russia’s Agri-Food Trade
with theMiddle East andNorth Africa
Maximilian Heigermoser, Tinoush Jamali Jaghdani,
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1 Introduction
As Russia’s food exports started to increase substantially with the turn
of the millennium,1 the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region
became the most important destination region, particularly for grain
exports.2 Due to unfavourable climatic and soil conditions, most MENA
countries are dependent on grain imports, as domestic production does
not meet consumption. While around one-third of Russia’s food exports
were destined for MENA countries in 2019, the region’s share exhibited
a slight downward trend over the past decade, while agricultural exports
to Asian markets gradually increased. From 2011 to 2019, Russia’s total
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food exports more than doubled from $12 billion USD to over $25
billion USD, and in 2018 the government’s declared its objective to
increase the volume of food exports to $45 billion USD by the year
2024.3 The government subsequently had to back off the target date
of 2024, but food exports by that date were still expected to be signif-
icantly higher than the base year of 2017. Simultaneously, food imports
decreased during the immediate period following Russia’s decision to
implement a complete ban on agricultural imports from Western coun-
tries in August 2014. In 2015 Russia’s imports fell by almost a third
compared to 2014, from 39 billion USD to $27 billion USD, although
after 2016 the dollar value of imports began to rise again.4
Russia’s primary agricultural export item is grain, which accounted
for 37 percent of the country’s food exports between 2011 and 2019.
Wheat is Russia’s most important grain export product, accounting for
more than 75 percent, followed by barley (11 percent) and maize (11
percent). In the 2015/2016 season, Russia became the world’s largest
wheat exporter for the first time, a position it has mostly maintained since
then.5 While fish and crustaceans are important food export products,
primarily for East Asian markets such as China (frozen fish) and South
Korea (crustaceans), the MENA market region is Russia’s key market
for grain exports. Only 70 percent of grain consumed in this region is
produced domestically,6 while the rest, 90 million tonnes annually, is
imported, with Russia and further Black Sea exporters playing an increas-
ingly important role. Against this background, this chapter primarily
focuses on Russian wheat exports to the MENA region, while barley,
maize, and sunflower oil exports are considered when relevant. We also
consider Russia’s food imports from the MENA region, which are small
compared to exports and mostly consist of fruit, nuts, and vegetables.
We focus on Russia’s top four destination markets within the MENA
region, namely Egypt, Turkey, Iran, and Saudi Arabia. Jointly, these
four countries accounted for close to two-thirds of Russia’s food exports
to the whole region from 2011 to 2019, while 55 percent of Russia’s
food imports from MENA originate from these four countries. Grain is
the main commodity of this food trade relationship; Egypt and Turkey
are the two top wheat export markets for Russia, while Saudi Arabia is
the primary destination market for Russian barley. Food trade is largely
unidirectional considering Egypt, Iran and especially Saudi Arabia, while
Turkey is also a significant supplier of fruits and vegetables to Russia.
Considering Russia’s total food exports, Turkey is the most important
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destination market followed by China and Egypt, while Iran and Saudi
Arabia fall into the top ten. Regarding Russia’s most important suppliers
of food, Turkey is fifth, trailing Belarus, Brazil, China, and Germany.
In most MENA countries, including the four considered, State Trading
Enterprises (STEs) that manage food imports play a major role in food
trade and food security.7 In most instances, these agencies have a domi-
nant, if not monopolistic position, as primary or exclusive importers
of grain in the respective countries. The Egyptian General Authority
for Supply of Commodities (GASC), the Turkish Grain Board (TMO),
the Saudi Grains Organisation (SAGO), and the Iranian State Livestock
Affairs Logistics (SLAL) purchase agricultural commodities on interna-
tional markets by employing tender systems in order to foster competition
among suppliers. These tender markets constitute a central characteristic
of the considered regional food trade. Another key feature of Russian
food trade with MENA countries is the recurrent disruption caused by
political disputes or rapprochement between the respective countries.8
Further, food trade is frequently impacted by conflicts about the quality
and compliance with phytosanitary standards for the supplied products.
In the following, we first briefly outline central characteristics of
Russian grain exports, before presenting four individual descriptive anal-
yses of Russia’s food trade relationships with Egypt, Turkey, Saudi Arabia,
and Iran. We finally project future trends and scenarios in the outlook.
2 General Characteristics of
Russian Grain Exports
Russian customs data shows that close to 90 percent of Russia’s grain
exports flow through ports located at the Black Sea, while smaller quan-
tities are exported by train or via ports at the Caspian Sea, the Baltic Sea,
or Far Eastern ports.9 The deep-water port of Novorossiysk is central
to Russia’s grain exports via the Black Sea.10 Together with Tuapse
and Taman, Russia’s three deep-water ports handle 60 percent of grain
exports shipped via the Black Sea. The remaining 40 percent are managed
by smaller ports located at the Azov Sea and up the Don River, such as
Azov, Rostov-at-Don, Taganrog, and Yeysk. These shallow water ports
handle smaller vessels with capacities reaching up to 25,000 tonnes.
Turkey—the geographically closest among the four considered trading
partners—is usually supplied by these smaller vessels, while barley gets
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shipped to Saudi Arabia by larger panamax vessels exclusively. In the case
of Iran, grain trade partly flows via Black Sea ports and partly via smaller
ports located at the Caspian Sea, most notably Astrakhan.
Russian grain exports generally show a strong seasonal pattern. Export
volumes are high in the summer months of July through September,
when wheat is exported right after the harvest. Elevated exports can be
observed until the end of the year before they decrease during the winter
and spring months. This pattern partly results from a lack of adequate,
modern storage infrastructure, as Russian farmers have no alternative to
exporting the new crop right after the harvest, having to accept low prices
at the start of a marketing year. However, in recent years, additional
storage facilities were set up in Russia. While the United States Depart-
ment of Agriculture (USDA) estimated Russia’s grain storage capacities at
119 million tonnes in 2017,11 this capacity was estimated at 157 million
tonnes in 2019. It can thus be expected that the strong seasonality pattern
of Russian grain exports will be dampened in the future.12
The climatic and soil conditions in Russia’s main agricultural producing
regions are generally favourable to grain production. However, Russia’s
recent ascent as a top wheat exporter also results from a strong devalua-
tion of the Russian ruble since 2014, which supported the competitive-
ness of Russian exports on the international market.13 Furthermore, due
to close geographical proximity to important destination markets such as
Egypt, Russia and further Black Sea exporters, like Ukraine and Romania,
benefit from freight cost advantages when competing with other major
exporting countries such as France, the United States, or Australia.14 As
agricultural commodities—and grains in particular—have a low value-to-
weight ratio, differences in freight costs can become a decisive factor in
determining the overall competitiveness of specific exporters in contested
destination markets.
3 Focus on Specific MENA Countries
3.1 Egypt
Egypt is the world’s largest wheat importer, buying around 12 million
tonnes per season, as its domestic production only covers 42 percent of its
total consumption.15 Around half of Egypt’s wheat imports are handled
by the General Authority for Supply of Commodities (GASC), a STE
responsible for the procurement of foodstuffs. In fulfilling its mandate,
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the GASC alone imports as much wheat as the whole of Japan, making the
agency a dominant single player on the international market. To purchase
wheat, as well as other food commodities such as rice, soy oil, or sunflower
oil, the agency employs a tender system. The GASC usually issues wheat
tenders every two weeks, buying three to four cargoes of 60,000 tonnes
originating from the destinations that are currently most competitive.
GASC tenders are closely watched by the global grain trade, as Egypt is
geographically located at a vital chokepoint of international trade, namely
the Suez Canal. Therefore, being competitive in GASC tenders typically
also implies competitiveness in destination markets beyond the canal,
which grants high informational value to the outcome of Egypt’s wheat
tenders.16
The wheat that GASC purchases is processed domestically to produce
baladi flat bread. This staple food is sold at subsidised prices to Egyp-
tians with lower incomes. Egypt’s bread subsidy programme is a politically
sensitive issue and efforts to abolish or reform the subsidy system repeat-
edly caused uprisings and riots.17 Over the past two decades, Russia and
further Black Sea exporters such as Ukraine and Romania have steadily
increased their share in the GASC tender market, mostly at the expense
of the United States, which had been the top wheat supplier to Egypt
for decades. From the 2015/2016 agricultural year onwards, at least 80
percent of wheat imported by the GASC originated from the Black Sea
region, with Russia alone accounting for between 40 and 80 percent. This
compares to an average share of 33 percent between the 2005/2006 and
2008/2009 agricultural years. As a result of the increasing share of Black
Sea wheat in the Egyptian market, the United States Wheat Associates,
the U.S. wheat industry’s export market development agency, closed their
Cairo office in December 2017.18
Russia exports significant amounts of wheat and sunflower oil to
Egypt, while importing fruits and vegetables from the North African
country (see Fig. 1). The food trade between the two countries has
repeatedly been affected by conflicts over product quality and compli-
ance with phytosanitary standards regarding the shipped commodities.
A major Russo-Egyptian food trade dispute arose after Egypt imposed a
zero-tolerance policy regime regarding ergot contamination19 in wheat
cargos shipped to the GASC on 28 August 2016. After requiring that
wheat shipped to the GASC must contain zero ergot, which is practically
impossible for traders to ensure when wheat is delivered in bulk, Egypt
rejected cargos from Romania and Russia in early September 2016, as


















Fig. 1 Russia’s Agri-Food trade with Egypt, 2010–2019 (Source UN Comtrade.
International Trade Statistics Database. https://comtrade.un.org/, Accessed 18
August 2020)
they failed to meet the newly established quality standards.20 In response,
wheat traders boycotted several GASC wheat tenders that the agency had
to cancel due to a lack of offers. On 16 September, the Russian govern-
ment announced that fruit and vegetable imports from Egypt would be
temporarily halted starting 22 September, due to concerns over food
safety. Shortly after, on 21 September, the Egyptian government decided
to cancel the zero-tolerance ergot policy.21 This was followed by the
resumption of fruit and vegetable imports from Egypt to Russia on 26
September. Importantly, however, the resumption of food imports did
not include Egyptian potatoes, its second most important export to the
Russian market after citrus fruits, which remained banned from entry to
the Russian market until 14 December (see Fig. 1). Russia itself is a large
producer of potatoes and could become a net exporter of potatoes in
the future after becoming virtually self-sufficient in potato production
recently.22
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In a similar trade dispute, several shipments of Egyptian potatoes were
initially rejected at Russian ports in March and May 2018 due to the
cargos reportedly being infested with brown rot disease.23 On 31 May,
Egyptian officials rejected a cargo of Russian wheat because it exhib-
ited ergot contamination levels of 0.06 percent, exceeding the acceptable
level of 0.05 percent.24 Two days after the rejection of the cargo, the
Russian government announced that potato imports from specific Egyp-
tian regions that had previously been banned would resume on 6 June
2018. Conducting a second test on ergot levels of the respective Russian
wheat cargo, Egyptian officials concluded that the wheat contained 0.01
percent ergot and was therefore allowed to enter the country. However,
even as potato exports to Russia resumed, the potato trade volume still
declined from $120 million USD annually in 2014 through 2018 to $60
million USD in 2019 (see Fig. 1). While adjustments in trade policy
and phytosanitary standards by the Egyptian and Russian governments
are usually not explicitly implemented as a response or in retaliation to
steps taken by the other side, the sequence of policy changes displayed
above suggests that the food trade between the two countries is strongly
affected by political considerations.
In 2017, several reports published by Reuters portrayed widespread
corruption in the Egyptian food procurement system, with government
officials allegedly taking bribes in order to guarantee seamless passage
of wheat into Egypt.25 While the effort to curb corruption resulted in
arrests of several government officials responsible for Egypt’s food supply,
disputes over ergot levels in wheat cargos and adjustments to the quality
inspection procedures employed by the GASC continue to cause friction
within Egypt’s food trade. However, it can be expected that Russia will
remain the uncontested top supplier of wheat to Egypt and the GASC
due to its competitively priced wheat and the freight cost advantages it
enjoys in comparison to competing origins such as the United States or
France.
3.2 Turkey
Turkey is Russia’s most important trading partner in the MENA region
with an average annual food trade volume of $3.15 billion USD from
2017 to 2019 (see Fig. 1). Food trade, however, constituted only 13
percent of total trade between the two countries over the past decade,
as Turkey—a country dependent on energy imports—predominantly
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buys natural gas and crude oil from Russia, making energy trade the
prior component in the economic relationship between the two coun-
tries located at the Black Sea. Turkey is mostly self-sufficient in wheat
and barley production, while total corn consumption exceeds domestic
production by around 40 percent. However, grains and wheat in partic-
ular still account for more than 55 percent of Turkey’s food imports from
Russia (see Fig. 2), with excess wheat quantities being processed into
wheat flour, which Turkey exports to destination markets in the MENA
region, foremost Iraq, as well as Syria and Yemen. With a market share
of 20 percent and exports worth $1 billion USD per year, Turkey is
the world’s largest wheat flour exporter, followed by Kazakhstan (10.5






















Fig. 2 Russia’s Agri-Food trade with Turkey (Source UN Comtrade. Interna-
tional Trade Statistics Database. https://comtrade.un.org/, Accessed 18 August
2020)
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Similar to Egypt, Turkey’s grain imports are managed by a state
procurement agency, the Turkish Grain Board (TMO). The TMO covers
Turkey’s wheat and feed corn imports and also purchases feed barley
if domestic production does not meet consumption. While the TMO,
like its Egyptian counterpart, predominantly purchases Russian wheat,
it contrasts the GASC by sourcing grain from smaller Russian shallow
water ports located at the Azov Sea and up the Don River, most notably
the ports Azov and Rostov-on-Don. Shipping grain using large panamax
vessels enables economies of scale if geographically distant destination
markets are supplied. Turkey, however, is located in close geograph-
ical proximity to the Russian grain export facilities and the TMO thus
purchases numerous smaller parcels of between 10,000 and 30,000
tonnes in its grain tenders. Grain exports from Russia’s shallow water
ports show particularly strong seasonality patterns as some port facilities
become inoperable in the winter months due to cold temperatures.27
In spite of the generally strong economic entanglement between Russia
and Turkey, bilateral food trade was highly affected by political tensions
between the two countries in recent years.28 On 24 November 2015, a
Russian fighter jet operating in Syria was downed by the Turkish military
close to the country’s border. In response, Russia introduced an exten-
sive package of sanctions against Turkey, including a ban on imports of
Turkish food products such as tomatoes, onions, cucumbers, grapes, apri-
cots, apples, chicken products, and salt, while imports of lemons and nuts
remained unrestricted just like the energy trade that is central to the bilat-
eral trade relationship.29 After these trade restrictions took effect on 1
January 2016, the Kremlin announced in late June 2016 that Ankara had
apologised for downing the military jet. Subsequently, after a meeting
between the two countries’ presidents in St. Petersburg in early August
2016, the intent to ‘normalise’ the bilateral relationship and a gradual
lifting of the Russian import restrictions were announced.30
As a consequence of the implemented trade restrictions, Russia’s food
imports from Turkey decreased by more than 50 percent, from $1.5
billion USD per year between 2011 and 2015 to $663 million USD in
2016 (Fig. 2). Conversely, Russian food exports to Turkey only showed
a modest decrease of around 15 percent in 2016. After the agreement
to gradually resume food trade in late 2016, Russia’s food imports from
Turkey rebounded to around $1.25 billion USD per year in 2017 through
2019, still standing below the levels recorded prior to 2016. This gap
in trade volume is almost entirely resulting from diminished imports
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of Turkish tomatoes, which remained restricted after 2016. Exempting
tomatoes from the resumption of food trade corresponds to an effort
by the Russian government to support domestic tomato production to
ultimately reach self-sufficiency. Indeed, Russian vegetable greenhouse
production grew by around 12 percent annually over the past five years.31
As Russia’s ban on Turkish tomato imports remained in place, Turkey
removed Russian food products, most notably wheat, corn, and sunflower
oil, from its tax-free import licence list on 15 March 2017, which effec-
tively barred all Russian food exports to Turkey.32 Following another
meeting between the state leaders in Sochi, Russian food exports to
Turkey resumed in May 2017, while the ban on Turkish tomato imports
was, however, only partially relaxed and converted to an import quota
that came into effect on 1 November 2017.33 This new policy regime
allowed only a small number of Turkish companies to sell tomatoes to
Russia, which prompted Ankara to threaten a similar limitation on the
number of Russian companies accepted to ship food products to Turkey
on 19 March 2018.34 In late April 2018, the limitation on the number
of trading companies allowed to sell tomatoes to Russia was finally
removed, while the import quota remained unchanged until 28 March
2019, when a tripling of the quota to 150,000 tonnes was announced.
This policy adjustment followed an announcement by the Turkish govern-
ment to implement a 5,000-tonne tax-free import quota per year for beef
imports from Russia.35 A further increase of the Russian import quota
to 200,000 tonnes was announced on 26 February 2020. However, as
Turkish tomato exports to Russia amounted to around 340,000 tonnes
per year before 2016 and in light of Russia’s expansion of greenhouse
vegetable production over the past five years, a further increase or abol-
ishment of the import quota is likely to have little effect on Turkey’s total
tomato exports to Russia.
3.3 Saudi Arabia
Until 2016, food trade between Russia and Saudi Arabia was practi-
cally limited to Russian barley exports (Fig. 3). For several decades,
Saudi Arabia has been the world’s largest barley importer with annual
imports of around 7.5 million tonnes and a market share of around 30
percent.36 Today, Saudi Arabia is entirely dependent on the import of
barley, which is used as animal feed in the country. Since the early 2000s,
Saudi Arabia sources around 40 percent of its barley from the Black Sea



















Fig. 3 Russia’s Agri-Food trade with Saudi Arabia (Source UN Comtrade.
International Trade Statistics Database. https://comtrade.un.org/, Accessed 18
August 2020)
region, primarily from Ukraine, followed by Russia. In particular years,
the Black Sea market share has even exceeded 60 percent. While Saudi
Arabia is still the top destination for Russian barley exports, its share
has decreased from 60 percent between 2011 and 2015 to 40 percent
since 2016, while exports to other MENA countries, particularly Iran and
Jordan, increased substantially.
Currently, Saudi Arabia is also among the top 20 wheat importers
in the world. However, the country only started importing grain on a
large scale in 2008. In the early 1980s, Saudi Arabia had formulated
an extensive self-sufficiency policy encouraging and supporting domestic
wheat production projects, which were entirely based on irrigation.37 This
policy enabled the country to indeed become a sizeable wheat exporter
between 1985 and 1994,38 before domestic wheat production was scaled
back to only supply the domestic market. Due to serious concerns about
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depleting water reserves, the irrigation-intensive wheat production was
gradually phased out between 2007 and 2016. During this time period,
Saudi Arabia’s wheat imports increased steadily to ultimately reach 3.4
million tonnes annually. In November 2015, the Saudi Grains Organi-
zation (SAGO) was established to manage the country’s grain imports.39
The SAGO has a monopoly on the import of milling wheat and is respon-
sible for the vast barley imports, as well. Feed corn, of which Saudi Arabia
is also a major importer, is imported by private companies. Similar to
the countries discussed previously, the SAGO employs a tender system to
purchase grains on the international market. Compared to its counter-
parts in Egypt and Turkey, the SAGO issues tenders rather infrequently
(i.e. roughly every two months) and then buys large quantities at once.
After years of bilateral negotiations, Russian wheat was approved to
be offered in SAGO tenders on 8 August 2019.40 Precisely, tolerated
bug damage levels for Russian wheat were adjusted from a practically
prohibitive 0 percent level to a manageable level of 0.5 percent. The deci-
sion was announced after samples of Russian wheat were sent to Saudi
Arabia in late 2018 and multiple meetings between government officials
had taken place to discuss amending the quality specification. After Saudi
Arabia became a wheat importer, Russian wheat was initially allowed to
enter the country. However, a Russian wheat cargo exhibiting strong
contamination with the sunn pest on arrival prompted the government
to effectively ban Russian wheat in 2012.41 Following re-approval, the
first two cargos of Russian wheat purchased in SAGO tenders were sent
to Saudi Arabia in April and May 2020.42
The opening of the Saudi Arabian market for Russian wheat must be
seen in the context of a steadily improving relationship between the two
countries in recent years. After bilateral relations reached a low point due
to opposing involvements in the Syrian civil war, Saudi Arabia and Russia,
the two largest crude oil exporters worldwide, initially started to coop-
erate in oil markets in 2016 in view of crude oil prices falling to historic
low levels.43 An agreement to cut oil production between the Organiza-
tion of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)—which is virtually led by
Saudi Arabia—and Russia was signed on 10 December 2016, resulting in
rising oil prices in the following years. Similarly, food exports from Russia
to Saudi Arabia, which had halved from around $500 million USD annu-
ally in 2012 through 2015 to $250 million USD in 2016, returned to
previous levels (see Fig. 3). Additionally, since 2016, Russia’s food exports
to Saudi Arabia show a gradual diversification, as cocoa products, as well
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as poultry, started to be exported to Saudi Arabia in 2017 and 2018,
respectively. This resulted in a decreasing share of barley in Russia’s food
exports to Saudi Arabia, from 95 percent in 2014 to 68 percent in 2019.
On 14 October 2019, during the first state visit by the Russian pres-
ident Vladimir Putin to Riyadh since 2007, the heads of state signed
a comprehensive Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) aiming to
further improve the bilateral relationship. Alongside various agreements
on joint investments and expanded cooperation, both governments reaf-
firmed their intent to increase the mutual food trade. Particularly, the
Russian side expressed interest in the export of animal and dairy products,
among others, while Saudi Arabia proclaimed the intent to export fish and
shrimp products, as well as fruit and dates to Russia.44 During a preceding
bilateral meeting in early September 2019, the Russian Minister for Agri-
culture had underlined the goal of quadrupling Russian food exports to
Saudi Arabia to reach USD 2 billion in 2024.45 The MoU should be
seen in the context of his ambitious goal regarding the food trade volume
between the two countries.
3.4 Iran
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, there was bilateral political will
to expand trade relations between the Russian Federation and the Islamic
Republic of Iran (Iran, hereafter). The ‘Look to the East’ policy defined
by Tehran in 2006,46 promoted the improvement of Iran’s economic
and political relations with Russia and China after many years of a
no-alliance policy.47 However, while the bilateral economic relationship
remains insignificant if total trade is considered, agricultural and food
trade has increased substantially since 2017 (see Fig. 4). In 2018, Iran
had imported food products worth $856 million USD from Russia, while
food exports to Russia showed a volume of $450 million USD.48 As
such, the Russo-Iranian food trade accounted for around two-thirds of
the total trade between 2017 and 2019. Russia and Iran both have large
oil and natural gas reservoirs, and both depend on fossil fuel exports.
However, Iran has an arid to semi-arid climate and is confronted with
severe water scarcity issues. Despite this fact, Iran has implemented self-
sufficiency policies, particularly for its domestic grain production, which
is affected by varying levels of precipitation. As Russia turned into a major
grain exporter, Iran has started to diversify its cereal import portfolio
by relying more on Russia, while imports from other countries remain


















Fig. 4 Russia’s Agri-Food trade with Iran (Source UN Comtrade. International
Trade Statistics Database. https://comtrade.un.org/, Accessed 18 August 2020)
substantial, as well.49 In 2018, maize was Iran’s primary food import
from Russia followed by sunflower oil and barley. The top food exports
from Iran to Russia are fruits, nuts, and vegetables. It must be added that
there is a volatile pattern of Iranian wheat imports from Russia, which
mainly depends on the domestic wheat production in Iran and thus on
annual precipitation levels (see Fig. 4).50
While Russia and Iran do not have a land border, they are connected
by the Caspian Sea and its sea transport facilities. The food trade over the
Caspian Sea is mainly conducted via the Russian port of Astrakhan and the
ports of Amirabad and Anzali in Iran. However, bilateral seaborne trade
is impeded by a lack of adequate infrastructure, as well as bureaucratic
hurdles. For instance, the available port facilities are not well prepared
for handling container trade, as well as the storage of fresh agricul-
tural products.51 Furthermore, non-Russian ships are only allowed to use
inland waterways in Russia after paying a fee of $30,000 USD. As this
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fee is essentially prohibitive, non-Russian vessels need to either unload
cargos at the ports of Astrakhan or Makhachkala or switch to Russian
vessels.52 Facing these impediments, a mutual protocol aimed at the
improvement of trade infrastructure and the reduction of bureaucratic
hurdles was signed in 2020.53 Furthermore, the first permanent container
shipping line between Iran and Russia was planned to be established in
September 2020, which could increase the trade of fresh food products.54
Further reports have announced the construction of additional Russian
port infrastructure in Lagan at the Caspian Sea, which could also facil-
itate food trade with Iran.55 Railway and road infrastructure between
Russia and Iran is not well developed and the contribution of non-marine
transport of agricultural commodities is currently low. On the Iranian
side, the constant intervention of the government in the domestic agri-
cultural market is another issue that impedes the long-term provision of
fruit and vegetable exports to the Russian market, as a state organisa-
tion called the Market Control Centre frequently implements restrictions
on the export of agricultural and food commodities once food shortages
appear in Iran.56
Despite the deficiencies in transport infrastructure, bilateral food trade
has increased in recent years and can be expected to further develop in
the future. After years of negotiations, on 27 October 2019, a free trade
agreement between the Eurasian Economic Union and Iran took effect.57
This was an important decision for expanding Iran’s trade relationships
with former members of the Soviet Union, and Russia in particular. The
main objective of the agreement is the liberalisation and facilitation of the
trade between the parties through, inter alia, reduction, or elimination
of tariff and non-tariff barriers.58 This interim preferential trade agree-
ment should lead to a free trade agreement within three years (Article 1.3,
§3). At its primary stage, the EAEU-Iran interim preferential trade agree-
ment (PTA) covers approximately 55 percent of the total trade between
the partners and focuses on selected agricultural and industrial products.
Iran grants preferential treatment for meat and other food commodi-
ties, as well as metals, electronics, and other items. The average import
tariff applied by Iran to imports from the EAEU is reduced from 22.4
percent to 15.4 percent for manufactured commodities and from 32.2
percent to 13.2 percent for agricultural commodities. A total of 360
commodity categories are covered in the agreement. Furthermore, Iran
receives preferential treatment for exports of fruits and vegetables and
other selected products. The average import tariff applied by the EAEU
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on Iran is reduced for agricultural commodities from 9.6 percent to 4.6
percent and for industrial commodities from 8 percent to 4.7 percent,
with 502 commodity categories being covered.59 The available data on
tariff changes show, however, that barley and corn are not included in the
list of goods with reduced tariffs by Iran at this stage. Conversely, there
are complaints that the agreement disregards goods that are important
to Iranian producers and exporters. While tariff reductions on additional
goods could be considered in the next round of negotiations,60 the
trade between Iran and EAEU has already increased compared to the
same period before the agreement, despite the presence of U.S. sanctions
against Iran since 2018.61 A first study investigating the effects of this
EAEU-Iran free trade agreement employing a gravity model framework
projected a higher increase of exports by EAEU members to Iran than by
Iran to the other EAEU members.62
4 Outlook
This chapter examined Russia’s food trade with its top four destination
markets in the MENA region. Food trade is the most important compo-
nent of the bilateral economic relationships with Saudi Arabia, Iran, and
Egypt, which are energy net-exporters like Russia. Regarding Turkey, the
sole energy net importer among the considered cases, food trade only
accounts for 13 percent of total trade with Russia, which is dominated
by energy trade. In all four cases, Russian food exports to the MENA
clearly outweigh its food imports. Due to unfavourable climatic condi-
tions, the majority of MENA countries are unable to produce enough
grain to meet the consumption of growing populations and Russia thus
emerged as a main supplier of wheat, as well as barley and maize for the
neighbouring region. After Saudi Arabia approved the import of Russian
wheat in August 2019, only few MENA countries continue to disallow
the import of Russian wheat, most notably Algeria, the world’s third-
largest wheat importer, as well as Iraq.63 However, regardless of Algeria
approving wheat imports from Russia, its overall grain exports to the
MENA region are unlikely to increase much further in the future, as the
region already sources most of its grain from Russia or competing Black
Sea exporters, such as Ukraine, Kazakhstan, or Romania.
As a consequence, a goal outlined by Russian trade officials is the
diversification of Russia’s food exports, and thus the development of
new destination markets for food export products other than grains and
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vegetable oils. In this respect, Russia recently started to export notable
amounts of chocolate products and poultry meat to Saudi Arabia, which
had previously almost exclusively imported barley from Russia. This diver-
sification in Russia’s exports to the high-income gulf country follows an
improvement in the bilateral relations due to a fruitful cooperation in the
energy market since 2016 and corresponds to Russia’s proclaimed effort
to quadruple food exports to Saudi Arabia by 2024. Since 2018, growing
volumes of chocolate products and lamb meat have also been exported
to Iran. Russo-Iranian food trade shows a clear upward trend after Iran’s
free trade agreement. Regarding Egypt and Turkey, total food trade does
not exhibit a clear upwards or downwards trend over the past decade.
The considered food trade relationships are strongly shaped by polit-
ical disputes and/or the improvement of diplomatic ties. Russia appears
to use import restrictions on specific food products as an instrument
of support for domestic production to substitute its imports, reach self-
sufficiency and even gain the capacity to export, an approach that several
studies focusing on Russia’s import restrictions versus Western countries
in 2014 have previously analysed.64 The trade dispute surrounding the
imports of Turkish tomatoes especially illustrates how Russian import
quotas are maintained to (successfully) encourage domestic greenhouse
tomato production. Regarding food trade between Russia and the MENA
countries, food exports are often restricted using non-tariff measures, as
products are rejected over concerns about food safety, product quality
or the alleged non-compliance with prevailing phytosanitary standards.
While it must be expected that non-compliant food cargos be rejected
from government agencies that control the quality of food imports, the
sequence of cargo rejections in the considered cases suggests that the
product quality tests are partly influenced by bilateral political relations
or previous adjustments in trade policies or quality standards introduced
by the other side.
By exporting wheat and other grains to the import-dependent MENA
region, Russia has achieved building meaningful economic trade relation-
ships with countries that are also primarily energy-exporters and thus
competitors. After reaching low points in 2016 due to inter alia Russia’s
involvement in the Syrian civil war, a stand-off in international energy
markets and various disputes over product quality, the food trade relation-
ships with the selected MENA countries have largely improved recently.
While the food trade was repeatedly disrupted by political interventions in
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recent years, its central component, grain trade, can be expected to remain
stable in the long run due to its unequivocal mutual benefit. Because
of climatic and geographic advantages, Russia can competitively produce
and ship grains to the MENA countries that lack sufficient production of
grains to meet domestic consumption.
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Historically, the U.S.-Russia agricultural trade relationship has been one-
sided with the United States as the exporting country. Starting in the
1970s, the former USSR became a prominent importer of grain from the
United States. For the remainder of the Cold War, even though the bilat-
eral political relationship was tense, the United States supplied and even
increased grain shipments to its adversary. Since August 2014, however,
the U.S. has been almost entirely shut out of the Russian food market and
its 146 million consumers due to Russia’s embargo, called countersanc-
tions. Although Russia’s food embargo against the West has been widely
discussed in the media and among scholars, the fact is that even prior
to 2014, American agricultural exports to Russia already were already
declining in dollar amount and quantity. Russia’s 2014 food embargo
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merely took the agricultural trade relationship with the U.S. one step
further, to irrelevance.
This chapter examines whether political relations affect agricultural
trade. It surveys bilateral agricultural trade between the United States
and Russia, starting in the 1970s and continuing to the present.1 The
Cold War period suggests that political relations do not need to affect
food trade. The period since 2014 raises the question of whether it may
be possible to re-start agricultural exports to Russia based on the Cold
War precedent, or whether the post-Cold War pattern of convergence
will continue.
This historical survey leads to several conclusions. First, during the
Cold War, the link between the political relationship and food trade
often was weak. In other words, political relations between the United
States and Russia and agricultural trade were divergent, which means
that agricultural exports were maintained or increased even as the polit-
ical relationship deteriorated. Second, the divergence between worsening
political relations and increasing agricultural exports ended in the post-
Soviet period. Instead, the relationship between politics and agricultural
exports became convergent. With Putin in office, U.S. agricultural exports
have fallen into irrelevance, a trend that predates 2014 but has become
pronounced since 2014. To the extent that the U.S. ever had a ‘food
weapon’ in its arsenal, this lever to influence Russian behaviour going
forward would appear to be lost. The next section presents the analyt-
ical framework and subsequent sections examine the interplay between
political relations and agricultural trade during the Cold War 1970s and
1980s, the 1990s, and since 2000.
2 Analytical Framework
The analytical framework draws ideas from two literatures. The first,
Realism, holds that leaders act to ensure national security; national secu-
rity is in turn is a function of power and power is a function of military
strength. In short, national leaders are interested in maximising their own
national security and minimising the strength of an adversary. The second
literature argues that food may be weaponised to advance foreign policy
interests and national security. States frequently use food to enhance
power and when they do, government’s food exports are utilised to gain
economic, diplomatic, or security advantages.2 Paarlberg observes that
with regard to diplomatic or security advantages, exporters may use food
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power to reward allies or punish adversaries with embargoes. Importers
may adopt a defensive form of food power by reducing food imports or
diversifying their imports away from an adversary.3
Intuitively, one would think that trade follows political relations.
Indeed, Gowa argues that trade creates security externalities and for
that reason, trade is more likely to occur within alliances than across
alliances, especially in a bipolar world.4 That said, the fact is that the
United States exported strategically important food to its rival the USSR
during the Cold War. Broadly speaking, adversaries have different moti-
vations for trading with one another. One side tries to initiate trade to
lower tensions or to improve relations. The exporting side may want to
create dependence by the importer and thus gain potential leverage. The
importing side may want access to goods that it cannot produce itself or
are cost-prohibitive to produce. That said, the core motivation of state
security and preservation can also be threatened by international trade
with adversaries. In agricultural trade, for example, exporting food allows
that adversary to allocate resources to its military to make itself stronger
instead of growing food. A state that imports food from an adversary
helps its rival earn income that allows it to use that higher income for its
military. A rise in disposable income in an adversary state thereby lessens
the security of the first state.
Concerning bilateral relations between the United States and the
USSR, American presidents from the beginning considered the Soviet
regime to be illegitimate, but that does not mean that they were prepared
to dedicate resources to force its overthrow or replacement. Gaddis argues
that however distasteful the Soviet regime was, no U.S. president ever
tried for regime change in the USSR, even going so far as to help Soviet
leaders twice in their darkest hour.5 During 1921–1922, the United States
offered food aid to the nascent Soviet government instead of working for
the overthrow of Bolshevism; and in 1941, following Hitler’s attack on
the USSR, the United States sided with Stalin against Germany rather
than try to bring Stalinism to an end. The question, therefore, is not
merely why the United States did not press its advantage against its main
adversary in the post-World War II period, but also why it did not take
advantage of Soviet systemic weaknesses in later decades. In particular, it
is curious why did the U.S. not utilise its ‘food weapon’ against a rival
that suffered from chronic food shortages.
U.S. policymakers have been aware of their food power. The political-
isation of food trade dates has existed for decades. In the years following
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World War II, both food aid and commercial food sales were used repeat-
edly by the United States to support its foreign policy goals in different
regions of the world.6 The politicalisation of food aid dates to the 1950s.
The Eisenhower administration used food to exacerbate tensions between
the communist regime in East Germany and its population following
the death of Stalin in March 1953.7 In the early 1960s, the Kennedy
administration advocated making ‘full use of our agricultural abundance
in furtherance of U.S. foreign policy’.8
Commercial food sales were also politicised. In 1974, Secretary of
Agriculture Earl Butz referred to food as a ‘weapon’ that the U.S. should
utilise. In the early 1980s, conservative analysts in the U.S. recognised the
disadvantaged position the Soviets were in and called for using American
grain as leverage by threatening or actually withholding grain to change
Soviet international behaviour and to make the USSR pay an economic
price for violating international norms.9 Specifically, conservatives argued
that the grain weapon could be used to force a reduction in Soviet live-
stock herds that ultimately would affect meat consumption levels, with
the intent to foment consumers’ dissatisfaction with the Soviet regime.
Some evidence suggests that the food weapon was at least partially effec-
tive. Following the U.S. ban on grain sales to the USSR in 1980, the CIA
noted ‘a rising incidence of strikes related to food shortages in the 1980–
1982 period’, although the dysfunctional retail price and distribution
system also contributed to spotty food supplies.10 Thus, it is reasonable
to conclude that food exports are another weapon in states’ arsenals to
protect and project their interests.
3 Cold War Foreign Policy Context: 1970–1985
Dating from 1946, the USSR and the United States were adversaries
who during the next forty-five years would engage in espionage, assas-
sinations, coups, and support puppet governments in an effort to gain
a geopolitical advantage against the other. The Cold War represented
economic, psychological, ideological, and geopolitical warfare, stopping
just short of direct military conflict between the two countries. During the
second half of the 1970s and into the 1980s the Soviet Union reached
the apex of its global political influence and its military might. During
this period there was a significant increase in Soviet military forces. The
build-up included a dramatic increase in ICBMs; modernisation of the
navy, including the deployment of submarines with nuclear warheads,
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nuclear-powered attack submarines, and an expansion in the number of
guided missile cruisers, frigates, destroyers, and aircraft carriers; the devel-
opment of intermediate nuclear weapons; the modernisation of ground
forces and ground attack capability; the deployment of advanced strategic
bombers and attack aircraft; and the development of air defences. The
Soviet intent was to challenge U.S. hegemony on the land, sea, air, and in
nuclear force. Improvements in Soviet military capability were also accom-
panied by the spread of political influence into Central America, North
Africa, and the Middle East, an improvement in relations with India and
China, and forging alliances with Vietnam and North Korea.11 By the late
1970s-early 1980s the USSR reached nuclear parity or even surpassed the
United States based on sheer numbers of nuclear weapons and warheads.
In short, the national security of the United States was threatened by
Soviet advances militarily and politically.
Although the 1970s is sometimes called the ‘decade of détente’, in
fact, it was at its height only during 1972-1974. By mid-decade, the
détente relationship already showed signs of unraveling. Soviet support
for rebels in regional conflicts such as Angola, Ethiopia, and Mozam-
bique strained the relationship and in the opinion of U.S. leaders violated
the 1972 political ‘code of conduct’. Soviet pressure on Poland in the
wake of widespread protests in 1976 led President Gerald Ford to stop
referring to détente during his reelection campaign, reflecting the fact that
conservatives were souring on détente and its supposed benefits. In 1979,
the U.S. raised alarms that the Soviets were stationing combat troops in
Cuba. Although in many ways that crisis was manufactured and did not
constitute a new phase of Soviet adventurism in the Caribbean, it did
cause enough of a ruckus as to prevent the SALT II Treaty from being
approved in 1979,12 and following the Soviet’s December 1979 inva-
sion of Afghanistan, the treaty was removed from consideration in the
Senate. The U.S. also raised objections over Soviet support for Sandin-
istas in Nicaragua that threatened American interests in Central America.
The decade ended with the Soviet Union invading Afghanistan which at
the time was feared by U.S. conservatives to be a drive to cut off the
U.S. from Saudi oil. By the end of the 1970s, U.S. political willingness
to cooperate with the USSR had waned.
The first half of the 1980s witnessed the Cold War at its coldest. There
was a general war scare among the general population in both the U.S.
and USSR. In the West, the peace movement ramped up as the super-
powers seemed headed for conflict. President Ronald Reagan distrusted
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the Soviet leaders and accused them of being ‘the focus of evil in the
modern world’ and being behind all of the global political instability
that was occurring in different regions.13 Numerous crises exacerbated
tensions: the imposition of martial law in Poland and a threatened Soviet
invasion over the challenge represented by Solidarity to communist rule
in 1980; the standoff over the deployment of U.S. medium-range missiles
in Europe in 1982–1983; and the shooting down of a Korean passenger
plane in August 1983. After August 1983 then-General Secretary Yurii
Andropov indicated that he was done talking to the Americans. The
Soviets stationed submarines armed with SLBMs off the East coast that
could reach Washington, DC in less than ten minutes. Muscle-flexing in
Berlin in 1984 led to the shooting death of an American soldier near the
Berlin Wall.
The existential threat posed by Soviet nuclear forces in the early 1980s
is easily forgotten today but was very real then. Coit Blacker noted that
in the early 1980s the Soviets could devote 3,000–4,000 warheads from
their SS17, SS18, and SS19 ICBMs that could destroy 90 percent of the
U.S. ICBM force. He argued that ‘the development of this Soviet option
[to strike first] deeply disturbs some Western military and political leaders
because….it enhances the Kremlin’s ability to “intimidate” or to “coerce”
the United States and its allies during times of severe tension or crisis’.14
Such a strike would not only destroy U.S. retaliatory capacity but render
its economy and society unable to function. Together with Secretary of
State Alexander Haig, Reagan’s intent was ‘the management of global
Soviet power’, a strategy, which relied more on the stick than the carrot.15
In reaction to these trends, during Reagan’s first term, the U.S. engaged
in a significant military modernisation and introduced new nuclear land-
based, sea-based, and air-based weapons to counter the Soviet military
build-up. The Strategic Defence Initiative, or ‘Star Wars’ as it came to be
called, was directed at the Soviet Union and threatened to neutralise its
nuclear deterrent.
Despite a rising political and security threat, the United States sold
wheat and feed grain to the adversary who threatened its survival. To be
sure, rivals trade with each other during periods when they are not at
war.16 That said, there had never been a global rivalry on the scale of
the Cold War. Thus, Soviet-American bilateral food trade was paradoxical
because the two nations were competing globally while simultaneously
engaging in trade which helped the other country.
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The seeming paradox of American food exports to the country that
most threatened it is compounded by two other factors. First, in the
1970s and 1980s, the U.S. was the global food hegemon, accounting
for 55 percent of international wheat and coarse grain exports in 1980.17
France and Canada were second and third, respectively, accounting for 10
percent of global wheat and coarse grain exports in that same year.18 In
other words, the U.S. had the food resources that could not be matched
by any other country. It had the leverage, at least in theory, to disrupt
Soviet society and foster political instability. In the current vernacular, the
U.S. could have worked for regime change. Second, the U.S. had options
about to whom to sell its surplus grain. The U.S. was not forced to sell
grain to the Soviet Union. There were other potential and real customers
besides the Soviet Union: Eastern bloc satellites were eager customers;
surplus grain could be offered as concessionary food aid; or surplus grain
could be commercially sold to developing nations. Members of OPEC
in particular were interested in the purchase of American wheat.19 Thus,
while the U.S. was interested in the economic advantages of exporting its
surplus grain, there was nothing that dictated that the purchaser had to
be the Soviet Union.
4 U.S. Agricultural Exports to USSR, 1972–1984
When political relations and agricultural trade move in the same direction
I refer to it as convergence; divergence occurs when political relations and
agricultural trade move in opposite directions. The 1972–1985 period is
an example of convergence (1972–1974) and then divergence (1975–
1985), during which the political relationship deteriorated but U.S.
agricultural exports to the USSR reached unprecedented levels in value
and quantity.
4.1 1972–1974
In 1972, at the beginning of détente, former Secretary of State Henry
Kissinger had wanted to cultivate Soviet dependence on U.S. grain and
link trade to Soviet behaviour in Jewish emigration and other foreign
policy.20 In the second half of the decade, that dependence certainly
existed, but the U.S. did not deploy its food weapon to its political or
security advantage.
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As political relations warmed in the early détente period, the United
States extended a $750 million USD Commodity Credit Corporation
loan in 1972 to the Soviet Union to purchase U.S. grain. The agreement
included an understanding that U.S. cargo ships would be used.21 The
grain agreement required the Soviets to purchase a minimum of $200
million USD in each year of the three-year deal. In reality, the Soviets
utilised the entire $750 million USD credit in year one by misrepresenting
their true needs. Ultimately, in 1972 the Soviets purchased 25 percent of
the American wheat harvest at subsidised prices, the largest grain purchase
in history, as well as large quantities of corn and soybeans.22 The total
purchase value exceeded $1 billion USD. When the full extent of Soviet
purchases became known, the Nixon administration was embarrassed and
American consumers were faced with higher retail prices for bread. The
deal became known as the ‘great grain robbery’.23
In 1974, after another large Soviet purchase, and remembering the
bad experience of 1972, President Gerald Ford canceled $500 million
USD in export contracts with the USSR in order to ensure sufficient
domestic supply and to prevent further food inflation.24 As a result, the
value of agricultural exports to the USSR dropped nearly 70 percent
compared to 1973. Again in 1975, the U.S. government suspended
export contracts with the Soviets during a record American wheat harvest.
American farmers claimed that the export ban cost them $200 million
USD from lower domestic prices and lost business abroad.25 The 1975
suspension was short-lived, however, as farm states organised to oppose
the move. Thus, the embargo lasted only two months and for all of 1975
the value of U.S. agricultural exports to the USSR jumped to over $1.1
billion USD, beginning a string of years when agricultural sales surpassed
$1 billion USD.
4.2 1975–1984
Another poor Soviet harvest led to a new five-year deal in October
1975 to buy American grain (1976–1981). The agreement almost fell
apart over the U.S. insistence on a long-term commitment which the
Soviets initially rejected.26 The final agreement required that the Soviet
Union purchase a minimum of six million metric tonnes (mmt) of grain
each year, evenly divided between corn and wheat. If U.S. production
surpassed 225 mmt, the Soviets could buy up to 8 mmt without consul-
tation; above 8 mmt required prior notification and permission from the
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Table 1 U.S. Agricultural Exports to USSR, 1975–1979 (dollar values are
USD)
Total value of U.S.
agricultural exports to
USSR
Value of US grain
exports to USSR
U.S. grain sales to USSR
(million metric tonnes)
1975 $1.17 billion $1.13 billion 7.61
1976 $1.60 billion $1.46 billion 11.60
1977 $1.05 billion $852.5 million 6.86
1978 $1.76 billion $1.47 billion 13.44
1979 $3.00 billion $2.39 billion 18.87
Source Kathryn A. Zeimetz, USSR Agricultural Trade, Statistical Bulletin 808 (Washington, DC:
United States Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, 1991), 36, 38
U.S. government.27 In reality, the Soviets purchased much more than
the minimum stipulated in the agreement. In 1976 they were allowed to
purchase 11.6 mmt of grain, 13.4 mmt in 1978, and 18.8 mmt in 1979
without objection from the U.S. government. The dollar value of U.S.
agricultural exports to the USSR during 1975–1979 is shown in Table 1.
The fact that agricultural trade did not suffer even as the détente rela-
tionship deteriorated after 1974 reflects divergence between politics and
economics. Despite a rise in bilateral political tensions, U.S. agricultural
exports to the USSR remained strong, surpassing $1 billion USD each
year during 1975–1979 and reaching $3 billion USD in 1979. Iron-
ically, both rivals helped each other. Soviet imports of American grain
contributed to the rise of American food power. The U.S. share of world
agricultural trade increased from 13.5 percent in 1970 to 17 percent in
1978. Moreover, during the 1970s the U.S. accounted for more than 80
percent of the increase in global grain exports.28 Conversely, American
grain exports allowed the USSR to continue to allocate large amount
of money and other resources to its military and towards expanding its
influence around the world.
Thus, the second half of the 1970s witnessed divergence between polit-
ical relations and agricultural exports, which meant that America’s use of
food as a weapon of foreign policy was weak and the deterioration in
the political relationship became secondary to economic considerations.
If U.S. security considerations had dominated, there certainly were avail-
able levers given the fact that U.S. grain accounted for over 60 percent
of Soviet grain imports from 1972 through 1979.29 In the 1978/1979
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agricultural year, U.S. grain exports accounted for 67 percent of Soviet
grain imports.30
The 1980s began with a U.S. grain embargo in retaliation for
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. President Jimmy Carter suspended
delivery of grain sales in December 1979 for purchases in excess of the 8
mmt permitted in the 1975 grain agreement. Paarlberg notes that ‘never
before had U.S. food exports to the USSR been suspended in pursuit of
a noncommercial, foreign policy objective’.31 It appeared that the ‘food
weapon’ had been taken from the shelf.
The U.S. grain embargo was an important symbolic act, along with
the U.S. boycott of the 1980 Olympics in Moscow. But the embargo
was not successful. This occurrence in and of itself is not surprising
since the literature on sanctions is generally negative about the effec-
tiveness of sanctions.32 Lindsay places sanctions into five categories:
(1) compliance—to alter another state’s behaviour; (2) subversion—to
remove the target’s leaders; (3) deterrence—to dissuade the target from
repeating disputed behaviour in the future; (4) international symbolism—
to send a message to other members of the world community; and (5)
domestic symbolism—to increase domestic support and thwart domestic
criticism of its policies.33 Carter’s grain embargo was most concerned
with domestic symbolism and according to Paarlberg was not intended to
force the Soviets out of Afghanistan but simply to punish them for their
behaviour.34
The U.S. grain embargo was not successful for a variety of reasons.
First, the U.S. was unable to enforce an embargo coalition and thus
there was considerable ‘leakage’, meaning other states filled the U.S. void.
Canada, Australia, Argentina, and the European Community all expanded
their grain sales to the Soviet Union following the announcement of the
U.S. embargo. Even India sold grain to the USSR for the first time, a
modest 2 mmt. In short, the Soviet Union was able to substitute U.S.
grain and thus paid a very small price for its ‘adventurism’ in Afghanistan.
Second, the embargo motivated Soviet leaders to lessen their dependence
on U.S. grain, although doing so proved more difficult. During the first
half of the 1980s, the U.S. share of Soviet grain imports did not exceed 40
percent, compared to more than 60 percent in the 1970s. Third, the U.S.
grain embargo was not expanded to Warsaw Pact countries to prevent
‘leakage’ to the USSR. Instead, the U.S. expanded grain sales to Eastern
Europe from an original 16 mmt to 18 mmt despite favourable harvests
in the communist bloc.35
CHAPTER 10: AGRI-FOOD TRADE BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES … 289
Perhaps most important, the embargo did not even meet its limited
goal of punishing the Soviets for their behaviour in Afghanistan. A long-
term ‘leak proof’ embargo combined with a reduction in agricultural
exports may have forced the Soviet leaders to reallocate resources away
from the military, but that was not done for domestic political reasons
in the U.S. Carter’s embargo was designed to trigger a distress slaughter
of livestock due to feed shortages, thereby affecting Soviet meat supply
and consumption. Instead, in 1980 the Soviet Union fed 126 mmt of
grain to livestock, 1 mmt more than the year before.36 In reality, there
was no distress slaughter. In the Russian Republic during 1979–1984 the
number of long-horned cattle rose from 58.6 million to 60 million head;
the number of dairy cows remained constant at 22.2 million; and the
number of pigs increased from 36.4 million to 38.7 million.37 Finally, in
April 1981, four months into the new administration of Ronald Reagan,
the arch-anti-communist, the U.S. embargo ended.38
The five-year period 1980–1984 period overall witnessed significant
divergence between political relations, which fell to their nadir, and agri-
cultural trade which increased. Instead of the U.S. maximising its leverage
at a time when the enemy was vulnerable, the value of U.S. agricul-
tural exports increased from $1.1 billion USD in 1980 to $2.8 billion
USD in 1984. Even as the two sides threatened each other militarily,
the volume of U.S. grain sales increased from 6.6 mmt in 1980 to over
18 mmt in 1984. Moreover, U.S. grain sales averaged 10.7 mmt during
1980–1984, more than double the level of the détente years 1970–1974
when the political relationship warmed. During 1980–1984, the average
annual value of America’s agricultural exports to the Soviet Union was
$1.80 billion USD, higher than the $1.69 billion USD average during
1975–1979, as shown in Table 2.
As the 1980s came to a close, U.S. agricultural exports to the USSR
were at their peak. During 1988–1991 U.S. agricultural exports totaled
more than $10.55 billion USD, more than in any other four-year period.
This high point in U.S. agricultural exports to the Soviet Union reflected
the partial opening of the Soviet economy and improving bilateral polit-
ical relations. During the 1988–1991 period, political relations and
agricultural trade were convergent.
Rising American agricultural exports also reflected political support by
the Reagan and Bush administrations for President Mikhail Gorbachev
and his perestroika efforts, particularly in foreign policy where he was
making unilateral concessions in Eastern Europe and supporting the U.S.
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Table 2 U.S. Agricultural Exports to USSR, 1980–1984 (dollar values are
USD)
Total value of U.S.
agricultural exports to
USSR
Value of U.S. grain
exports to USSR
U.S. grain sales to USSR
(million metric tonnes)
1980 $1.13 billion $1.02 billion 6.66
1981 $1.68 billion $1.57 billion 9.65
1982 $1.87 billion $1.63 billion 11.42
1983 $1.47 billion $1.20 billion 7.86
1984 $2.87 billion $2.62 billion 18.26
Source Kathryn A. Zeimetz, USSR Agricultural Trade, Statistical Bulletin 808 (Washington, DC:
United States Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, 1991), 37, 39
in its first Gulf War against Iraq.39 Unfortunately for Gorbachev, the
broad-based economic assistance that he had counted on was not forth-
coming from the United States, a fact that was deeply disappointing to
Soviet leaders.40 But the Americans were willing to sell food, and thus
agricultural trade reached a single year high point in 1989 at $3.59 billion
USD. In that year, the USSR purchased over 21 mmt of American wheat
and corn.
5 1990s Foreign Policy Context
Following the breakup of the Soviet Union in December 1991, the
remainder of decade ushered in significant changes in world politics
and the U.S.-Russia bilateral relationship. The end of the Soviet Union
lowered bilateral political tensions and witnessed multilateral economic
cooperation as post-Soviet Russia joined international and regional organ-
isations. It also meant that the U.S.-USSR ideological competition that
had dominated world politics during the Cold War faded away. The zero-
sum game that had defined bilateral relations was replaced by a search
for mutual security, although this desire was often frustrated by mistrust
and misunderstanding especially with regard to political arrangements in
Europe.
Further, the collapse of the Soviet Union diminished military-strategic
competition. With the subsequent collapse of the Russian economy and
deep cuts in its military spending, Russia was no longer a global threat,
at least in conventional weaponry. Competition between the two nations
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was characterised by asymmetrical power in favour of the United States.41
One constant in the bilateral relationship was the U.S. as a provider of
economic assistance and as the dominant player in the global financial
system. In the late Gorbachev period and early post-Soviet period, polit-
ical leaders in Moscow were hoping for assistance from the U.S. along the
lines of the Marshall Plan, but by about 1994 it became clear that that
level of assistance would not be forthcoming.42
Even without a massive aid package that the Russians had hoped for,
the 1990s represented a honeymoon decade in U.S.-Russian relations
during which the relationship was warmer and more cooperative than at
any other time in the twentieth century. Russian President Boris Yeltsin
and U.S. President Bill Clinton were on a first name basis and met no
less than eight times during 1993–1999. The core reasons for this new
phase in the bilateral relationship were the demise of Marxist-Leninist
ideology that viewed international relations as inherently conflictual
between capitalist and socialist states, and the rise of a pro-Western vision
of national identity and foreign policy.43 Russia’s post-Soviet leaders saw
their country as part of Western civilisation whose identity had been
‘hijacked’ by the Bolsheviks and the Soviet system.44 Tsygankov argues
that the new concept of the post-Soviet identity emphasised partnership
with the West and was predicated on rapid membership in Western inter-
national organisations; radical economic reforms that would usher in a
market economy; and isolationism from the former Soviet region. This
new foreign policy concept was signed into law in 1993.45
During the decade, the two sides signed the START 2 arms control
treaty in 1993 and an agreement to ban chemical weapons in 1996;
adhered to the Nunn-Lugar programme to help Russia destroy its nuclear
weapons; and conducted on-site inspections to enforce the Intermediate-
range Nuclear Force treaty. The two sides also cooperated on the
construction of democracy, civil society, and human rights in Russia.
There were regular meetings between the Russian Foreign Minister and
the U.S. Secretary of State; and in 1995 regular meetings convened
between Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin and U.S. Vice
President Albert Gore. There were also economic achievements: a $24
billion USD aid package from the U.S. in 1992; an American-led G-
7 commitment for an aid package of more than $43 billion USD; the
rescheduling of $70 million USD of Soviet debt with the Paris Club;
and a U.S.-backed $10 billion USD aid package from the IMF in 1998.
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In short, the relationship moved from being defined by conflicting and
diverging interests to parallel and common interests.46
The improvement in bilateral relations did not imply an absence of
problems. The December 1993 Duma election witnessed the emergence
of powerful nationalist politicians that led to ‘a series of tactical conces-
sions that reflected the changing balance of domestic power’ away from
Westernism.47 In an embarrassing moment, Foreign Minister Andrei
Kozyrev had asked for a special session of NATO foreign ministers at
which he would presumably announce Russia’s membership in the Part-
nership for Peace. Instead, at the December 1994 meeting, Kozyrev
indicated that Russia was not yet ready to join. Then-Secretary of State
Warren Christopher recalls being ‘flabbergasted and embarrassed….Russia
was putting a thumb in our eye’.48 After the meeting, Kozyrev explained
to Christopher that hardliners had convinced Yeltsin not to join the
Partnership for Peace. Russia finally joined the Partnership for Peace in
May 1995. Russian leaders also complained about patronising and conde-
scending treatment by the United States, claims that would seem to be
justified given that the Clinton administration expected Russia to adopt
Western views of security for Europe. By 1995, pro-Western Foreign
Minister Kozyrev was openly asking the West whether it wanted ‘Part-
nership or Cold Peace’ between the two countries by way of complaining
about U.S. unilateralism in the Balkans.49 There were other tensions—
U.S. support for an independent Kosovo in 1997, economic aid that
Russia felt was insufficient before and after the 1998 financial crisis in
Russia, and the U.S. bombing of Serbia in 1999, which was an ally of
Russia.
The decision to expand NATO to include former communist satellite
nations in Eastern Europe in 1999 was especially contentious. Christo-
pher notes that Russia’s opposition to NATO enlargement seemed
to centre around a lack of respect from the United States. From
Christopher’s own descriptions, the U.S. essentially dictated to Russia
that NATO would enlarge and bring in former communist nations
in Europe.50 Christopher’s successor, Secretary Madeline Albright, also
noted that ‘part of our strategy, of course, was to convince the Russians
that enlargement would go forward with or without their agreement’.51
Robert Gates, who served as Secretary of Defence from 2006 to 2011,
observed that during the 1990s, ‘we did not take Russian interests seri-
ously. We did a poor job of seeing the world from their point of view, and
of managing the relationship for the long term’.52
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Eventually, Albright admits that ‘we wore the Russians down’.53 Not
only did NATO expand, but the NATO-Russia Charter shut Russia out of
a formal role in NATO’s decision-making process. Yeltsin had little choice
but to accept what the Americans decided.54 But Russian unhappiness
with the way they were treated was reflected in their negotiation strategy
which was characterised as similar to a ‘dental root canal’. Albright writes
that ‘Moscow wanted the ordeal [NATO enlargement] to be so painful
that we would forget about further rounds’.55
Despite tensions in the relationship, the U.S. remained fully invested in
Boris Yeltsin and supported him through his extra-constitutional actions
in September–October 1993 when he disbanded Parliament; the brutal
conduct Chechen war of 1994–1996 during which rape, genocide, and
murder were common; flagrant violations of a free and fair presidential
election in 1996; and Russia’s 1998 financial meltdown that effectively
ended Russia’s experiment with de-statisation. The broader point is that
the bilateral relationship was generally positive during the 1990s and
cooperation, even if strained at times, replaced military confrontation.
6 U.S. Agricultural Exports in the 1990s
Building on a record value of U.S. grain exports to the USSR in 1989
($3.59 billion USD), in 1990 the United States and the Soviet Union
signed a new grain agreement. This agreement raised the Soviet Union’s
minimum annual purchase to 10 mmt and included barley and sorghum
for the first time. The Soviets were given the right to buy up to 14 mmt
without advance notification, up from 12 mmt. The Soviets also agreed to
buy a minimum of 4 mmt of wheat and feed grain.56 As a result, 1990–
1991 witnessed continued high levels of U.S. agricultural exports, with
more than $4.5 billion USD in agricultural exports to the USSR despite
its limited hard currency reserves.
With the fall of communism and the emergence of a democratic and
market-oriented government in Moscow, it could be expected that the
improving bilateral political relationship would build upon the trade
momentum of 1988–1991, especially considering the economic difficul-
ties that Russia’s transition to a market economy were experiencing. It
would be reasonable to expect that warmer political relations would be
accompanied by much higher agricultural trade. In fact, however, higher
valuations of agricultural exports did not occur, instead of dropping from
$2.45 billion USD in 1991 to $1.12 billion USD in 1992 and never
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exceeding $1.5 billion USD for the rest of the decade. The volume of
the main U.S. export in the past, grain, began to decline precipitously.
The improving political relationship after 1992 contrasts with trends in
agricultural trade which were lower than 1990–1991 and lower than the
1980–1984 period. Thus, the relationship between politics and agricul-
tural trade was divergent, but not as much as during the 1980–1984
period. Annual U.S. agricultural exports during the 1990s are shown in
Table 3.
The table demonstrates three occurrences about U.S. food exports to
Russia: (1) the value of U.S. agricultural exports declined after 1992; (2)
the value of grain exports comprised a smaller percentage of total agri-
cultural exports as the decade progressed; and (3) the quantity of grain
exports declined after 1992.
Mild divergence is further witnessed by lower annual valuations of U.S.
agricultural exports than in the last decade of the Soviet period. During
1992–1999, the value of U.S. agricultural exports totaled $9.01 billion
USD, or an annual average of $1.1 billion USD for the eight-year period.
In comparison, during the 1980–1984 period, U.S. agricultural exports
Table 3 U.S. Agricultural Exports to USSR/Russia in 1990s (dollar values are
USD)
Total value of U.S.
agricultural exports to
USSR/Russia
Value of grain exports to
USSR/Russia
Quantity of grain export
to USSR/Russia
1990 $2.26 billion $1.68 billion 13.2 mmt
1991 $2.45 billion $1.78 billion 16.5 mmt
1992 $1.12 billion $738 million 5.9 mmt
1993 $1.22 billion $682 million 6.0 mmt
1994 $1.00 billion $45 million 303.9 tt
1995 $1.45 billion $80 million 444.0 tt
1996 $1.32 billion $56 million 223.2 tt
1997 $1.20 billion $27 million 114.3 tt
1998 $988.5 million $9 million 40.6 tt
1999 $728.0 million $257 million 1.90 mmt
Notes (a) Data for agricultural exports in 1990–1991 are for USSR, thereafter they are for Russia
(b) mmt = million metric tonnes (c) tt = thousand metric tonnes. Sources Kathryn A. Zeimetz,
USSR Agricultural Trade, Statistical Bulletin 808 (Washington, DC: United States Department of
Agriculture, Economic Research Service, 1991), 37, 39; and Foreign Agricultural Service database at
https://apps.fas.usda.gov/GATS/default.aspx
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totaled $9.02 billion USD, or an annual average of $1.8 billion USD
during the five-year period. Further, U.S. grain exports declined from
16.5 mmt in 1991 to about 6 mmt in 1992 and 1993, and thereafter
did not come close to 500 thousand tonnes for the rest of the decade.
Another perspective on the decline is to note that during 1982–1989,
a period generally considered to be one of poor agricultural performance
and high grain imports, the average annual domestic grain production was
98.8 mmt per year. During 1992–1999, Russia’s annual average domestic
grain harvests declined to 76.3 mmt a year.57 And yet, Russian grain
imports declined after 1992.
The decline in U.S. grain exports to Russia was due to economic
changes in demand within Russia. Due to high food inflation and contrac-
tion in real per capita income, Russian consumer demand for meat
plummeted after 1992 as consumers turned to cheaper starches, carbohy-
drates, and grains which domestic production could fulfill.58 Consumers
responded to price changes for food, especially for high-cost livestock
products. Farms in turn responded to falling consumer demand and rising
prices for fuel, feed, and other inputs by slashing livestock herds. The
result was a decline in animal husbandry that rivaled the mass slaughter
of the early 1930s when peasants resisted collectivisation. In 1996, for
example, the number of cattle was 70 percent and the number of pigs was
59 percent of the 1990 level. The number of cattle and pigs continued
to decline, falling to 49 percent and 48 percent of the 1990 level by
2000, respectively.59 As demand for meat plummeted and the number
of farm animals decreased, the need (demand) for imported feed grain
evaporated.
As Russian consumers shifted their demand to cheaper proteins, Russia
quickly became the largest importer of poultry meat in the world. Russia’s
poultry imports rose from about 46 thousand tonnes in 1992 to 500
thousand tonnes in 1994, and then to 1.14 million tonnes in 1997.
In 1997, 70 percent of Russia’s poultry imports came from the United
States.60 U.S. poultry exporters earned in excess of $1 billion USD annu-
ally from trade with Russia from about mid-decade onward. Chicken meat
replaced grain as the main U.S. agricultural export to Russia.
Russia’s dependence on foreign meat and poultry impacted Russia’s
food import policy.61 Protectionist policies began to emerge in mid-
decade to protect the domestic food market from imports. Advocates
of more protectionism cited Russia’s comparative disadvantage in land
productivity and harsher climatic conditions that made it difficult to
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compete with lower international prices.62 To assist domestic producers
to retain market share, food import tariffs were increased in mid-1995.
The tariff on meat (non-poultry) increased from 8 to 15 percent; on
poultry and sugar from 20 to 25 percent; and on butter from 15 to
20 percent.63 In 1996, the Russian government raised import tariffs on
alcohol, chicken, and other food products that resulted in an average
weighted tariff of 14 percent.64 Further, in July 1996 import quotas were
introduced for the first time on meat, milk, and poultry products, but
withdrawn in December 1996 under U.S. pressure.
In addition, in 1996 the first of several disputes over U.S. chicken
exports arose. In February 1996, a controversy arose when the Russian
Ministry of Agriculture announced that its veterinary service would deny
import certification to many U.S. poultry processing plants, in effect
placing a temporary ban of American poultry exports. Critics in the
U.S. argued that the sanitary issue was Russia’s pretext for what was
really a political demonstration of power by Russian conservatives whose
influence was rising following the departure of Foreign Minister Andrei
Kozyrev and First Vice Premier Yegor Gaidar from Yeltsin’s cabinet. The
controversy was settled in March 1996 following negotiations that led
to Russia accepting the U.S. poultry inspection system. The issuance of
import licenses was resumed and chicken imports that had been shipped
when the dispute arose were admitted into the country by Russian
customs. The ‘chicken war’ between the U.S. and Russia would extend
into the next decade.65
America’s agricultural exports to Russia encompassed not only
commercial sales. U.S. food aid was first extended to the Soviet Union
in 1990–1991 when the Bush administration was informed of the possi-
bility of hunger and even starvation. Those forecasts turned out to be
exaggerated but nonetheless food aid was continued during the Clinton
administration. By 1993–1994 it became clear that U.S. food aid to
Russia was suffering from waste, loss, and corruption. The Russian state
grain monopoly colluded with a small group of banks and grain auction
houses to buy up U.S. supplies of grain at artificially low prices. These
supplies undercut existing private farmers and kept domestic grain prices
so low that they were a formidable barrier to entry for prospective
growers. According to estimates by the United States Department of
Agriculture, no more than 5 percent of aid reached intended recipients.66
In 1994, the U.S. reoriented its distribution away from state-owned grain
distributors to private farmers. During fiscal years 1994–1998, the U.S.
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government underwrote the delivery of millions of tonnes of wheat, corn,
and soybeans, as well as tens of thousands of tonnes of rice, barley, and
rye to Russia.67
As one aid package came to an end, another began in late 1998.
Following a very poor harvest in 1998, in November of that year the
United States set up a $1 billion USD food aid package to avoid
mass hunger in the Far East and other remote regions of Russia. The
aid package consisted of 1.5 mmt of wheat worth $600 million USD
as humanitarian assistance, and a $400 million USD line of credit to
purchase additional food at 2 percent interest repayable over twenty years
after a five-year grace period. The U.S. also agreed to pay shipping costs,
which totaled more than $300 million USD. Food aid began to arrive
in Russia in March 1999, although the bulk of aid was not shipped until
late summer 1999, and even then few small towns in remote areas where
aid was needed actually received food. A large share of the aid remained
in Moscow and St. Petersburg.68 In January 1999, the U.S. donated
additional seed for Russia’s spring sowing.69
7 Foreign Policy Context Since 2000
At the turn of the century, both countries were disappointed in the
other. The U.S. was losing hope that Russia would democratise; U.S.
leaders were frustrated with the level of corruption in the Russian govern-
ment; and they were concerned about stalled economic reform following
Russia’s financial collapse of August 1998. The incoming Bush admin-
istration downplayed the geostrategic importance of Russia and instead
articulated other priorities.70 President Clinton’s engagement with Russia
in the 1990s gave way to ‘Russia fatigue’. The Kremlin was disillusioned
as well. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld recounts how President
Vladimir Putin argued that Russia was being ‘pushed out’ of collec-
tive defense with the West for which Putin blamed the West.71 Russian
political leaders continued to be offended at the lack of respect by the
Americans, an issue that Rumsfeld says he explicitly tried to address.72
Lingering bitterness over NATO expansion led to early tension between
the two countries. The tension escalated when FBI agent Philip Hanssen
was arrested and charged with spying for Moscow for 15 years. The
Bush administration ordered the expulsion of 50 Russian diplomats from
the U.S. in March 2001.73 Russia retaliated and expelled U.S. diplo-
mats, behaviour reminiscent of the Cold War. Unlike the Soviet period,
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however, the rivalry between the two countries flowed from big power
competition and increasing nationalism in Russia rather than incompatible
political ideologies.
The bilateral drift came to an abrupt halt with the 9/11 attacks. Not
only was Putin among the first world leaders to offer condolences to Pres-
ident George W. Bush, the aftermath brought concrete cooperation in
counterterrorism as the U.S. began military action against the Taliban in
Afghanistan. There was also cooperation in nuclear proliferation as Russia
joined the West in trying to limit Iran’s nuclear capabilities. The reemer-
gence of common interests was able to withstand the announcement of
another round of NATO expansion in 2002 that brought in the Baltic
states and the announcement of a ‘big bang’ expansion of the European
Union that witnessed almost all former Soviet satellite nations in Eastern
Europe join the Western sphere of influence in 2004. Further, after noti-
fying the Russians of intent, in June 2002 the United States withdrew
from the ABM Treaty that had existed since 1972, a move denounced by
Putin. The U.S. also continued with the development of a modest missile
defense system in Europe, which, according to Rumsfeld, Putin said he
understood did not threaten Russia’s security interests.74
By 2003, however, disagreements outweighed cooperation. Putin
made clear his opposition to the U.S. invasion of Iraq in March 2003.
Later in 2003, the Russian government took over oil giant Yukos in 2003
and subsequently imprisoned its CEO, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, in 2004.75
Stent argues that the Yukos affair had a minimal impact on the political
relationship.76 However, in the financial sphere, foreign direct investment
(FDI) into Russia collapsed in the fourth quarter of 2003 and declined
from a net of + $1.79 billion USD in 2003 to net -$1.62 billion USD
in 2004, which reflected concerns over the sanctity of private property in
Putin’s Russia.77
Even as Western FDI dried up, the bilateral trade relationship between
the United States and Russia began to take off. Total U.S. exports in
goods to Russia increased from $2.4 billion USD in 2003 and eventually
reached a high of $11.1 billion USD in 2013. Even more impressive was
the growth in Russia’s exports of goods to the U.S., which increased from
$8.6 billion USD in 2003 to a high of $34.6 billion USD in 2011. Most
of Russia’s exports to the U.S. were energy-related and in general, there
were several cooperative energy projects up to 2008.78 The U.S. trade
balance in goods since 2000 is presented in Table 4, showing that the
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Table 4 U.S. Trade Balance with Russia (dollar values are USD)
Total value of U.S.
exports to Russia





$2.85 billion $3.63 billion $−780 million
2000 $2.09 billion $7.65 billion $−5.56 billion
2001 $2.71 billion $6.26 billion $−3.54 billion
2002 $2.39 billion $6.87 billion $−4.47 billion
2003 $2.44 billion $8.61 billion $−6.17 billion
2004 $2.96 billion $11.89 billion $−8.93 billion
2005 $3.96 billion $15.30 billion $−11.34 billion
2006 $4.70 billion $19.82 billion $−15.12 billion
2007 $7.28 billion $19.31 billion $−12.03 billion
2008 $9.33billion $26.78 billion $−17.44 billion
2009 $5.33 billion $18.19 billion $−12.86 billion
2010 $5.99 billion $25.69 billion $−19.69 billion
2011 $8.31 billion $34.61 billion $−26.30 billion
2012 $10.69 billion $29.36 billion $−18.66 billion
2013 $11.14 billion $27.08 billion $−15.94 billion
2014 $10.75 billion $23.65 billion $−12.90 billion
2015 $7.98 billion $16.37 billion $−9.28 billion
2016 $5.83 billion $14.54 billion $−8.71 billion
2017 $7.00 billion $17.05 billion $−10.05 billion
2018 $6.65 billion $20.87 billion $−14.21 billion
2019 $5.78 billion $22.28 billion $−16.49 billion
Sources https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c4621.html; and Author’s calculations
U.S. began to run a chronic trade deficit with Russia after having trade
surpluses through 1994.
Even as bilateral trade ramped up, the political relationship drifted.
Following the tragic loss of life in the 2004 Beslan school murders, Putin
seemed to implicate the United States for the event in a speech to the
Russian people.79 In the wake of Beslan, Putin imposed stricter control
over domestic politics by changing the election system for the State Duma
in a way that benefited the pro-Kremlin party United Russia; he ended
gubernatorial elections; banned electoral blocs in the Duma; revised the
way members of the Federation Council were selected; and replaced
elected city mayors with appointed city managers in many regions. The
cumulative political effect was a significant backsliding from democracy
and the rise of human rights abuses that caused concern in Washington.80
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The next few years deepened the political mistrust between the two
countries. In 2006, Russia felt mislead in its quest to join the World Trade
Organisation (WTO), accusing the United States of double standards that
held up Russia’s membership.81 In a February 2007 speech at a secu-
rity conference in Munich, Putin recited a long list of complaints about
the American-dominated unipolar world. He excoriated the United States
for provoking a new nuclear arms race, undermining international insti-
tutions, destabilising the Middle East by invading Iraq, and increasing
tensions through the expansion of NATO, which he said, can only be
interpreted as directed at Russia.82 Secretary of Defence Robert Gates,
who was in attendance at the Munich security conference, was stunned
by Putin’s ‘harshness’ but decided to respond in a humourous manner,
observing that ‘by the nods and smiles throughout the hall, I knew I had
taken the right tack’.83
In 2008, during Russia’s abbreviated war with Georgia, Foreign
Minister Sergei Lavrov tried to enlist the support of the United States to
remove Georgian President Saaskashvili whom the Russians considered an
annoyance. Washington, of course, refused. In the aftermath of the war,
Russia withdrew from the NATO-Russia Council, followed by NATO’s
declaration of support for Georgia and its territorial integrity and inde-
pendence. NATO called on Russia to withdraw its troops. Immediately
after the war ended, the U.S. signed a missile defence pact with Poland,
the timing of which former Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice claims
was coincidental but even if that claim is true, the Russians perceived it
as ratcheting up tensions in Europe.84 Robert Gates, who was Secretary
of Defence during the Georgian war, gives the impression that the missile
defence pact with Poland was a response to Russian aggression in Georgia.
Further, he indicated that Russian behaviour ‘called into question the
entire premise of our dialogue’. He continued that, ‘all of the nations of
Europe are looking at Russia through a different set of lenses’.85 In the
aftermath of the Georgian war, the U.S. tabled Russia’s application to the
WTO to show its opposition to Russia’s unilateral redefinition of borders
of Georgia.86 Russia’s entry into the WTO would not be reconsidered
until the Obama administration, which led to eventual membership in
2012.
The 2009 ‘reset’ in bilateral relations and subsequent 2010 START
arms control agreement were exceptions to the downward trend in rela-
tions. During the ‘reset’, the two countries experienced some cooperative
successes—sanctions against Iran and North Korea, opening a northern
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supply route to Afghanistan, getting a UN resolution on a no-fly zone
in Libya passed, and Russia’s membership in the World Trade Organi-
zation. Yet, once Putin retook the presidency in 2012, relations cooled.
Putin declined President Obama’s invitation to the G8 meeting at Camp
David in May 2012; Russia adopted an uncooperative stance with regard
to Syria by backing the Assad regime; and Putin cracked down on internal
dissent and protest (for which he blamed former Secretary of State Hillary
Clinton for instigating). Clinton writes that ‘for those who expected the
reset to open a new era of goodwill between Russia and the United States,
it proved to be a bitter disappointment’.87 Perhaps the failure of the reset
was inevitable. Stent argues that ‘U.S.-Russian relations were indeed over-
burdened by a legacy of disagreements and mutual mistrust from both
the Cold War and post-Cold-War periods’.88 From Russia’s perspective,
contested issues such as U.S. missile defence, U.S. meddling in Russia’s
domestic affairs, European security, and U.S. behaviour in the Middle
East continued to affect relations negatively. In December 2012, the so-
called ‘Magnitsky Act’ passed in the U.S. Senate 92–4, denying visas and
freezing the assets of Russian nationals who U.S. officials believed were
complicit in the murder of Sergei Magnitsky, the former accountant from
Hermitage Capital who died in a Russian prison in 2009 after weeks
of torture and abuse.89 Putin was furious over the Magnitsky Act and
tried to prevent its passage, but when he could not, Russia retaliated by
adopting the Dima Yakovlev Law two weeks later, which permanently
banned the adoption of Russian children by U.S. parents.
Heightened tensions surrounding the Ukraine crisis of late 2013-early
2014 were symptoms rather than causes for a relationship that would fall
to new lows after summer 2014 and continued into 2020. The 2014
political crises in Ukraine—the Yanukovych presidency, the annexation of
Crimea, and independence movements in Ukraine’s eastern provinces—
poisoned the relationship and created a trap of acrimony that neither side
seems willing or able to end. In March 2014, following Russia’s annexa-
tion of Crimea, Putin threw down the gauntlet when he accused the West
of ‘primitive, blunt cynicism’. He alleged that the West has ‘lied to us
many times, made decisions behind our backs, [and] placed before us an
accomplished fact’, referring specifically to the expansion of NATO and
missile defence. He continued that ‘they are constantly trying to sweep
us into a corner because we have an independent position, because we
maintain it and because we call things like they are and do not engage in
hypocrisy. But there is a limit to everything’.90
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The breadth and depth of animosity led journalists and some academics
to speak of a ‘New Cold War’.91 To be sure, there were differences
with the original Cold War, for instance the lack of ideological compe-
tition, different Russian motivations, and certainly a change in Russia’s
capabilities.92 Nonetheless, heightened tensions after 2014 were unpar-
alleled in the post-Soviet period. Intensified rivalry, competition, and
‘hybrid warfare’ replaced cooperation. A representative but not exhaus-
tive summary includes the following. The United States feared a potential
Russian attack on the Baltics or even worse, a ‘frozen conflict’ in coun-
tries with a high percentage of ethnic Russians. Russia opposed a modest
increase in NATO troops in Poland and Lithuania while engaging in
actions that motivated that increase. The U.S. contested Russia’s military
support for Syrian President Bashar al-Assad starting in 2015, which came
without any advance notification to the U.S., and which former Secretary
of State John Kerry characterised as eviscerating U.S. leverage in Syria
and setting the stage for even more blood-letting.93 Despite opposing
Russian troops in Syria, the U.S. took no direct action against Russian
forces in Syria. The U.S. criticised Russia’s closer relations with Iran.94
Russian energy supplies to Europe became a contentious policy issue and
the U.S. pressed its European allies to diversify their sources in order
to lower dependence on Russia. In March 2018, the U.S. expelled 60
Russian diplomats over the allegation that the Russian government was
behind the nerve agent attack against former military intelligence officer
Sergei Skripal and his daughter in England. Putin retaliated by expelling
60 U.S. diplomats and closing the U.S. consulate in St. Petersburg. The
U.S. withdrew from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action in May
2018. In October 2018, the U.S. informed Russia of its intention to leave
the Intermediate Range Nuclear Force Treaty (INF) which had been in
effect since 1987. According to former National Security Advisor John
Bolton, the Russians used the announcement to play on Europeans’ fears
that the U.S. was abandoning them, a notion that Bolton dismisses.95
Following the U.S. withdrawal from the INF Treaty in August 2019,
Putin announced a new hypersonic weapon that could defeat missile
defence. Allegations of Russian meddling in the U.S. 2016 presidential
election coloured the relationship during the entirety of Trump’s presi-
dency. Thus, the political relationship since early 2014 was characterised
by nearly unending disagreement and mistrust.
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8 U.S. Agricultural Exports to Russia Since 2000
In the post-Soviet period, U.S. agricultural exports to Russia shifted
away from grain. As previously noted, Russia imported large quantities
of poultry meat from the U.S. in the 1990s. After 1999, poultry and
other meat imports continued to increase rapidly as the economy began
to grow again and consumers began to realise real gains in their stan-
dard of living and income. By 2002, Russia imported double the level of
meat compared to 2000, and meat imports as a percentage of total supply
increased from 12 percent in 2000 to 24 percent in 2002.96 The dollar
value of Russia’s food imports would continue to increase for another
decade, although not linearly due to the financial crisis of 2008–2009.
Against this context, the story of U.S. agricultural exports to Russia
since 2000 is one of decline compared to the 1990s, a brief and modest
increase during 2007–2012, and then renewed decline to the point
of irrelevance after 2014. U.S. agricultural exports declined for three
reasons: (1) the recovery in Russia’s agricultural sector, which was able
to meet more of domestic demand; (2) an expansion in Russia’s other
trading partners; and (3) a significant deterioration in the political rela-
tionship revolving around the crisis in Ukraine in 2014 that continues
to the present. U.S. agricultural exports to Russia during 2000–2019 are
presented in Table 5.
For analytical purposes, U.S. agricultural trade with Russia since 2000
may be separated into three periods. In the first period, 2000–2006, the
value of U.S. agricultural exports did not exceed $1 billion USD, despite
the fact that political tensions were between Washington and Kremlin
were generally low.97 For context, during this period the total value of
Russia’s agricultural imports increased from $7.3 billion USD in 2000 to
$21.5 billion USD in 2006, a rise that reflects higher consumer demand
within Russia. The European Union in particular became a major trading
partner. Russia was a main export market for agricultural products from
the EU. In 2013, the EU exported e10.9 billion of agricultural goods
to Russia, equal to more than 10 percent of its total agricultural exports.
By 2016, however, EU food exports to Russia declined to e5.4 billion
before rebounding to e7 billion in 2019, equal to about 3.9 percent of
non-EU food exports.98
In contrast, U.S. agricultural exports to Russia became progressively
less important and by 2006 accounted for less than 5 percent of the
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Table 5 U.S. Agricultural Exports to Russia After 2000 (dollar values are USD)












2000 $580 million $116 million 779.5 tt 68
2001 $917 million $65 million 133.9 tt 87
2002 $552 million $21 million 53.9 tt 88
2003 $579 million $11 million 13.4 tt 87
2004 $802 million $84 million 90.1 tt 83
2005 $972 million $72 million 25.2 tt 87
2006 $820 million $53 million 43.6 tt 87
2007 $1.32 billion $86 million 60.2 tt 88
2008 $1.83 billion $92 million 35.1 tt 90
2009 $1.42 billion $90 million 116.7 tt 88
2010 $1.13 billion $67 million 65.6 tt 86
2011 $1.24 billion $71 million 69.1 tt 79
2012 $1.65 billion $99 million 102.2 tt 71
2013 $1.20 billion $230 million 309.0 tt 60
2014 $900 million $246 million 362.0 tt 56
2015 $426 million $236 million 524.8 tt 23
2016 $250 million $95 million 164.7 tt 36
2017 $193 million $24 million 6.6 tt 47
2018 $233 million $17 million 5.1 tt 39
2019 $191 million $17 million 4.7 tt 23
Notes (a) Total value of U.S. agricultural exports includes foodstuffs, intermediate products, and
bulk goods. In this table, grain exports are defined as bulk goods. The value of U.S. exports
excludes agricultural-related products which are non-food products as defined by the USDA. See
Table 6 for full definitions. (b) Numbers have been rounded. (c) Data for agricultural exports in
1990–1991 are for USSR, thereafter they are for Russia. (d) tt = thousand metric tonnes. Sources
Kathryn A. Zeimetz, USSR Agricultural Trade, Statistical Bulletin 808 (Washington, DC: United
States Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, 1991), 37, 39; Foreign Agricultural
Service database at https://apps.fas.usda.gov/GATS/default.aspx; and Author’s calculations
value of Russia’s food imports. The relatively low level of U.S. agricul-
tural exports to Russia marked a departure from the 1990s when all but
two years surpassed $1 billion USD and those two years, 1998–1999,
were due to financial crisis and the devaluation of the ruble that made
imports more expensive. Thus, the value of U.S. agricultural exports to
Russia during 2000–2006 was lower than in the 1980s and 1990s and
comprised an insignificant percentage of Russia’s total food imports.
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Table 6 Distribution of U.S. Agricultural Exports to Russia 2014–2019 (dollar
values are USD)








2014 $900 million $151 million $502 million $245 million
2015 $4269 million $90 million $99 million $236 million
2016 $250 million $64 million $90 million $95 million
2017 $193 million $77 million $90 million $24 million
2018 $233 million $123 million $91 million $17 million
2019 $191 million $90 million $83 million $17 million
Notes (a) Numbers have been rounded. (b) Intermediate goods include: soybean oil, soybean meal,
vegetable oil, animal fat, live animals, hides and skins, hay, distiller grain, planting seeds, sugars and
sweeteners, and other intermediate goods. (c) Consumer oriented goods are essentially foodstuffs and
include: beef and beef products, pork and pork products, poultry and poultry products, eggs and egg
products, dairy products, fresh fruit, fresh vegetables, processed vegetables, fruit and vegetable juices,
tree nuts, chocolate and cocoa products, snack foods, breakfast cereals, condiments and sauces,
prepared foods, wine and beer, non-alcoholic beverages, dog and cat food, and other consumer-
oriented products. (d) Bulk goods are crop products and include: wheat, corn, coarse grains, rice,
soybeans, cotton, pulses, tobacco, and other bulk commodities. (e) Agricultural-related goods are
excluded from the total value of agricultural exports. They are defined as: distilled spirits, ethanol,
biodiesel, forest products, and fish products. All definitions are taken from United Stated Department
of Agriculture. Source Foreign Agricultural Service database at https://apps.fas.usda.gov/GATS/def
ault.aspx
During the 2000–2006 period, the value of U.S. grain exports
comprised a small percentage of the overall value of bilateral agricultural
trade. The volume of U.S. grain exports to Russia did not exceed 100
thousand tonnes during 2002–2006. That said, agricultural exports from
the U.S. during the 2000–2006 period were overwhelming ‘consumer-
oriented products’, a term used by the U.S. Department of Agriculture
that basically refers to foodstuffs. In 2000, foodstuffs comprised 68
percent of the dollar value of U.S. agricultural exports to Russia; there-
after and through 2006, the percentage did not drop below 83 percent
and most years was 87–88 percent. In short, the overwhelming majority
of U.S. agricultural exports to Russia consisted of food.
From the Russian side, the 2000–2006 period brought stabilisation
and then rebound in agricultural production. The period also served to lay
a legislative and policy foundation for future growth, guided by a strategic
plan that led to the creation of a state-owned agricultural bank through
which credits and subsidies could be channeled; financial debt relief for
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large farms; the creation of a mechanism for state intervention in the
grain market; the introduction of a new credit policy; and in 2005 the
development of a ‘national project’ that channeled unprecedented levels
of financial assistance, credit, and subsidies to agriculture during 2006–
2007.99 The strategy of ‘bringing the state back in’ paid off, as growth in
agricultural production on large farms averaged more than 4 percent per
annum during 2000–2006.100
During the second period, 2007–2013, the political relationship had
its ups and downs while U.S. agricultural exports to Russia increased
modestly from $832 million USD in 2006 to $1.32 billion USD in
2007. Exports stayed above the $1 billion USD threshold through 2013,
though never exceeding $1.65 billion USD. The political relationship was
framed by Putin’s February 2007 speech in Munich; the 2008 Geor-
gian war; a largely inconsequential ‘reset’ in 2009; the START arms
control agreement in 2010; and U.S. support for Russia’s entry into the
WTO in 2011 with membership finalised in 2012. Because the political
relationship had aspects of cooperation and competition during 2007–
2013, I characterise the relationship between politics and agricultural
trade as neither convergent nor divergent. During the 2007–2013 period,
foodstuffs remained the dominant U.S. agricultural export to Russia,
but their percentage declined over time. During 2007–2009, foodstuffs
accounted for 88–90 percent of U.S. agricultural exports to Russia, but
this percentage declined to 71 percent in 2012 and to 60 percent in 2013
even as the level of agricultural imports from the U.S. remained above $1
billion USD.
The third period, 2014-present, has witnessed a significant decrease
in U.S. agricultural exports to Russia brought about by Russia’s counter-
sanctions that ban the importation of most agricultural products from the
United States and other Western nations. The decline in the value of U.S.
agricultural exports is convergent with the deterioration in political rela-
tions. Prior to Russia’s food embargo in August 2014, U.S. agricultural
exports were on track to surpass the $1 billion USD threshold, but the
food embargo brought immediate curtailment. After 2014, U.S. agricul-
tural exports continued to decline, eventually falling to just $191 million
USD in 2019. Grain had historically accounted for a large percentage of
U.S. exports to Russia, although we saw that situation began to change
in the 1990s and continued into the 2000s. Starting in 2003, U.S. wheat
exports to Russia fell to zero and remained at zero through 2018 but
rose to 433 thousand tonnes in 2019, still a small quantity. Soy was the
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dominant grain export to Russia during 2014–2016, but soy exports to
Russia fell to zero in 2017–2019.
Russia’s food embargo brought about a significant redistribution in
U.S. agricultural exports away from foodstuffs and towards intermediate
goods that are used in processing. The transition is shown in Table 6.
The table depicts the effects of Russia’s countersanctions which led to
an 80 percent decline in the value of agricultural imports from the United
States. Within the overall decline in the value of agricultural exports, the
table also shows that from 2014 through 2019 exports of foodstuffs fell
from 55 percent of U.S. agricultural exports to Russia in 2014 to 43
percent in 2019; bulk goods, or crop products, also declined, from 27
percent in 2014 to 9 percent in 2019; while intermediate goods increased
from 17 percent in 2014 to 47 percent in 2019. Assorted agricultural-
related goods (products that are not directly consumable) are excluded
from the table because this category generally is not very significant
in volume or value. For example, agricultural-related goods fell from 6
percent of the dollar value of U.S. exports to Russia in 2014 to 2.5
percent in 2019.
9 Outlook
This chapter documented how U.S. agricultural exports to Russia have
changed from being a significant factor in the USSR’s food security to
being essentially irrelevant to food security in the contemporary period.
This contemporary irrelevance is measured by a low dollar valuation of
U.S. agricultural exports to Russia and the transition away from foodstuffs
as the dominant agricultural export.
The historical trading patterns during the Cold War demonstrate
that agricultural trade is not dependent on good political relations.
However, the difference between now and then is that now Russia has
a strong agricultural sector that provides food self-sufficiency in many
basic commodities, including grain. For this reason, the outlook for U.S.-
Russian agricultural trade appears reasonably clear. Russia’s 2014 food
embargo, which continues through the end of 2022, has rendered U.S.
agricultural exports insignificant to Russia. Given the commitment by the
Putin regime to food security, food self-sufficiency, and the expansion
of its own export capacity, it is difficult to foresee how U.S. exporters
can re-gain any significant market share in Russia’s food market in the
near to medium term, and that is significant because Russia is the largest
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consumer market in Europe. Putin himself noted that once markets are
lost, they are hard to recapture. Thus, the contemporary story of U.S.-
Russia agricultural trade represents the loss of the ‘food weapon’ as
leverage by the exporter and the rise of the power of the importer.
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